AUGUST 1, 1988 • $2.25

Dukakis The Poet—*Hendrik Hertzberg*

BUSH'S BUDGET BALONEY • REAGAN DEMOCRATS • ROGER RABBIT FOR PREZ

THE RISE
D FALL OF
VENTIONS
NICHOLAS
VON HOFFMAN

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Democratic Convention Special



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THEY ALL PINNED THEIR HOPES ON PEACE.

They were all fighters.

The conservatives fought with the liberals. The Democrats fought with the Republicans. The Bull Moosers fought with everybody.

They fought for different policies. But for the same principles. For freedom. And the freedom to live in peace.

Americans are still fighting for those principles today.

And working for them too.

That's why every day more than 100,000 Americans work at General Dynamics to supply America's fighting men and women with the best weapon systems in the world.

They are working for peace. And for peace of mind.

GENERAL DYNAMICS

A Strong Company For A Strong Country

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECEIVED
JUL 20 1988
ANDREWS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
Big Sandy, Texas

THE NEW REPUBLIC

FOUNDED 1914 — *A Weekly Journal of Opinion* — ISSUE 3,837

WASHINGTON, D.C. — AUGUST 1, 1988

Editor-in-Chief and Chairman
MARTIN PERETZ

Editor
MICHAEL KINSLEY
Literary Editor
LEON WIESELTIER
Managing Editor
DOROTHY WICKENDEN
Senior Editors
FRED BARNES, ANN HULBERT,
MORTON M. KONDRACKE, CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER,
ROBERT WRIGHT
Associate Editor
ANDREW SULLIVAN
New Republic Books Editor
(Basic Books)
BILL NEWLIN
1988 Politics
HENDRIK HERTZBERG
Economics
ROBERT KUTTNER
Films
STANLEY KAUFFMANN
Theater
ROBERT BRUSTEIN
Music
EDWARD ROTHSTEIN
Poetry
RICHARD HOWARD
Art
MARK STEVENS
Architecture
HERBERT MUSCHAMP
Contributing Editors
ROBERT COLES, HENRY FAIRLIE,
JAMES K. GLASSMAN, VINT LAWRENCE,
LOUIS MENAND, ROBERT B. REICH,
MAGGIE SCARF, RONALD STEEL,
RICHARD L. STROUT, E. V. THAW,
ANNE TYLER, NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN,
MICHAEL WALZER, C. VANN WOODWARD
Editorial-Corporate Coordinator
LAURA E. OBOLENSKY
Assistant to the Editors
JUNE HALEY
Production Manager
BRUCE STEINKE
Assistant Editor
LEONA HIRAOKA ROTH
Production Associate
ELDON S. SARTE
Literary Assistant
SARA MOSLE
Reporter-Researchers
RICHARD BLOW, SARAH BURGESS, NOAM COHEN,
TOWNSEND DAVIS, WENDY KOHN,
DAVID KURAPKA, ARI POSNER

President and Publisher
JEFFREY L. DEARTH
Associate Publisher
JOAN M. STAPLETON
Circulation Director
TOM HICKS
Controller
JEAN GANDY
Advertising Manager
JENNIFER BARRETT
Circulation Manager
PATTY JONES
Accounting Manager
CHRISTINA R. OVERHOLSER
Circulation Assistant
KRISTIN CONRADI
Advertising Assistant
DARLENE BUSCAGLIO
Accounting Clerk
MARY ANNE THOMPSON
Back Issues and Reception
MAXINE OAKLEY
Corporate Marketing
GUY STODDARD
Leadership Network Advertising
ROBERT F. SENNOTT JR.

4 **TRB FROM WASHINGTON** ..... NOT SO WRETCHED REFUSE
The American double standard about Soviet Jews.

6 **CORRESPONDENCE** ..... Jackson's pathway, divorce and the underclass, &c.

7 **THE EDITORS** ..... FUNDING THE DEMOCRATIC VISION
In 1988 the Democrats have won the argument for a more active government. To win the election, they need to show how they'll pay for it.
THE DUKE AND THE BARON
The first mistake of the Dukakis administration.
NOTEBOOK

8 **CHARLES PAUL FREUND** ..... THE ZEITGEIST CHECKLIST

14 **SUSAN IRVING** ..... BUSHLIT
The Republican candidate's phony fiscal plan.

16 **NICHOLAS LEMANN** ..... ESCAPE ARTIST
Frank Carlucci, Washington's premier survivor.

18 **FRED BARNES** ..... CAMPAIGN '88: BENTSEN AND HEDGES
How Dukakis is going after the Reagan Democrats.

22 **MORTON M. KONDRACKE** ..... THE EPIC ELECTION
Unlike ours, Israel's election really *is* about the future.

24 **NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN** ..... CONVENTIONAL HISTORY
Political conventions were invented for a reason. They survive only because of inertia and federal subsidy.

28 **HENDRIK HERTZBERG** ..... POETRY AND OTHER SURPRISES
The secret life of Michael Dukakis, as discovered by our crack reporter in a half-hour interview on an airplane.

34 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ..... ON FILMS: LOVE AND OTHER DIVERSIONS
Who Framed Roger Rabbit is a flop; *Bull Durham* is a pop up.

37 **MAUREEN DOWD** ..... "EIGHTY-EIGHTSOMETHING"
HBO's "Tanner '88," politics's answer to *Roger Rabbit*: a candidate caught between reality and fantasy.

41 **DAVID HERBERT DONALD** ..... THE BLACK SIDE OF THE STORY
Reconstruction by Eric Foner

44 **ALAN TONELSON** ..... THE PEACOCK THROWN
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations by James A. Bill

48 **A. R. AMMONS** ..... POEM *Boon*

49 **SAMUEL H. BEER** ..... MADE IN AMERICA
Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America by Edmund S. Morgan

52 **SAMUEL HYNES** ..... BOYS IN BERLIN
The Temple by Stephen Spender

54 **PETER LUBIN** ..... A LITERARY THAW
Russian émigré literature after *glasnost*.

58 **WASHINGTON DIARIST** ..... BOOMER ROCK

COVER by Peter de Sève for THE NEW REPUBLIC. Articles on pages 7, 18, 24, and 28.

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Vol. 199, Number 5, Issue 3,837, August 1, 1988. (Printed in the U.S. on July 13, 1988.) Published weekly (except for combined issues dated Jan. 4 & 11, July 18 & 25, Aug. 8 & 15, and Sept. 12 & 19, 1988) at 1220 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Telephone (202) 331-7494. Leadership Network advertising (212) 684-5500. Yearly subscriptions, $56; foreign, $81; Canada, $70. Back issues, $2.50 (includes postage & handling). ©1988 by The New Republic, Inc. (ISSN 0028-6583). Second-class postage paid at Washington, DC, and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Readers' Guide, Media Review Digest. Available on microfilm from University Microfilms Intnl., 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 and Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, OH 44691. Member, Audit Bureau of Circulations. Unsolicited manuscripts can be returned only if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. **Subscribers:** Please send all remittances, changes of address, and subscription inquiries to **Subscription Service Dept., The New Republic, P.O. Box 56515, Boulder, CO 80322.** For subscription problems call **800-525-0643.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB®

FROM WASHINGTON

Not So Wretched Refuse

In 1971, near the beginning of the mass exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union, about 8,000 arrived in Vienna with Israeli visas and 96 percent of them actually proceeded to Israel. Last year again, after some ups and some downs and some back ups, about 8,000 Jews were allowed to leave the Soviet Union. But word had gotten out that once you made it to Vienna, there was another option. Three-quarters of them chose to come to the United States.

In a world with an estimated 11 million refugees, there is a battle going on for possession of these few thousand bodies. Israel, hungry for Jews, feels these lost recruits are cheating when they obtain exit permits by proclaiming their love of Zion and then forsake the challenge of Jewish nation-building for the easy life in America. The United States government, and most American Jews, feel these people shouldn't be forced to go to Israel just because that is the technicality that allowed them to escape the Soviet Union. Giving them free choice in the matter, writes *New York Times* columnist A. M. Rosenthal, is "a fulfillment of American principle."

Earlier this year Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir called on the United States to refuse refugee status to Soviet Jews who arrive in the west with Israeli visas. When that idea got a stony response, the Israelis took direct action. Following a Cabinet vote in June, they are arranging with the Soviets for Jews with Israeli visas to exit the country via Bucharest, Romania, rather than Vienna. In Bucharest, behind the Iron Curtain, there will be no opportunity to change travel plans. The only option will be: Go Directly to Israel, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect American Visa.

In response, the State Department is trying to arrange for Soviet Jews who wish to come to the United States to get American visas right in Moscow, skipping the whole Vienna charade. If that doesn't work, we may change the rules so that Soviet Jews would retain their status as refugees from Communist oppression—and thus their right to resettle in the United States—despite a "temporary" stay in Israel. Even the American Jewish groups that oppose this last dodge as an insult to Israel favor lobbying the Russians for direct flights to America for Soviet Jews who wish to come here.

Freedom of choice about where to live surely is a fundamental American principle. Unfortunately, it's a principle that is dishonored more often than not in our refugee and immigration policy. In some ways the obsession with Soviet Jews—especially the obsession with making sure they can come to the United States—mocks our principles more than it honors them. While Israel's rather brutal effort to recruit Jews against their will deserves no special sympathy, the fact that there *is* a free and democratic country eager to take these people in ought to be an important consideration when we are turning so many others away.

Contrast the situation of Soviet Jews with that of Soviet Armenians. They also are being given exit permits in large numbers. Ten thousand have come to the United States since last fall. But our embassy in Moscow has suddenly stopped issuing refugee visas, ostensibly because its budget is exhausted. Dozens of Armenians are now stranded in Moscow, after quitting their jobs and shutting off their previous lives by the very act of applying to leave. This bureaucratic nightmare doesn't affect Jews, because they escape the Soviet Union with visas from Israel then get their American refugee status in Vienna.

The State Department believes that most of these Armenians are not entitled to enter the United States as refugees anyway. The law says that to qualify as a refugee, you must be motivated by "a well-founded fear of persecution" in your native country. Otherwise, you must apply for immigration through normal channels, a lengthy and usually futile procedure. State believes these Armenians really want to come here for the same reason any sane person would rather live in the United States than in the Soviet Union: a better life. Unfortunately, despite what it says on the Statue of Liberty, that's not good enough anymore.

Although Soviet Jews face specific ethnic and religious oppression that Soviet Armenians do not, those who come to the United States are by and large not

continued on page 56

"Likely to transform the way we think about media and politics."
—SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

"THE ELECTRONIC COMMONWEALTH raises the single most important problem posed by the electronic age: how can we stop subdividing ourselves into ever narrower groups and create instead a politics where citizens take seriously their rights and obligations." *—E.J. DIONNE, Chief National Political Correspondent, New York Times*

"A clear-eyed vision of the future."
—EDWARD FOUHY, former producer, The CBS Evening News

THE ELECTRONIC COMMONWEALTH
The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics
JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON, F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON, GARY R. ORREN



At bookstores, or direct from the publisher. Toll free (800) 638-3030. Major credit cards accepted.
BASIC BOOKS **BASIC BOOKS, INC.**
10 East 53rd Street, New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nuclear energy, not foreign oil, is the best way to prevent electricity shortages

Electricity is so vital to our economy and our way of life that a shortage of electricity is unthinkable. Yet some parts of the country are already experiencing brownouts during peak periods of demand. The question is not "Will we run out?" The question is "What price will we have to pay?"

Our electricity demand will outgrow our present supply. It is only a matter of time. Federal planners believe that our current generating capacity may not be enough to supply our peak electrical demand in the 1990s.

America's electricity use has steadily increased for the last 50 years, and has grown over 45% since the 1973 Arab oil embargo. This growing electricity demand is already forcing us to turn to oil.

Imported oil: a dangerous fix

The longer we wait to build new coal and nuclear plants, the more we will have to depend on oil. Using more oil plants would increase our foreign oil imports, worsen our trade deficit, and make America even more dangerously dependent on foreign countries for crucial energy.

More nuclear plants needed

Nuclear energy is already America's second largest source of electricity after coal. By reducing the use of foreign oil to make electricity, nuclear plants have saved America $105 billion in foreign oil payments since 1973. Nuclear plants have also helped cut consumer electric bills by over $60 billion.

Nuclear energy reduces America's dependence on foreign oil, not only at electric power plants, but wherever electricity replaces oil. It supplies a large part of the electricity that our economy needs to prosper.

If you'd like more information on making America more energy independent, write to the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, P.O. Box 66103, Dept. SH21, Washington, D.C. 20035.

Information about energy America can count on

U.S. COUNCIL FOR ENERGY AWARENESS



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

BLACK SIDESTREETS

To the editors:

Stanley Crouch, in his article on the Jackson candidacy ("Beyond Good and Evil," June 20), takes members of the white press to task for allowing "the popularity of everyone from Bill Cosby to Michael Jackson and Michael Jordan" to go right by them. Crouch should commend them for maintaining a wary eye toward the actual nature of "the racial sensibility of the country." Instead, he committed the same error that many political pundits and social critics continue to make. To wit: the acceptance by mainstream (i.e., predominantly white) America of black entertainment and sports figures as proof of a change in society as a whole.

Mainstream America tends to place these blacks in a certain "realm of acceptability" that does not necessarily reflect its actual feelings, and this realm has certain acceptable levels within it that blacks often encounter resistance transcending. For example, we have come a long way from "Good Times" to "The Cosby Show" as depictions of black family life, but successful, predominantly black drama (as regular series) is rare. The success of Michael Jackson does not necessarily suggest that all is copacetic between the races now—anymore than the acceptance of Motown by white America 20 years ago meant that the Millennium was at hand. Michael Jordan has become fabulously wealthy playing basketball. Mainstream America can accept predominantly black teams and even accept their being paid outrageous salaries. But there is a limit. Much has been written recently on the lack of blacks in team management positions.

Crouch is correct that tremendous gains have been made by blacks in mayoral and congressional campaigns. But blacks are conspicuously not present in Senate seats and governor's mansions, which is significant in presidential politics since the majority of viable presidential candidates arise from the senatorial and gubernatorial pool. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that the first viable black presidential aspirant should approach Pennsylvania Avenue from the civil rights/protest sidestreet.

ROBERT A. GEORGE
Annapolis, Maryland

DIVORCING THE UNDERCLASS

To the editors:

Christopher Jencks perpetuates a number of harmful myths about women and divorce in "Deadly Neighborhoods" (June 13). He argues that the post-divorce experience of upper-middle-class women compares favorably with that of underclass women because: (1) they can find another husband if they want one, (2) if they don't remarry, their ex-husband can afford sizable child support payments even if he's maintaining another household, and (3) even if he stops making payments, the mother can get a job that pays enough to make ends meet. Jencks's comparison of the two extreme cases is rather misleading. For what is significant about the data on women and divorce is *not* the differing post-divorce experience of the two groups Jencks discusses, but rather the similarity.

First, although many divorced women do remarry, remarriage is much less common among older women. Less than 15 percent of women whose marriages end after age 40 remarry. Second, child support awards are scandalously small, and only about 20 percent of fathers are in full compliance with support orders. Third, it is unlikely that a woman who has been out of the labor force for 20 years raising the children can get a job that will provide her with "a reasonable life." Because of the extreme sex segregation of the work force, (about 70 percent of all full-time employed women are working in occupations in which ¾ of the employees are female), the average female worker (even if she has a college degree, and especially if she is just returning to work after a long absence) is likely to be employed in the "pink collar ghetto," where the pay is low (often minimum wage), there is little job security and often no fringe benefits.

It is clear that divorce is a devastating experience for most women, not only those who are members of the underclass. Indeed, much research has linked the feminization of poverty to the economic consequences of divorce for middle-class women. Some women, of course, can and do hedge their bets, like the educated elites with whom Jencks compares women of the underclass. But the bottom line is that for many women—black and white, middle class and underclass—poverty is just one man away.

HELENE SILVERBERG
Princeton, New Jersey

THE FINAL FRONTIER

To the editors:

TNR was right on target in calling for a national commitment to a manned space program ("The Case for Space," June 27) but overlooked one very important argument for this type of national commitment: it is a long-term investment in the United States' ability to compete. Year after year, the federal budget is long on consumption expenditures such as entitlements, and short on investment expenditure—education, infrastructure, R&D, etc. An ambitious manned space program is an R&D investment—a natural part of any federal program designed to ensure that this country is competitive in the 21st century. A presidential candidate who seizes on space exploration gets a bonus. He can wax eloquent on the spiritual rewards of exploring the heavens, and he can point to his space policy as a part of his national investment strategy.

IRA N. FORMAN
Washington, D.C.

To the editors:

"The Case for Space" could include the vital promise of global climate control. The unprecedented drought that threatens this year's crop in much of our Midwest quite likely derives from the greenhouse effect, which made the 1980s the warmest decade on record. Attempts to reverse this trend through conservation alone are doomed. Third World countries will not renounce the fossil fuel technology that allowed the industrialized countries to escape poverty. Western electorates will not stand for the massive unemployment and collapsing living standards that would follow a major Western cutback in fossil fuels. Quite possibly, the only predictable and speedy way to block catastrophic droughts will be to intercept and divert sunlight in outer space. The technology (material obstructions? plasma fields?) does not yet exist, but its development would be speeded by a vigorous presence in space. (Now is also the time to

continued on page 56

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC
AUGUST 1, 1988

FUNDING THE DEMOCRATIC VISION

Haven't we seen this movie before? A two-term Republican administration lets social problems fester, making the nation uneasy even amid affluence. Voters in growing numbers ask whether it isn't time for a little more enlightenment in the White House. As if on cue, along comes a compassionate, well-spoken, Harvard-educated Democrat from Massachusetts . . .

Cut. Whatever the parallels between 1988 and 1960, Democrats are better off not dwelling on them. More important are the differences. First, government activism doesn't carry the cachet it once did. In 1960 liberals could point proudly to the New Deal as evidence that a social conscience makes for sound policy. Now when they look to the past for an example of liberalism in action, they see the Great Society initiatives of the 1960s—which, rightly or wrongly, are viewed by many as excessive, if not counterproductive. The second difference between now and 1960 is that Dwight Eisenhower, unlike Ronald Reagan, had the decency to leave some money in the treasury when he headed home. The current budget deficit makes it hard to contemplate an ambitious domestic policy agenda.

Yet a frank appraisal of the state of the union makes it unconscionable not to. There's the welfare mess, the pathetic state of inner-city schools, the lack of adequate health care for many Americans, the relentless decline of the natural environment, the decline as well of the nation's physical public infrastructure (roads, bridges), and various family issues raised by the mass entrance of women into the work force. America today is one big reminder of what the Democratic Party is for—to insist that government can and must be a force for good in everyday life.

Not even Republicans deny this any more. Even as they try to tar Michael Dukakis as yet another "ultraliberal" (ridiculous term), they increasingly concede the logic of liberalism. George Bush is now conspicuously fretting about education and the environment, and Reagan didn't dare to veto the recent catastrophic health care bill. Of course, the Republicans, with their knack for convincing dishonesty in budgetary matters, carefully avoid candid discussion of how to pay for the progressive policies they're suddenly backing. And, for that matter, Michael Dukakis, mindful of Walter Mondale's brief career as a truth teller, isn't talking a lot about raising revenue either. But Dukakis can't, and anyway shouldn't, duck the issue forever. He needs to remind voters that assertive government is a Democratic, not Republican, specialty, and one way to do that is to figure out how to pay for it. There are several ways to fund a Democratic vision, all tempting, most with shortcomings.

1. *Spontaneous generation*. Dukakis says he'll create revenue by tightly enforcing existing tax laws. We like this idea, and we love the way it sounds in speeches, but we don't honestly expect it to bring a huge windfall. The revenue hunt must continue.

2. *Cut a deal with the Russians*. One of the paradoxes of modern Communism that hasn't escaped Mikhail Gorbachev's attention is that even as the Soviet Union feeds, clothes, and equips an immense, modern army, civilians are hoarding toilet paper when they can get it. Gorbachev knows that's no way to run a superpower, and he says he wants to free up economic resources by scaling down military commitments. Since Russia's global designs are the main rationale for American defense spending, this offers a chance to save real money at the Pentagon (which now consumes nearly $300 billion a year, roughly a fourth of the federal budget). The Soviet Union's military withdrawal from Afghanistan, its rumored plans to withdraw from Hungary, and its apparently waning enthusiasm for handing client states blank checks are all promising signs. But that's all they are. Though a symmetrical cut in military spending is in both nations' interests, ensuring symmetry requires tough American bargaining, which takes time. If the next administration mistakes Gorbachev's rationality for altruism, and makes large unilateral defense cuts on faith, it will be setting the stage for another panicked, wasteful arms buildup a few years later. A Dukakis administration should aim steadfastly at king-size Pentagon savings, but it can't responsibly count on them during its first couple of years in office.

3. *Soak the rich*. This is no time for Democrats to raise tax

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rates, even in the upper brackets. It's bad politics, and besides, we shouldn't fiddle with the fundamentals of the 1986 tax reform, a rare triumph of reason. But there are other ways to raise additional money while making the tax system more progressive. Billions of dollars of capital gains escape tax every year because of an obscure loophole involving inherited property. Mortgage interest is still deductible on second and third homes. And half of all Social Security payments remain tax-free no matter how high the recipient's other income.

4. *Pay as you go.* The Gramm-Rudman Act virtually compels Congress to say how it's going to pay for each new program. This isn't a new way to fund programs, of course, but merely an insistence that they be funded. Still, it has the effect of opening valid revenue sources that were once off-limits for political reasons. Take tax loopholes. When Democrats were looking for a way to fund Daniel Moynihan's broadly popular welfare bill, Bill Bradley suggested they phase out the meals-and-entertainment deduction for company owners earning more than $360,000 a year. This provision may not survive House-Senate conference, but it's a good example of how worthy but dicey tax reforms can ride the coattails of popular legislation. The linkage of new programs to specific revenue sources will also make for some aesthetically appealing pairings: a steeper cigarette and alcohol tax, for example, could fund expanded health care. In addition, this sort of linkage usefully reminds citizens that the money they pay in taxes goes to pay for government services they like to have. It crystallizes their policy choices. One reason Reagan abided a new Medicare "premium"—read "tax"—for catastrophic health care was that people said they were willing to pay it, given the benefits.

5. *Spend on the sly.* Massachusetts has found a way to expand medical coverage without new taxes: simply require employers to provide health insurance. A Senate bill sponsored by Ted Kennedy, and a House bill sponsored by Henry Waxman, would do much the same nationwide.

THE ZEITGEIST CHECKLIST

BY CHARLES PAUL FREUND

This Week		Last Week	Weeks on Chart
1.	MASS. POLITICS	7	4
2.	I SHOT AN ARROW	*	18
3.	NOR ANY CROP TO SHRINK	1	3
4.	FROM UNDER THE RUBBLE	—	1
5.	THE LONG COUNT	—	1
6.	FRONT AND CENTRIST	—	1
7.	LIE IN THE SKY	*	2
8.	THIS HOLLOWED GROUND	—	1
9.	PUSHERS COME TO SHOVE	*	2
10.	A KICK OUT OF VIEW	—	1

*Item resurfaces in the Zeitgeist after at least one week's absence.

1. MASS. POLITICS

The race. Why did Dukakis head into the convention under a load of bad press? Some credit Bush's positioning, but others see it as part of a front-runner's news cycle. The veep stuff was stupendously overplayed, and internal Massachusetts problems, while real enough, aren't resonating. Anyway, Bush isn't moving; this is a cycle.

2. I SHOT AN ARROW

Gulf. It is fascinating that the press never reached for the guilt button in the deaths of Flight 655's passengers; such is the depth of Iran's bogeyman status. That Iran has failed (so far) to play its maniac role, however, upset the familiar coverage archetypes. Though the press tried to keep it a conflict piece, the story, despite itself, lurched into a post-Khomeini angle.

3. NOR ANY CROP TO SHRINK

Drought. The national news sounds rather like the agribiz report, with rain measured in the hundreths of inches. With good reason, too; the effects of the drought are spreading. It's begun to rain on poor Bush, for example. Many drought sufferers are disappointed by the administration's reactions, and Bush is paying in approval points. Unless it rains, it could pour.

4. FROM UNDER THE RUBBLE

Brownsville. Credit "Nightline" with a TV news breakthrough. Though such events as the Brownsville collapse always play as inspirational melodrama, the truth is that such disasters are handled in unnecessary chaos, and that many "volunteers" converge only to exploit their products. Among such exploiters, of course, is a heavy-breathing press, but never mind this time.

5. THE LONG COUNT

Mexico. Forget China and the Soviet Union, when Mexico breaks up (sort of) its one-party monopoly, that's news. Actually, Mexico—completely invisible in our national vision—seems to be this year's Summer Doldrums guest entrant in the collective consciousness. Last year's was the mind-boggling Fiji, about which we've heard so much lately.

6. FRONT AND CENTRIST

Thornburgh. The appointment of a centrist Republican like Richard Thornburgh to replace Meese is a real post-Reagan event. The discomfiture of the descending right has been a background buzz all year, but the fact is the GOP is trying to metamorphose, and is not likely to have an easy time of it.

7. LIE IN THE SKY

Military technology. Events aboard the *Vincennes* have again raised doubts about our superexpensive military technology. There's a Luddite quality to the coverage, but the same questions about the relation of soldier and commander to the machines on which they depend have arisen before. In an increasingly anti-military atmosphere, these concerns could gel.

8. THIS HOLLOWED GROUND

Battlefields. Manassas, Antietam, and Gettysburg are all under development pressure (as where is not?). That opposition has made this a story indicates that some U.S. history lives yet. But what stands out is one of the pro-development arguments in Manassas: preservation glorifies war. This isn't merely vulgar; it is actually anti-community, anti-heritage. It's the ultimate developer position.

9. PUSHERS COME TO SHOVE

Sobriety. Tobacco firms have been reduced almost to the status of drug pushers; their youth-oriented and Third World marketing is viewed with outright hatred. Something similar is brewing with alcohol; i.e., attention is shifting from "aberrant" user to "malicious" supplier. But how much of this movement is really about health anymore, and how much is becoming social control?

10. A KICK OUT OF VIEW

World Cup. Two reactions interlocked in the wake of the U.S. getting the '94 games: the U.S. sports culture was disdainful and the world soccer culture was incredulous. You know what this is, don't you? It's another triumph for U.S. Hispanic culture. Without Hispanics, there wouldn't be much of a live audience.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Such "mandated benefits" may become a trend; they appeal to the Republican obsession with "privatization," the Democratic thirst for New Ideas, and the popular attraction to anything that promises something for nothing. In dismissing mandated benefits as hocus-pocus, it's not enough to note that they levy a hidden tax, paid by consumers at the checkout counter (not to mention the workers who go unemployed because of the increased cost of their labor). After all, real taxes cost money, and often jobs too. The main question, rather, is how efficient the hidden tax is. Do the insurance premiums paid indirectly by consumers get as much bang per buck as tax dollars would if the insurance were run by the government? There's no compelling reason to believe so. Granted, waste invariably creeps into government bureaucracies, but government-run health insurance has its efficiencies too: economies of scale, the absence of marketing costs, and clout. As Medicare has demonstrated, a large insurance program can, by capping reimbursement for specified procedures and maladies, help hold down medical costs. These factors help explain why, while Medicare buys a decent amount of health care per tax dollar, the private supplementary "medigap" insurance policies often give an abysmally low return on premiums.

There's nothing inherently wrong with addressing social needs through the private sector. Mandated benefits have the virtue, at least, of always paying for themselves. But too often the rationale for them is strictly political: legislators, convinced they can't get the public to knowingly foot the bill, sneak it through the back door. This is dangerously disingenuous. Not only does the bill often get inflated between front door and back door; the program gets shielded from public scrutiny, and frivolous benefits can creep in. Consider the way states now exercise their power to dictate the terms of group insurance policies. They often include expensive treatments of questionable value, such as psychotherapy, and sometimes even vanity treatments, such as cures for baldness. And finally, don't forget the most ironic side effect of mandated insurance: the government ends up paying for part of it, since employer-paid insurance premiums are tax deductible.

The problems with mandated benefits suggest one final way to fund a Democratic policy agenda.

6. *Tax and spend.* Even now that supply-side economics is in eclipse, this tactic isn't exactly a guaranteed vote-getter. But it's a guaranteed revenue-raiser, and it can, in moderation, be made palatable. To sell the public on any essential tax hikes, Democrats have to sound hard-nosed and pragmatic, stressing that some social programs actually pay for themselves in the long run. In other words, when talking about the underclass to Joe Six-pack, don't get misty-eyed about welfare mothers and equal educational opportunity. Stress instead that the inner city is a breeding ground for crime and drug use, and that good education is a prerequisite for national success in the global economy. Similarly,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pollution isn't just ugly—it's expensive, once the health toll is counted. And even if it weren't, it would still stand as a classic occasion for good liberal government: almost everyone hates it, but it doesn't make economic sense for any one person, or corporation, to do anything about it alone. Some things only the government can do well.

In addition to sounding hard-nosed, Democrats must *be* hard-nosed. Make sure money spent on workfare pulls, and if necessary yanks, people out of the underclass. Make sure our schools address practical problems—illiteracy among the underprivileged, mediocrity among the privileged, and any mismatch between jobs and job hunters. Whenever someone mentions the touchy-feely educational style that many liberals championed in the '60s, change the subject.

It's imperative to keep Republicans from stealing the rhetoric of bottom-line liberalism. George Bush's timely conversion to the cause of sound social investments is not a reliable guide to his future behavior if elected, and the voters need to be reminded of this. Democrats must not only talk unabashedly about the need for active government. They must also point out that they are the party uniquely qualified to do the talking. For the past half century, the main difference between the Democratic and Republican parties has been their answers to the question of what government is for: respectively, to do good and to avoid doing bad. These days there's a lot of good to be done. And, with a bit of luck and skill, a lot of credit to be taken for doing it.

The Duke And The Baron

Lloyd Bentsen? Why not just go all the way and choose Jim Wright? After all, he's a Texan too, with similar ethical standards. Or, if the formula calls for a conservative to balance the ticket, why not Bob Dole? He too favors Reagan-style tax cuts for corporations and rich people, is anti-environment, anti-abortion, anti-gun control, and so on. Of course, Dole's a confessed Republican and Bentsen, technically, is not. But that shouldn't bother a "pragmatist" like Michael Dukakis. The Democratic candidate called the selection of Lloyd Bentsen as his running mate the "first presidential act" of his administration. That makes him 0 for 1 on the season.

Senator Bentsen does look good in a suit and is handsome enough to do Grecian Formula commercials, without being embarrassingly (for Dukakis) tall. And he won't outshine the top of the ticket in the charisma department either. He's a bland, unimaginative man, a savvy politician with no apparent political values.

If any coherent philosophy can be derived from Bentsen's legislative record, it is that of a corporate statist. He believes, not in capitalism, but in business (or, as they say in Texas, "bidness"). Thus he is among the Senate's leading proponents of protectionism—interfering in the market to protect existing economic arrangements. He's always willing to lend a government hand to big business, especially banks, insurance companies, real estate interests, and those Texas favorites, oil and gas companies. When the 1986 tax reform was taking shape, it was neck and neck between him and George Bush to see who would do most to adulterate the bill with favors for oil companies. Five years earlier he had enthusiastically backed President Reagan's regressive tax cut. When it comes to government help for the poor, he's less enthusiastic. He is hardly the type of conservative likely to inspire ethnic Americans and working-class whites to return to the Democratic Party fold.

The ideal vice presidential nominee, it's said, is someone who carries his home state and otherwise does no harm. It is characteristic of the least appealing side of Michael Dukakis—cautious, plodding, unimaginative—that he chose to follow this conservative advice. Of course, it's far from certain Bentsen will carry Texas for the Democrats. But it's certain he offers nothing else in the way of inspiration or creative leadership. The selection of a running mate who could just as easily be a Republican may stave off George Bush's efforts to paint Dukakis as an "ultraliberal," but it also throws away the opportunity to add a badly needed spark to the ticket.

Dukakis seems mesmerized by the 1960 analogy: another Bay Stater and another Texan battling another incumbent vice president. Does every Massachusetts politician have to imagine himself another John F. Kennedy in order to get through the day? We dread to think that this folly played any part in Dukakis's choice. But it's a lousy choice, no matter what the reason.

Notebook

□ IN THE SAME BOAT: None of the corrective information that has come out in the days since a U.S. ship shot down an Iranian airliner in the Gulf—the airliner was *not* outside the normal commercial air pathway, the plane was *not* descending as it approached the ship, and so on—is cause to change the initial conclusion that the ship's captain, Will Rogers III, was right to fire when he did, given the situation he was in and the information he had. Whether the much-touted $600 million AEGIS system can be faulted for supplying such tragically mistaken information will be the subject of investigations and recriminations, possibly justified. Whether the *Vincennes* should be there in the first place, along with the rest of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf, also is the subject of renewed recriminations. This journal supports the Reagan administration's Gulf policy, though we would prefer to see it administered legally by invoking of the War Powers Act. However, as the original excuses for the tragic mistake on July 3 fall away, it becomes ever clearer that we owe the Soviet Union an apology for our cheap response to their shooting down of the KAL 007 airliner in 1983, which the CIA determined—long after President Reagan stridently asserted otherwise—was also a case of mistaken identity.

continued on page 14

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thinking About AMERICA

The United States in the 1990s

An Intellectual Feast

Scholars and statesmen, Democrats and Republicans, on-campus and off-campus writers, four U.S. presidents, four Nobel laureates—all of them independent thinkers—give us the best of their learning, wisdom, and experience in 47 essays on foreign and domestic policy for the United States in the coming decade. Among the contributors:

James M. Buchanan ▪ *Jimmy Carter* ▪ *Gerald Ford* ▪ *Milton and Rose D. Friedman* ▪ *Philip C. Habib* ▪ *F.A. Hayek* ▪ *Sidney Hook* ▪ *Bobby Inman* ▪ *Seymour Martin Lipset* ▪ *Richard Nixon* ▪ *Ronald Reagan* ▪ *Rita Ricardo-Campbell* ▪ *George Shultz* ▪ *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn* ▪ *Thomas Sowell* ▪ *James B. Stockdale* ▪ *Edward Teller* ▪ *Casper W. Weinberger* ▪ *Aaron Wildavsky* ▪ *James Q. Wilson* ▪ *Andrew Young*

In 1985 General Secretary Gorbachev told Congressmen Bob Michel and Tip O'Neill—and Secretary of State George Shultz—that he believed many of the policies of the Reagan administration could be traced to an influential work, *The United States in the 1980s*, published by the Hoover Institution at the beginning of the 1980 election year. "I believe *Thinking About America: The United States in the 1990s* should provide exactly the same kind of intellectual foundation for the next administration," says Michel.

Annelise Anderson & Dennis L. Bark
editors
Foreword by W. Glenn Campbell

Available in September . . . *Reserve your copy today*
$14.95 (paper) $24.95 (cloth)

The Hoover Institution Press
East Coast Order Department
4720-A Boston Way
Lanham, MD 20706

ANDREW YOUNG ♦ EDWIN MEESE III ♦ SIDNEY HOOK ♦ MILTON
OWELL ♦ JAMES BOND STOCKDALE ♦ JAMES Q. WILSON ♦ F. A. HAYEK ♦
R. INMAN ♦ GERALD FORD ♦ JIMMY CARTER ♦ RONALD REAGAN ♦
LLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE ♦ HENRY S. ROWEN ♦ JOHN B. DUNLOP ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Look again.

A group of blind men
came upon an elephant.
One man ran his hand
along its flank and said,
"This is the tallest tree
in the jungle."
Two others examined
a leg and soon agreed:
"A column. Ionic perhaps."
Yet another felt its trunk
and then jumped back, crying,
"Look out, the dreaded
black mamba snake!"

We find this story amusing and quite apt. After all, many people see us as simply an aerospace company; whereas an equal amount of our efforts are in the building and automotive fields. We are a part of nearly every car on the road. And Carrier and Otis still lead the industries they began. But perhaps the best way to think of us is not as a collection of parts, but rather as a single company that shares ideas and resources wherever it can. In other words, one company with one goal: united technologies.

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The similarities and differences between the two incidents can be debated endlessly. Our victims were flying over a combat zone; on the other hand, their victims were flying over the Soviet homeland. (What if a mysterious Iranian plane appeared over California?) What's clear in retrospect is that our response to KAL 007 was part cynical propaganda and part technological hubris: it could never happen to us.

□ HOLY GUACAMOLE: Carlos Salinas probably did win the Mexican presidential election, although certainly not by the 53 percent of the vote that the ruling PRI party is claiming. A pre-election poll by the U.S. firm of Bendixen and Law showed Salinas ahead with 38 percent of the vote to 29 percent for the left-wing National Democratic Front headed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and 26 percent for the conservative National Action Party. Though the public is unhappy with the PRI after six years of an economic austerity program that has cost average citizens half their disposable income, the PRI presumably retained enough organizational power to truck rural voters to the polls and attain a plurality. The main cause of the delay in reporting the vote was furious fighting within the PRI—between old guard pols and Salinas's modernist democrats—over how honest to be about the party's failure to win a majority. Two dangers now face Mexico. One is that Cárdenas will call his supporters into the streets, triggering violence that the Mexican army might have to put down. The other is that Salinas will be forced to abandon the economic modernization that has caused his country such pain. Declaring a moratorium on Mexico's debt, retaining subsidies and heavy government regulation of business, and instituting big "populist" spending programs will make the PRI less unpopular in the short run, but won't help Mexico in the long run. The United States can help, with debt relief conditioned on further economic reform.

□ POSITION WANTED: Simon & Schuster is about to publish *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy* by right-wing foreign policy consultant and Washington hanger-on Constantine Menges. In the bound galleys of the book, distributed for review, several passages have been blocked out by hand in magic marker. In the following sentence, for example, the words in italics apparently were the subject of last-minute second thoughts: "*While* I believe Bush is unfailingly considerate and an honorable, well-intentioned man, *my experiences have led me to wonder whether he has the strategic vision needed for effective leadership on major foreign policy issues.*"

□ GREAT MINDS:
" 'Coming to America' may be more interesting as a career move than as a movie. . . . [The screenwriters] have produced what in the old days would have been considered a first draft." —critic David Ansen, *Newsweek*, July 4

"[T]he filmmakers seem to have shot the first draft. . . . Finally, *Coming to America* seems to be more career move than movie." —critic Richard Schickel, *Time*, same date.
(thanks to Craig T. Mason, Morton, Illinois)

□ WELL EXCUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUSE ME: "Jackson, however, is not the only one to blame for the recent strain in relations. The governor visited Chicago nine days ago and failed to give Jackson a courtesy call, even though reports were spreading in political circles that Jackson had been deeply depressed because he felt that no one was any longer paying attention. And while Dukakis made the grand gesture of inviting Jackson to his home for dinner, there was no high-level Dukakis aide to greet him at the airport. Dukakis and his wife made up the menu for dinner without finding out what Jackson likes to eat. Jackson was unable to eat the clam chowder served because he cannot drink milk, and the only fish Jackson eats is fried. The salmon was not well received, and Jackson had food delivered to him at the concert later that night." —*Boston Globe*, July 10

□ ONLY THE POPE IS INFALLIBLE:

Catholic Bishops Vote to Retain Controversial Statement on AIDS

—*New York Times*, June 28

Catholic Bishops Vote to Rewrite AIDS Policy

—*Washington Post*, same day
(thanks to Tom Melia, Philip L. Brach, Washington, D.C.)

□ STRAIGHTEN UP AND FLY RIGHT:

Wider Use of Altitude-Reporting Devices By Small-Plane Pilots Is Ordered by FAA

—*Wall Street Journal*, July 17

FAA Eases Rule for Small Plane Altitude Radar

—*Los Angeles Times*, same day
(thanks to Mark Chandler, Palo Alto, California)

The phony 'flexible freeze.'

BUSHLIT

GEORGE BUSH plans to campaign against Michael Dukakis by portraying him as a tax raiser. Bush, by contrast, promises to submit a balanced federal budget within three years of taking office, and to do so without any tax increase at all—not even in the gasoline tax or cigarette tax. Furthermore, Bush declares he will do this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without touching Social Security, and without cutting defense spending, which would be allowed to increase with inflation.

Bush's magic elixir is something he calls a "flexible freeze." That sounds fairly painless, and Bush has kept it nice and vague. But a bit of mathematics reaffirms the obvious. If Bush is to keep his promise about taxes, he will have to cut severely programs that are important to a lot of voters.

ACCORDING TO the Congressional Budget Office, if defense and most domestic programs are increased with inflation while programs like Social Security, Medicare, and farm price supports continue as in current law, the deficit in fiscal 1993—the year Bush promises to balance the budget—will be $139 billion. (Without a $97 billion Social Security surplus—more than double this year's—the deficit would be $236 billion.) How does Bush propose to wipe out that $139 billion deficit? He divides the job between two old friends from the early days of the Reagan administration, when the budget was supposed to balance by 1983: Ms. Rosy Scenario and Mr. Magic Asterisk (both coinages of David Stockman).

Rosy Scenario takes care of about $66 billion. In 1981 Rosy told us we could "grow our way out of the deficit." She was wrong. This time Rosy's emphasis is on interest rates. She tells us that long-term interest rates in 1993 will be 4.5 percent. This is almost three points lower than either the CBO or private forecasters expect, and it saves a great deal of money in federal interest payments. Given recent Federal Reserve actions and the need to keep attracting foreign investment to finance the deficit, this mammoth decline seems unlikely, to say the least.

But let's accept this wildly optimistic forecast. Where does the other $73 billion come from? In Stockman's early budgets, to make the numbers add up, he would add here and there an * —the "magic asterisk"—which stood for "additional savings to be proposed." Bush's "flexible freeze" is like Stockman's "magic asterisk" with this difference: he doesn't even concede that *some* cuts will be required, let alone what they might be. But we can figure it out.

Budgets are subject to the iron laws of arithmetic. To balance the budget, outlays must equal revenues. Since revenues in fiscal 1993 are expected to be $1261 billion, a balanced budget requires outlays of no more than $1261 billion. Outlays come in several categories: interest, Social Security, defense, and "all other." Bush has told us that Social Security will remain untouched ($303 billion), that defense will grow with inflation ($346 billion), and that interest will be calculated under the rosy scenario ($142 billion). That leaves a simple subtraction problem: 1261-303-346-142=470. That is the amount available for "all other" spending: $470 billion.

Every year the CBO computes how much spending would be if no laws were changed and discretionary programs increased with inflation. This is called the "baseline." For "entitlement" programs like Social Security,



Tilting at Windmills

The Autobiography of Charles Peters
Founder and Editor of
The Washington Monthly

"A pivotal figure in American journalism, an editor who has transformed the way the press covers government....His autobiography is as shrewd, thoughtful and humane as he is..."
J. Anthony Lukas

"The least jaded journalist in Washington, Peters turns *Windmills* into an inspiring account of a good man's quest for ideas that make sense and for deeds that can make a difference."
Walter Isaacson *TIME*

"The editor of the magazine you can never throw away is now the author of a book you can't put down....It's the best American biography since Russell Baker's *Growing Up.*"
Mary McGrory

"Full of ideas and fun and nostalgia. Read it to find out how much better this country could be: realistically, without pie in the sky."
Anthony Lewis

"It accomplishes what only the best biographies are able to do: in the telling of a particular life it provides a larger window onto an extraordinary strand in the life of our country."
Doris Kearns Goodwin

"Charlie Peters runs the best journalistic farm team in America, producing both talent and ideas. In our business, he is a giant. And this gem of a book helps tell why."
Ken Auletta

$18.95 NOW AT YOUR BOOKSTORE
ADDISON-WESLEY
Reading, Massachusetts 01867

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Medicare, farm price supports, and pensions, you count the number of eligible people and calculate their benefits to get the total program costs. For other government activities like environmental protection or health research, programs like EPA or health research or economic development grants, you simply index last year's spending for inflation. The current policy baseline estimate for "all other" spending in fiscal 1993 is $543 billion. By no coincidence, 543-470=73, the same $73 billion gap discussed above.

IN OTHER WORDS, the anodyne phrase "flexible freeze" hides the mathematical truth that Bush is proposing to cut non-defense, non-Social Security spending by $73 billion, or 13 percent. How's he gonna do it?

If you're not going to touch defense and Social Security, and you've already made wildly optimistic assumptions about interest payments, the only big-ticket item left is Medicare. Medicare is the fastest growing domestic program in the budget, and it grows much faster than inflation—from $80 billion in 1988 to a projected $137 billion in 1993. Medicare costs are increasing so fast partly because inflation is higher in the health care sector and partly because of expensive new technology, but in important part because there are more old people. Holding Medicare's total growth rate to inflation means *cutting* each person's benefits, perhaps radically. To hold Medicare to the growth rate of general inflation, it must be cut by *30 percent* in 1993. The unimaginably radical step of *doubling* the current monthly premium Medicare recipients pay (don't call it a tax increase!) would bring in $16 billion. A lot, but hardly enough.

What else? Total elimination of federal economic development projects would save $3.4 billion. A drastic cut in federal transportation aid (at a time when we desperately need new airports) might save $2.6 billion. Forget about grants for wastewater treatment plants to comply with the Clean Water Act and you can save $1.2 billion.

And then there are benefit programs. There is a few billion to be saved by tightening up on disability rules for veterans, reducing price guarantees for farmers, delaying unemployment benefits, freezing federal civilian pay, and so on. Some of these reforms might even be good ideas. But if Bush wishes to propose them, he should have to do so and take the heat.

A dozen or so steps of this sort—each controversial and certain to alienate vast numbers of voters—might save $45 billion to $50 billion, far short of budget balance. The numbers can work—*if* rosy scenario comes true, *if* deep cuts are made in various programs, and *if* all other programs are held at their 1989 spending levels. But this would mean no increases for education, for health research, for drug programs, for environmental protection, for anything in government. In fact, it would be very hard not to have to cut these programs.

Given the history of the budget debate, it would not be beyond the bounds of acceptable political practice for a presidential candidate to announce his earnest wish to balance the budget with the proviso that specific actions will depend on negotiations with Congress. But for Bush to announce that he has a plan called a "flexible freeze"—and that it can balance the budget without raising taxes and without causing any other sort of undue pain—is excessively dishonest even by the standards set by Bush's mentor, Ronald Reagan.

SUSAN IRVING

Susan Irving is a lecturer at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, despite which, she is not associated with the Dukakis campaign.

The Carlucci technique.

ESCAPE ARTIST

FRANK CARLUCCI IS always being described as the consummate government bureaucrat. He has served in seven agencies, from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the National Security Council to the Department of Health and Human Services, and done each job in a way that has enhanced his reputation for toughness, competence, and independence. Ever since becoming secretary of defense last November, he has been the object of a torrent of praise because he's been willing to cut the defense budget, which his predecessor, Caspar Weinberger, wasn't.

In February, before the race for the Republican presidential nomination was decided, *Business Week* said "there's talk in Republican circles" that either George Bush or Bob Dole "might want to keep Carlucci around to finish the job he's started." Last month *Time* upped the ante, calling Carlucci "the only rising star in the twilight of the Reagan administration," and suggesting not only that he would be a "natural holdover" in a Bush administration at Defense or State, but that (according to "speculation") he "might continue to head the Pentagon in a Dukakis administration."

The procurement scandal has dimmed Carlucci's star, but amazingly little. He has made it clear that he didn't know anything about the investigation, let alone the evildoings themselves, until a week before the story broke. He has cooperated fully, and he has made a show of stripping six suspected procurement miscreants of their duties even before they have been charged.

One of the skills of a consummate bureaucrat is the ability to take credit for administrative successes and avoid blame for disasters. In addition to his toughness, competence, and independence, Carlucci is very good at this. Everybody believes that the procurement scandals were the almost inevitable result of the big budget increases of the early Reagan years—some amount of dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

honesty is unavoidable in an operation the size of the Pentagon, as even Reagan and Weinberger have said, and adopting a wartime-bonanza level of procurement during peacetime, as the administration did in 1981, is bound to increase the level of crookedness. Amazingly, Washington seems to have forgotten that Carlucci was one of the key architects of the mammoth spending increases whose consequences he is now so admired for laboring to undo.

Back in December 1980, Carlucci's appointment as deputy secretary of defense made the conservative movement very unhappy. Carlucci had just finished serving as a high official in a Democratic administration, and not only that, he had taken part in the supposed dismantling of the covert operations division of the CIA, of which he was deputy director under Stansfield Turner. So he took pains to indicate that the right had nothing to fear from him. In his confirmation hearings, he called repeatedly for major increases in the defense budget, and also touched various other conservative bases of the time, such as opposition to SALT II, belief in the "window of vulnerability," and dissatisfaction with the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. He got one question about procurement, from Scoop Jackson. "We would certainly depend on the very large existing expertise in the Pentagon for advice on technical procurement matters, and hope to confine our role to the broad decisions," Carlucci said. The Senate confirmed Carlucci on January 19.

On January 30, in a brief evening meeting in Weinberger's office, he, Weinberger, and David Stockman decided to commit the Pentagon to a $1.5 trillion budget increase over the next five years. Federal budget hobbyists will recall that in his memoirs, Stockman describes this number as a giant mistake that Carlucci essentially tricked him into. The true size of a budget increase depends on what the baseline is, of course. Stockman left that fateful meeting thinking he had just agreed to a seven percent increase, but realized several weeks later, after it was too late to change the budget, that he had actually agreed to something like 16 percent. The reason is that Carlucci, in discussing the increase with Stockman, was using an inflated baseline—not the current level of defense spending, but the proposed level for the next fiscal year, which already reflected two big rounds of theoretical increases.

In August 1981 Stockman mounted a major attack on the defense budget, and, by his account, it was Carlucci who played the crucial role in his defeat. During a meeting with Reagan, Stockman produced a chart that showed the defense budget, in constant dollars, zooming upward. He quotes Weinberger immediately saying, "These aren't DOD numbers. I've never seen them before. We can't deal with incorrect numbers." Stockman turned to Carlucci for confirmation that he was right, but Carlucci ducked: "Well," Stockman quotes him as saying, "I can't tell for sure." Later, when Stockman won James Baker over to the cause of cutting the defense budget and Baker tried the

"A BOOK THAT SIMPLY DELIGHTS THE READER...
CURSE OF THE GIANT MUFFINS

is funny, sometimes extremely funny, and it is also mordant and clever. Unlucky is the fraud or windbag who catches Kinsley's eye."—Christopher Hitchens, *Vanity Fair*

"**A volume of wit, clarity, and great breadth,** with a tireless conscience energizing the whole."—*Kirkus* "Amounts to more than a collection of columns. The book is **a gleefully jaundiced tour**... a Hit Parade of fatuities and scoundrels...

MICHAEL KINSLEY
(TRB of *The New Republic*) is... **a classically gifted satirist."**
—Mark Caldwell, *Village Voice*

"**A disarming charmer... a shrewd thinker, a droll stylist,** a man for whom the phrase 'clarity of thought' seems to have been invented."—Dan Cryer, *Newsday*

"**I hope everyone in Washington will read Kinsley. It will do very little for their self-esteem."**
—John Kenneth Galbraith,
The Washington Post Book World



SUMMIT BOOKS
SIMON & SCHUSTER INC. A G+W COMPANY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tactic of making some cuts final by quickly leaking news of them to the press, Carlucci retaliated by proposing a program of lie-detector tests for top government officials in order to stop leaks.

MEANWHILE, Carlucci was at work inside the Pentagon reforming the procurement process. First he changed the composition of the Defense Resources Board, which oversees procurement, in such a way as to shift power from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the armed services bureaucracies. This, along with the spending increases, helped create the kind of run-and-grab climate inside the services, especially the Navy, that pervades the early accounts of the procurement scandal. Then Carlucci oversaw the formulation of the "Carlucci Initiatives," a series of supposedly major reforms of the procurement process. Very few defense experts ever took the Carlucci Initiatives seriously—their argument was that you can't vastly increase procurement and reform procurement at the same time. Carlucci himself left the government after a couple of years, and as soon as he was gone one heard very little about the initiatives around the Pentagon.

Between his departure from the Pentagon and his return to government to clean up the National Security Council after Iranamok, Carlucci was first president and then chairman of Sears World Trade, Sears, Roebuck's famously disastrous effort to create a Japanese-style trading company run by former high government officials. This association with a losing team didn't hurt him either—Washington regards private sector jobs as time on the bench, so nobody cares how well one did at them. At the NSC, as at the Pentagon, Carlucci quickly took charge, talked tough, and fired people, and his reputation as the best manager in government was immediately restored. It's a measure of his prestige that at the Pentagon, when he faced down another great favorite of the press, James Webb, the novelist and former Navy secretary, and Webb showily resigned, it didn't damage Carlucci's reputation at all.

No doubt Carlucci really is smart and efficient; if he weren't, he couldn't possibly have become the living embodiment of the top-notch government executive. But his life in the '80s illustrates some other important lessons that others who aspire to his eminence might well study: Remember that the best jobs are the ones in which you can position yourself as the architect of a dramatic turnaround of a troubled agency. Always set a course that is in accordance with the Washington mood of the moment (e.g., big defense increases in 1981, big defense cuts in 1988). After you've done the high-profile part of the job, get out fast—Washington adores people who can get things done, but usually gets tired of long-serving administrators. And don't worry about inconsistency in the positions you've taken over the years. Nobody will remember.

NICHOLAS LEMANN

Nicholas Lemann is national correspondent for the *Atlantic*.

CAMPAIGN '88

BENTSEN AND HEDGES

MICHAEL DUKAKIS has earned his reputation as Zorba the Clerk. He's an accomplished technocrat, a very smart guy, and a shrewd political strategist. But he's got nerd tendencies and he lacks the common touch. On a family vacation a few years ago, he took a copy of "Swedish Land Use Planning" for beach reading. Dukakis's idea of a wild time, says columnist Mark Shields, is an evening spent straightening out his sock drawer. Republicans are nastier about Dukakis's emotionless image. "He's the kind of guy you'd like to have in your foxhole—if you wanted to study soil erosion," says GOP consultant Todd Domke.

Barring a personality transplant, Dukakis is never going to have a personal affinity with the most important voting bloc in the 1988 presidential election, Reagan Democrats. Neither is Lloyd Bentsen, his colorless running mate. Reagan Democrats are the Archie Bunker crowd. They're lower-middle-class Democrats who were drawn to Reagan in 1984 (and maybe in 1980) because of his personality and ideology and because they didn't like his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale. Reagan snowed them. He had "the greatest knack of convincing guys making $30,000 a year that he was one of them," says William Daley, son of the former Chicago mayor and now a Dukakis campaign consultant. Dukakis doesn't have that knack.

He may not need it. According to ABC News polling, Reagan Democrats are nine percent of the electorate. They mostly are Southern whites and Northern Catholic ethnics, and mostly moderates or conservatives. To this day, they give Reagan remarkably high ratings. But they remain Democrats. In an ABC News survey last March, 65 percent said they trust the Democratic Party more than the GOP. A plurality (49 percent) said the country is "off on the wrong track." Not surprisingly, they think economic issues are paramount, and 39 percent said the economy is getting worse. Only 16 percent thought it was getting better. Reagan Democrats, says Dukakis pollster Tubby Harrison, "recognize there are problems despite low unemployment and low inflation."

So Dukakis has an opening. Peter Hart, the Democratic pollster, says Dukakis can exploit what Hart calls "the family security issue." The assumption is that Reagan Democrats don't share Reagan's bias against government. This means that Dukakis's proposals for universal health insurance and more money for college loans, the elderly, child care, etc., appeal to them. "These people are among the most vulnerable in our economy, and they're worried about the future," says Richard Moe, a Dukakis adviser. They want a president who is "prepared to use government" in their behalf.

More than that, Dukakis and his minions believe Reagan Democrats are prepared to dislike Bush. The more they know about Bush, the less they'll like him, argues Jack

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"... A VANGUARD JOURNAL ..."


FOREIGN POLICY
NUMBER 71 SUMMER 1988 $5.25
3 Campaign '88 And Foreign Policy
William A. Galston & Christopher J. Makins
22 International Law: The Critics Are Wrong
Tom J. Farer
46 Looking Beyond Noriega
Richard Millett
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER REAGAN
65 Managing Alliances
Lawrence Freedman
86 Security Requires Caution
Thierry de Montbrial
99 The International Economic Challenge
Robert D. Hormats
117 America's Third World Hang-ups
Charles William Maynes
141 Funding Foreign Aid
David R. Obey & Carol Lancaster
156 NATO's Enduring Value
Keith A. Dunn
176 Dateline Taiwan: A Dynasty Ends
Thomas Omestad
199 Letters: Drug Policy, Conservatives
71

A Quarterly published by THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

"Foreign Policy is a vanguard journal in the attempts to redefine post-Reagan U.S. foreign policy, reflecting the strategic views of a large section of the political community. As this becomes a center of debate in 1988, Foreign Policy will continue to be important reading."

—The 1988 Media Guide

BE A PART OF THE DEBATE!

Subscribe to Foreign Policy Today and Save 25%.
Four issues for $15.75.
Box 984 • Farmingdale, NY 11737
Or call (202) 797-6428 TODAY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corrigan, Dukakis's deputy campaign manager. At the Democratic National Convention in Atlanta, speaker after speaker will ridicule Bush's upper-class, WASP background and attack him as the epitome of the rich elite. "Bush is George Herbert Walker Bush of Kennebunkport," says Corrigan. "He was chauffeured to grammar school." Mark Siegel, a member of the Democratic National Committee, says Bush "looks like the admissions director of a country club that wouldn't have people like you and me as members." And so on.

BUSH INTENDS to shrug off these attacks and go on offense against Dukakis. (What else can he do? Deny he's a preppy who went to Andover?) The Bush campaign has gone to extraordinary lengths to find what Reagan Democrats don't like about Dukakis. "This is the pivotal group in the election," says Lee Atwater, Bush's campaign manager. "Whoever gets the lion's share is going to win." In June, Bush pollster Robert Teeter conducted ten separate "focus groups" in New Jersey, Alabama, and California. The dozen or so participants in each had three things in common: they were Democrats, voted for Reagan, and are leaning toward Dukakis in 1988. For hours, these folks were questioned, pumped with information, and then questioned some more. All the while, Bush campaign officials watched them through one-way mirrors. Officials who couldn't attend got videotapes of the sessions.

What'd they find? Dukakis's record on a half-dozen issues, including taxes, national defense, prison furloughs, and the death penalty, was laid out. This caused "a tremendous amount of movement," says Atwater. At each session, 40 percent to 60 percent of the participants abandoned Dukakis and declared themselves either for Bush or undecided. Of course, this happened in an artificial environment, and bad news about Dukakis was all they heard. Still, Bush strategists came to three firm conclusions. One, there is no big issue gripping voters. "No one issue is a silver bullet," says Atwater. Two, Reagan Democrats don't know much about either candidate. And three, the issues raised in the focus groups are ripe for exploitation against Dukakis.

On number three, Dukakis's advisers disagree sharply. Corrigan insists Bush can't credibly portray Dukakis as an unflinching liberal by citing "a few isolated issues." In response, Atwater points to weekend furloughs in Massachusetts for convicted murderers as "a bona fide example of an issue with a life of its own." Atwater says this issue mushroomed to the point that he heard about it in idle conversations in diners in Virginia when he and his family went on vacation in June. If Bush can keep the campaign riveted on this and a handful of other issues (taxes, in particular), Dukakis will be forced "to persuade Reagan Democrats he's not what he is, a liberal," says Teeter. That's a tough sell, Teeter adds, and the result will be a Bush victory.

Early poll results may have given Dukakis and his advisers a false sense of security about attracting Reagan Democrats. In the ABC News poll in May, he led Bush 72 percent to 25 percent among Reagan Democrats, up from a 62 to 33 percent advantage two months earlier. If Dukakis can keep his lead in that neighborhood, he can win the election, but keeping it won't be easy. In fact, it slipped to 59 percent to 34 percent in mid-July. The lead was based in large measure on Jesse Jackson's emergence as Dukakis's left-wing foil. Dukakis came off as a staunch moderate, and thus considerably more to the liking of Reagan Democrats.

Jackson is no longer a blessing in disguise for Dukakis. He's a problem that may be insoluble. Dukakis wants two things: the support of Jackson and his constituency, plus the support of Reagan Democrats. These may be mutually exclusive. Mondale found out in 1984 that appeasing Jackson drove conservative and moderate Democrats to Reagan. (That, after all, is how they became Reagan Democrats.) And the appeasement process was painfully drawn out. Jackson didn't endorse Mondale until late August, well after the Democratic convention.

Jackson isn't making it easy for Dukakis. He's refusing to abandon his own campaign or tone down his complaints about the platform or endorse Bentsen. He even let it be known that he resented the food Dukakis served him at a private dinner in early July. One threat for Dukakis is that Jackson will make himself the big story at the convention and afterward. The other is that Jackson's price for lining up behind Dukakis will be too high. Dukakis stands to lose something no matter what Jackson does. If Jackson warms to him, that hurts with Reagan Democrats. It's guilt by association. If Jackson doesn't and Dukakis tries sweet talk to woo him, that will scare off Reagan Democrats, especially the Southern contingent. Another option is to tell Jackson to buzz off. That would make Reagan Democrats happy, but might not sit well with Jackson's black constituency. So the Dukakis campaign is fit to be tied. "Jackson's going to do what he's going to do," says Corrigan. "We're going to do what we're going to do."

Besides Jackson, Bush has another ally in attracting Reagan Democrats: Reagan himself. The president's coattails don't amount to much, but he'll help a little. The plan is for him to concentrate almost exclusively on showing Reagan Democrats the way to Bush. He's already begun trashing Dukakis as unacceptably liberal and a tax raiser. More issues will follow—gun control, Dukakis's membership in the ACLU, defense and foreign issues. Reagan's campaigning will help Bush lock up the South. Bentsen, by the way, isn't a lure for Reagan Democrats except in Texas. He's a patrician, a wealthy Tory Democrat, and as cold a fish as Dukakis. Bush now may be inclined to pick Jack Kemp as his running mate. He's strong among Catholic working-class ethnics, which Bentsen isn't.

Bush doesn't need all Reagan Democrats or even half of them to win. Pollster Hart says if Dukakis gets less than two-thirds of them, he faces "an uphill struggle." What Dukakis needs most is a breakthrough among Catholic ethnics in the industrial belt and transplanted Southerners in California. "They'll tilt a lot of the battleground states—Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, California," says Richard Moe. And Dukakis needs every one of them.

FRED BARNES

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How one generation set out to change the world.

© Clarke Kissinger/George Abbott White Archive


"DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS"
"BRINGS THE SIXTIES ALIVE: IN ITS PASSION, IN ITS IDEALISM, IN ITS FOLLIES."
—RONALD STEEL
JAMES MILLER
FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO

In June of 1962, sixty young activists drafted a manifesto that set the agenda for a decade of protest, confrontation, and change. James Miller brings to life the personalities and issues of that turbulent era, candidly assessing the successes, the failures, and the lasting impact of a movement that brought a radical vision of democracy to our politics, and to our streets.

"The New Left has finally produced a history worthy of the name." —Sara Frankel, *Mother Jones*

"Indispensable....Miller's book recaptures the mood and analyzes the period better than anything else I have seen." —Theodore Draper, author of *The Roots of American Communism*

"It brings to life both the triumphs and tragedies of those of us who pursued the dream." —Tom Hayden

"Original and astute....Anyone interested in American political thought will want to study this analysis." —Paul Berman, *The New Republic*

"Accurate, sympathetic, critical, learned....The leaders of the next revolt will do well to read Miller's fine book—for inspiration, and for admonition, too." —Hendrick Herzberg, front page, *New York Times Book Review*

TOUCHSTONE BOOKS
SIMON & SCHUSTER INC.
A GULF+WESTERN COMPANY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel's November election.

THE EPIC ELECTION

Jerusalem

On January 17, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir wrote to Secretary of State George Shultz proposing a peace plan that Israeli officials say Shamir would resurrect if his Likud Party wins this country's November 1 elections. The plan involves negotiations with Jordan and non-PLO Palestinian Arabs to set up a self-governing authority in the West Bank that would oversee all aspects of Palestinian life except security and foreign relations; further talks with Jordan on commerce and on arrangements for West Bankers to vote in Jordanian elections; and, in the third year of a five-year transition period, the beginning of talks on the final status of the West Bank.

The Shamir letter is being cited as evidence that Shamir plans to be "forthcoming" on the peace issue if he wins and that he means to be generous in offering autonomy to the Arabs. In talking to Americans, Shamir likens himself to Ronald Reagan, claiming he is able to negotiate from strength as his Labor Party opposition cannot. And associates say Shamir will never appoint bullyboy Ariel Sharon to be defense minister, but really likes Labor's incumbent, Yitzhak Rabin. If he can't get Rabin to join his Cabinet, they say, he'll appoint Moshe Arens, the mild-mannered former ambassador to the United States.

Labor politicians regard all this as massive disinformation designed to keep Americans quiet during the election campaign. They point out that Shamir opposed the Camp David settlement, Israel's withdrawals from the Sinai and Lebanon, and even the original partition of Palestine in 1948. What really will happen if Likud wins, they say, is that Sharon will force Shamir to make him either defense minister or interior minister and then will use the forces at his command—the Israeli Defense Forces or an elite intelligence squad of his own creation—to shoot Palestinian rock-throwers, massively deport PLO sympathizers, let right-wing Jewish settlers run amok, and force Arabs to leave the West Bank. As for talk of giving the Palestinians autonomy, said one Labor official, "That's a word that Likud people use when they land at JFK. They never say it here."

Election day is still more than three months off for both Israel and the United States. In the United States, we luckily can look forward to a dull campaign between two moderates who disagree only marginally about the means to accomplish accepted ends. But Israel is beginning an epic election debate over fundamental issues: the country's security, the possibility of peace with the Arabs, even the nation's identity as a Jewish state, a democracy, and a humane culture.

The political parties here have always been philosophically polarized, but unlike other recent elections, this one will be about the issues that most sharply divide them. Labor and the left are offering peace formulas to the Arabs in hopes that they will reciprocate and enable Israel to unburden itself of the West Bank and Gaza and the need to dominate 1.5 million Arabs. Likud and the right, despite Shamir's overtures, are raising a fist to the Arabs in the belief that there is no real peace to be had, that force is the only guarantee of security, and that the West Bank should remain in Israeli hands, forever if possible.

Polls show that the public is ambivalent on the issues and almost evenly divided among the parties, though lately leaning in Likud's direction. Three-quarters of the electorate favors the kind of harsh measures to deal with the Arab *intifada* recommended by Sharon, including shooting rioters and deporting PLO sympathizers. At the same time, though, support also is increasing for various peace overtures. A majority favors Labor's plan to return at least some of the West Bank to Jordan in return for peace, and 53 percent favors negotiations with the PLO if that group recognizes Israel's right to exist.

A just-concluded survey by respected pollster Hanoch Smith shows that Likud and its right-wing and religious allies hold a lead of five percent, probably just enough to form a fragile coalition government if the election were held right now. Likud's lead is small enough, though, that Shamir would have to invite in racist Meir Kahane, who calls for expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the West Bank. Kahane's party gets three percent support in Smith's poll, more than double its showing in the 1984 election.

IRONICALLY, and perhaps tragically, the Arabs probably have it in their power to determine the outcome of Israel's election. Credible Arab peace offers could tilt the balance back in Labor's direction, where it was before the *intifada* began last December. Continued or expanded violence in the West Bank almost certainly will drive the electorate further to the right. The Arabs have shown some hints of a willingness to compromise. The West Bank newspaper *El Quds* and PLO-affiliated political leader Faisal Husseini, for example, have expressed support for a negotiating proposal by PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif despite its having been condemned or dismissed by other PLO officials. Yet the Arabs seem incapable of conducting the kind of full-blown peace offensive that would enable them to capitalize on their opportunity to affect Israeli politics.

The prospects, therefore, are for a modest Likud victory. If Shamir has his way, autonomy proposals may be made toward the Arabs, but almost certainly they will fall short of anything the Arabs will accept, so Likud's policy will amount to maintenance of the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza—continued occupation with no resolution of who owns the territory. The danger, however, is that the status quo will prove unsustainable and that extremists, Arab or Israeli, will trigger a horrible outcome: a war that Arab nations feel compelled to enter or an attempted Israeli expulsion of masses of Arabs from the occupied territories—a solution already favored by 55 percent of Likud voters, according to a Smith poll taken in March. "All it would take," said newspaper colum-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nist Tommy Lapid, "is for a Molotov cocktail to explode under an Israeli school bus."

WHAT MAKES the situation here agonizingly poignant is that it's becoming increasingly accepted among the public, many ranking active and retired military officers, and receptive politicians and defense experts that Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is not necessary to maintain Israel's security, given sufficient safeguards. About 150 retired high-ranking officers, including some illustrious war heroes, intelligence chiefs, and regional commanders, have formed an organization called the Council on Peace and Security to challenge the conventional wisdom that without the West Bank, Israel would be in mortal danger.

Many council adherents argue that the exact opposite is true: continued occupation, especially if it involves continued violence, will sap the morale and economy of Israel and cost it support abroad, especially in the United States, thereby weakening Israel's security. Meanwhile, members of the council and other defense experts have drawn up a series of suggestions for protecting Israel from attack while withdrawing most of its forces from the West Bank.

According to the most detailed plan, that of retired Brig. Gen. Aryeh Shalev of Tel Aviv University's Jaffe Institute of Strategic Studies, Israel would station two brigades totaling 5,000 troops along the five roads leading from the Jordan River into the West Bank, blocking a potential invasion by Arab armies. Jordan would guarantee not to allow Syrian or Iraqi armies on its soil and the West Bank itself would be demilitarized. The Israelis would have free access to airspace over the territory and the right to place electronic warning stations on high ground.

Council members argue that such measures could be temporary, and that gradually all Israeli forces could withdraw as the West Bank government—whether Jordanian or Palestinian—proved its reliability.

Council members and other officers agree that it would not be possible to rule out the possibility of terrorist acts, but as one former general said, "Israel faces terrorist threats every day right now. We deal with them with good intelligence. Terrorism is not a threat to the survival of Israel. Arab armies are." He said that Israel has suppressed terrorism emanating from Jordan and Syria, basically by threatening those countries with reprisals, and the same policy could prevail toward the West Bank. "I don't deny that we might have to come back and take over the West Bank," said a retired major general. "But if it comes to that, we'll have national and international support when we say, 'Look what those bastards did.' "

Likud is attacking the council as a front group for the Labor Party and is in the process of assembling its own group of generals to do battle on the security issue. Active duty officers are prevented from saying anything in public on such a hot political issue, but it's clear from informal soundings that a sizable proportion of them—perhaps a majority—fundamentally agree with the council viewpoint.

Politically, both Labor and Likud plan to present a double-barreled case to Israeli voters—claiming that they are tough on the security issue *and* capable of negotiating a peace. Like the Democratic Party in the United States, Labor and its leader, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, are almost too credible on the peace issue and are viewed as weak on security. To bolster its security case, Labor is depending on the presence in the No. 2 position on the party list of Rabin, author of the hard-line West Bank policy so heavily criticized around the world this spring. Polls show Rabin to be one of the most popular politicians in Israel.

In addition, party officials say Labor is about to revive an old pledge from the 1970s—that before it gives up any territory in a peace settlement, it will submit the proposal to voters in a referendum. Labor also plans to publish "red lines"—lists of military safeguards it would demand to guarantee Israel's security in the event of a territorial withdrawal. Another main Labor argument is demographic—that if Likud carries out its ideological goal of annexing the West Bank, Arabs eventually will outnumber Jews in Israel and the country cannot stay both a Jewish state and a democracy. "Keep Israel Jewish" is likely to be a major Labor campaign slogan, offensive though it may be to Israeli Arabs.

Peres has been virtually endorsed by Secretary of State Shultz, who adapted his own peace proposal to preliminary agreements worked out between Peres and Jordan's King Hussein. Yet Labor Party officials admit that American support renders Peres vulnerable to the charge of caving in to outside pressure. Moreover, Likud plans to attack frontally elements of Peres's plan, including an international peace conference and the central role to be played by King Hussein, who has been shown by the *intifada* to be practically without support on the West Bank.

ON THE Likud side, politicians so far have been vying with each other to strike tough poses. The party's new star, former United Nations ambassador Benjamin Natenyahu was quoted in the Israeli press as saying that Israeli soldiers should "shoot to kill" stone-throwers. He told me he was misquoted and that he actually recommended shooting to kill only firebombers and "shooting not to kill" stone-throwers. He told the *New York Times* that the question of whether to allow civilian Jewish settlers to shoot stone-throwers was "a gray area."

Presumably there will soon be a domestic version of the "peace through strength" line that Shamir is advertising to Americans. However, hard-line Shamir aides say that the most Arab power he can or will contemplate in the West Bank is some sort of shared sovereignty whereby Arabs would hold Jordanian citizenship and Jewish settlers would hold Israeli citizenship. What Shamir means when he talks about negotiating with Arabs, one aide said, is talking with Arab states, not the PLO.

In fact, neither Labor nor Likud is publicly offering what might be the most attractive of all exits from Israel's Palestinian dilemma: allowing the Arabs to elect their own mu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nicipal leaders, even if they are affiliated with the PLO; allowing (instead of forbidding) these local PLO adherents to attend meetings abroad of the Palestine National Council (the PLO's exile parliament) in order to exert influence (presumably moderating) within the PLO; and negotiating with these local leaders a gradual expansion of Palestinian self-government, concluding with a demilitarized independent Palestinian entity (perhaps even a "state") at the end of a lengthy interim period during which it proved its willingness to live at peace with Israel.

PUBLICLY and officially, such ideas are unacceptable to the Palestinians, who in turn make demands that all but the most dovish Israelis find unacceptable, including guarantees that they will get an independent state; recognition of the PLO without a prior PLO renunciation of intent to destroy Israel; Israeli willingness to return practically all land Israel captured in 1967, including Jerusalem; and a full-blown international conference as the forum for Arab-Israeli negotiations, where the Soviet Union and major Arab states would have the power to impose a settlement.

Bassam Abu Sharif's proposal distributed at the Arab summit in Algiers in early June was a departure from such demands. The PLO, he said, accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, providing for Israel to exist within secure borders, except insofar as the resolutions fail to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people. He said the PLO would agree to a "brief, mutually acceptable transitional period" prior to statehood, international guarantees for all states in the region, and deployment of a U.N. force to guarantee peace along the Israeli-Palestinian border.

Abu Sharif claimed that his statement was approved by PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, but Arafat would not confirm it. "It would not be good for his health if he did," said one West Bank journalist. Other PLO officials condemned Abu Sharif and threats were made against his life. This is typical of PLO behavior, and it sustains the Israeli case—made by moderates and right-wingers alike—that the Arabs are not politically mature enough to be trusted to keep a peace agreement even if they signed one. The best proof of the argument is the intra-PLO factional butchery just concluded in Lebanese refugee camps. The Israeli press carried an AP dispatch in which one Palestinian mother, weeping at the loss of five sons on opposite sides of the conflict, said that she would have been proud of her sons had they been killed fighting Israel.

Israelis have a right to be afraid that in such a cultural climate any Palestinian entity in the West Bank would be violent and bent on Israel's destruction. As a result, Israelis have a right to be cautious and to move very slowly toward any territorial concessions. The November election, though, is about whether Israel should move forward at all. If Israel says that it is unwilling and is closed to any compromise, the danger is that any good outcome—even in the long run—will be rendered impossible and that a terrible outcome will become more likely, and in the near future.

MORTON M. KONDRACKE

The rise and fall
of a political institution.

CONVENTIONAL HISTORY

THE FIRST national political convention was held in 1831 by the Anti-Masonic Party. A few years previously a story had flown across the country that William Morgan, a Mason who was preparing to make public the secrets of this ancient order, had been kidnapped and murdered to prevent him from carrying out his intention. What actually happened to Morgan isn't known, but what happened because of Morgan is. His disappearance spread the idea that the Masons were secretly anti-democratic aristocrats, and provided the oomph needed to bring state groups into a convention to nominate a candidate for president. They had trouble finding a respectable figure to nominate, but they got one (a former U.S. attorney general, who—incidentally—was a Mason), and yet another minor political fad dropped from sight. It did leave, however, the example of a new way to pick a presidential nominee.

Today, the party political convention has about as much to do with nominating a presidential candidate as the Electoral College has to do with electing one. It's a vestige of an earlier era, preserved by inertia and massive federal subsidies. But back in 1831 it was a new political institution that answered a vital need. The men nominated for the presidency after George Washington were picked by congressional caucuses. Such political parties were intensely local and state organizations. (National party platforms in a form recognizable to us moderns did not appear until the 1840s.) Distance and the formal, hierarchical 18th-century society shaped the first nominating system. People tended to vote for their social and economic superiors, who, as members of Congress, were entrusted with the power to choose the presidential nominees from among themselves. In the first decades of American political life, children were not taught that anybody could grow up to be president, but the new social equalities and man-to-man life of the frontier so changed the social underpinnings of the old system that nomination by caucus disappeared.

People would no longer accept decisions arrived at by gentlemen in powdered wigs and silk breeches. Nobody would have dreamed of calling George Washington Old Wiggie or Jefferson Old Freedom, but the politicians of the new post-caucus age were given hail-fellow-well-met egalitarian sobriquets like Old Hickory, Old Buckeye, and Old Fuss and Feathers. The politics of social deference as conducted by the last generation of the Enlightenment had run its course, and "King Caucus" was not overthrown as much as it was replaced by the new convention system more suited to an exuberant age. A highly organized, highly articulated state-based party system needed a mechanism for picking national candidates whose selection would be considered legitimate back home.

Today, however, the death certificate for the national

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ideas for '88
Books from Harvard Business School Press



Laboratories of Democracy A New Breed of Governor Creates Models for National Growth
David Osborne

"Now ... everyone will be looking to the states for ideas about how to solve the problems that have been ignored at the federal level. Osborne's book fits the bill perfectly."—Robert Reich, Harvard University.

A study of six innovative governors: Mario Cuomo of New York, Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, Bill Clinton of Arkansas, James Blanchard of Michigan, and Richard Thornburgh of Pennsylvania. Osborne explores their experimental economic and social programs, from technology development to welfare reform, and discusses the new political paradigm they are constructing.

384 pp. #84-30894 $24.95



The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition
J. Ronald Fox

"This is a critically important book at this point in our nation's history....Dr. Fox is doing a great service to the public as welt as today's students by telling this story in full detail."—Thomas D. Morris, The Procurement Round Table

Fox looks at the people behind the weapons acquisitions process and pinpoints the fundamental reasons for breakdowns in this process. He argues that any successful attempts at system reform must be based on major changes in the selection, training, and career path of defense program managers.

368 pp. #84-30795 $24.95



Community Capitalism
Richard P. Taub

"The story of the South Shore Bank as told in Community Capitalism is a wonderful example of good business judgment and a broad vision of what it takes to make a healthy community."—Franklin A. Thomas, President, The Ford Foundation

Professor Taub tells the story of the people who built Chicago's South Shore Bank and of the neighborhood that it serves. This account details the struggles and successes of one of the most amazing urban revitalization efforts of recent decades and will certainly be a source of guidance for private-sector enterprises around the country.

151 pp. #84-30852 $22.95

ORDER FORM

To order, call toll free 1-800-638-3030 (from Canada call 301-824-7300), or mail this form complete with payment (including $2.95 for postage and handling in North America, $12.00 for airmail postage outside of North America) to: Harvard Business School Press, P.O. Box 1542, Hagerstown, MD 21741.

Please send me the following:

_____Laboratories of Democracy (#84-30894) $_____

_____The Defense Management Challenge (#84-30795) $_____

_____Community Capitalism (#84-30852) $_____

Shipping & handling $_____
5% sales tax (MD residents) $_____
Total $_____

☐ Payment enclosed
☐ Charge my: ☐ MasterCard ☐ VISA

Card No. _____

Exp. Date _____

Signature _____

Send to: _____

_____

_____

☐ Please send me a complete catalog of Harvard Business School Press books.

HBSOSBNR

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political convention is all but signed. The American political system has evolved from one that picks its presidential candidates by national party convention to one that selects them via primary elections. The media will do their best, as they do every four years, to forget that the outcome is a foregone conclusion, but it's been 40 years since a Republican convention had to go to a second ballot and 36 years since the Democrats, who had a 103-ballot convention in 1924, went to a second round of voting. Bush and Dukakis began campaigning against each other in June. They know they've already been nominated.

The truth is that the convention system was never all that it's been cracked up to be. Not a few Americans who lived even in the heyday of the convention system yearned for its replacement by the primary, as an 1878 document attests. It was called "Petition of Nine Millions of Citizens for the Abolition of the 'Political Machine,' and the Redress of Other Grievances to the Congress of the United States." The nine million signators declared that

> . . . to make matters worse, Congress failing to give them ['the people'] a proper system of nominations, the politicians established one of their own. For the nomination of President they instituted national conventions. The Senators and Congressmen, to whom the president had formerly owed his nomination directly, still retain their influence. The monopolists could now enter into the scheme and manage this new machinery. . . . It is quite needless for your petitioners to describe this machine, so open to the designs of the few who have the means to purchase active effort in their behalf. The convention is a small body. Its members vote secretly, and are not held accountable for what they do . . .

The document ends with a request to Congress to abolish the national convention and replace it with a presidential primary.

In 1912 Teddy Roosevelt was the first to smoke a sitting president out of the White House to do battle in the primaries. He tried to take renomination away from William Howard Taft, who moaned, "I greatly deprecate having to trail the office of the President in the mire of politics, but I can not help it. I am fighting for a cause, and I have got to win. . . ." Win he did at the Chicago convention, one of the most exciting ever held, even though he had been skunked in a succession of primaries by Roosevelt, who was incontrovertibly the enthusiastic choice of a majority of the nation's Republicans. But Taft, who relied on non-primary states under the control of the regular party organization, wound up with more delegates. (The Roosevelt forces claimed that hundreds of Taft's delegates were fraudulently gained in the South, where the only Republican voters were a corporal's guard of blacks holding federal patronage jobs.) Few states had primaries then, few people voted in them, and a candidate who won them all, as TR almost did, still would not have enough delegates to gain the nomination.

Only one elected president, Franklin Pierce, had so feeble a control over the delegate-selection process that his party refused to nominate him for a second term. This unimportant little fact tells us more about why "Young Hickory," as they called this bogus replica of Andrew Jackson, is not on Mount Rushmore than it does about the rise and disintegration of the convention system.

It is now 36 years since a national political convention overrode the outcome of the primaries, nominating a man (Adlai Stevenson) who got fewer than 100,000 votes while rejecting the claims of one who polled more than three million (Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver). But even then the power of the primary was evident. In January 1952 Truman, who had not yet decided about running for a second full term, remarked that presidential primaries were "eyewash" and that he could have the Democratic nomination without entering them. In New Hampshire, where they were gearing up for their primary eyewashing, the reaction to his undiplomatic but essentially accurate statement was so negative that Truman was forced to consent to allow his name on the ballot against Kefauver.

Kefauver was a liberal who'd made a national name for himself as a crime-fighter by chairing the first televised congressional hearings—proceedings that gave a startled America a close-up look at the faces of Mafia padrones in living, snow-flecked black and white. In words not unlike those Jesse Jackson would speak a generation later, he reacted to the eyewash statement by declaring, "The selection of party candidates—like those in the general election—ought to be as democratic as possible in order to give the people an opportunity to express themselves." In the primary Kefauver did beat Truman, who had even sent a number of heavyweight proxies into New Hampshire to campaign for him. The loss was apparently decisive in convincing the president his career as an elective politician was over.

THE JOURNALISTS who will outnumber the politicians at this year's convention by 3- or 4-to-1 are infatuated with the national convention, unable to admit that this combination of circus, steam calliope, and side-wheeled Mississippi showboat has been mothballed by history. All last spring they wrote stories that they filed as political analysis but that were pure nostalgia, about the Democrats' heading for a "brokered convention." For it's still a Hot Time In The Old Town Tonight. It's 1912 all over again, and the bosses, redefined by modern reporters and political scientists as colorful men with cigars in their mouths who picked presidents in smoke-filled rooms and did other spine-tingly awfulnesses, will materialize out of the spirit of conventions past to give us the excitement and the suspense once again. These big, tough, powerful men purportedly step in to make the right decisions when the pressure's on and it really counts, etc. It's Daddy as politician.

The original smoked-filled room is commemorated by a plaque outside the door of Room 404 of Chicago's Blackstone Hotel, where on Friday night, June 11, 1920, a cabal of senator/bosses rescued a deadlocked convention by designating Warren Gamaliel Harding the Republican Party's standard-bearer. One of the hoariest chestnuts of convention lore, the tale is told with many variations, magical, delightfully cynical, and wickedly romantic, but they aren't true. None of them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The story was born that February, when Harry Daugherty, Harding's campaign manager, was schmoozing it up with the press about his boy's chances at the convention. "I don't expect Senator Harding to be nominated on the first, second, or third ballot," he told the reporters, "but I think we can well afford to take chances that about 11 minutes after 2 o'clock on Friday morning at the convention when 15 or 20 men, somewhat weary, are sitting around a table, some of them will say, 'Who will we nominate?' At that decisive time the friends of Senator Harding can suggest him and abide by the result. I don't know but what I might suggest him myself." The convention deadlocked between Governor Frank Lowden of Illinois and Gen. Leonard Wood, recessing after four ballots. Throughout that night powerful men went in and out of Room 404. George Harvey, a magazine publisher/politician and wild man, boasted that the candidate was chosen in his room, and, though the facts are otherwise, the legend of the smoke-filled room was now loose on the American political imagination.

What actually happened makes decent reading too. That Saturday morning Lowden and Wood took a taxi ride together, rocketing around Chicago while they argued about who would be the top of the ticket and who would get sloppy seconds. They couldn't agree, and the convention, worn down by heat and roll calls, went on to nominate the handsome, back-slapping Harding. Daugherty went on to become attorney general and Ed Meese's role model after being indicted but not convicted in conjunction with the Teapot Dome scandal.

Bosses frequently didn't fare well at convention time. In 1912 William Jennings Bryan stripped Tammany Hall and its Wall Street allies to open the way for Woodrow Wilson's nomination, but not before Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives and the leader in the early balloting, stalked the headquarters hotels of Baltimore with a pistol in his pocket looking to shoot Bryan for costing him the prize. Some of the most famous and colorful, like New York's brilliant, red-headed Roscoe Conkling, met embittering defeat on the convention floor. Conkling, the Gary Hart of the 1870s, was as well known for his affair with Kate Sprague, the wife of a senator from Rhode Island and the daughter of Chief Justice Salmon Chase, as he was for his power in the Republican Party. That was broken in his failing attempt, as leader of the GOP "Stalwarts," to win a third nomination for Ulysses Grant in 1880. His nominating speech was quoted by a generation of politically hip Americans. They told about the demonstration set off when Conkling, leaping down from the platform to land atop the reporters' table, began his speech with this bit of heroic Civil War doggerel:

When asked what state he hails from
Our sole reply shall be,
He comes from Appomattox,
And its famous apple tree.

The exciting conventions weren't decided in the backroom, but by confusion and accident and fatigue. Often the participants can't be sure what happened. Did Joe Kennedy's call to William Randolph Hearst asking him to get Bill McAdoo to throw California win it for Franklin Roosevelt, whose forces were beginning to waver on the 1932 convention floor? Or was it Jim Farley's deal with John Nance ("Cactus Jack") Garner for the Texas delegation that did it?

NO SINGLE THING killed off the convention system. The national convention was a coming together of state political parties. In the 1980s, when ticket-splitting is the norm and state parties are paper organizations, the convention is hardly a necessity. Tastes and styles have changed so much that few could take a convention as it used to be when men and women would sit and listen and stomp and whistle to two-hour speeches. Oratory was part of the culture then. Elocution was taught in every high school, so there was a public trained to be moved by eloquence. A man could make a career of being an orator, as did Col. Robert G. Ingersoll, who nearly won the 1876 Republican nomination for his man with a speech that contained sentences such as this one: "Like an armed warrior, like a plumed knight, James G. Blaine marched down the halls of the American Congress and threw his shining lance full and fair against the brazen forehead of the defamers of his country and the maligners of his honor." There were other opinions about James G. Blaine, "the continental liar from the State of Maine," but Ingersoll had made "the Plumed Knight" a figure of glory and honor for millions for years to come. Neither the tongues nor the ears for the kind of speech that was integral to the convention system exist today.

The national convention has also been superseded by a shift in the political culture foreshadowed in the 1878 petition. Direct voting seems much "more democratic" to us moderns than sending delegates off to choose a nominee for us. We live in a time when the referendum is coming to compete with legislatures, when direct polling of our opinions in all sorts of forms, from television's 900-number call-in elections to public opinion surveying, seems to us to be the democratic thing.

If the convention has ceased to have a political function, it has its uses for journalism. The mass media has moved into the politicians' spot like a cowbird in a thrush's nest and turned it into journalism's equivalent of the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association, where the nation's teachers of English come to look for jobs. Every four years this is where thousands of media executives, editors, reporters, public relations firms, and who knows what all else come to network their little heads off, making contacts and cruising for job offers. The numbers of media people and the money spent for entertainments bear no relationship to the importance of the story they have ostensibly gathered to cover. They, indeed, will be the only dynamic force at Atlanta and New Orleans, for the national convention itself is a political cultural lag, a government subsidized anachronism living on from the time of the Pullman car and the telegrapher's key.

NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yes, Michael Dukakis has a soul. We think.

POETRY AND OTHER SURPRISES

BY HENDRIK HERTZBERG

MICHAEL DUKAKIS IS a hard man to get an appointment with nowadays. There's no end to the people who want just a few minutes of his time. The other day the phone lines at Dukakis for President headquarters were so clogged with politicians, reporters, gray eminences, and would-be policy advisers trying to get through that the whole system crashed. The headquarters itself was so jammed with journalists clamoring for interviews with the candidate that staffers had to walk sideways to get to their desks.

So one happily takes what one can get. What I got was half an hour on a chartered airliner flying over the Gulf of Mexico from Miami, Florida, to Biloxi, Mississippi. This seemed a roundabout way to visit a neighbor (I live just three blocks from Dukakis's office at the Statehouse in Boston), but it suited me fine, because it gave me an excuse to go along on one of the campaign trips the governor made during the interval between clinching the Democratic nomination in California and collecting it in Atlanta.

The smooth political and logistical efficiency of the Dukakis campaign was much in evidence on this trip, an eight-city swing through the South. Even the fact of the trip was a tribute to that efficiency, since the Dukakis campaign's spending, unlike that of Vice President Bush, had been disciplined enough to stay well under the pre-nomination ceilings set by law. The theme of every event was that Dukakis as president would wage what he kept calling "a real war, not a phony war, on drugs." This was illustrated by, for example, a series of meetings between the candidate and teenagers attending drug education workshops. At one such workshop, sponsored by the South Carolina Teen Institute for Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, a couple of hundred fresh-faced high school students sat cross-legged on the floor of the student center of Francis Marion College, in Florence, South Carolina. They wore identical red T-shirts and chanted upbeat slogans about how good they felt. Dukakis appeared, took off his jacket, and, microphone in hand, alternately told the kids about Massachusetts's anti-drug programs and asked them about their own. The overall effect was *Gidget Goes Nuremberg*, via est, hosted by Phil Donahue. The wholesome groupthink made the traveling reporters sullen. Some retired gloomily to the back of the hall to smoke cigarettes.

This and similar events, however, were aimed not at the traveling press but at camera crews from local television stations, which duly passed along the tough-on-drugs message. The signals to the national reporters were on a different level. Take, for example, the presence of William (Billy) Bulger in Dukakis's entourage. Bulger, a sharp-tongued Boston pol of the old school, is the president of the Massachusetts state Senate. Dukakis introduced him at every stop, causing him to be applauded by crowds who neither knew nor cared who he was. But Dukakis had good reasons for bringing along a man who would end up spending much of the trip, as Dukakis must have anticipated, in the back of the plane regaling the press with humorous remarks at the candidate's expense ("He may not have charisma, but he does have anesthesia," and so on). Bulger's presence was a subtle suggestion that Massachusetts's budget problems, a big story that week, were under control. It was also a signal, equally subtle, that Dukakis is an executive who (unlike Jimmy Carter, say) is willing to do what it takes to get along with legislative (read congressional) leaders.

In Miami, Dukakis got his picture taken raising the flag with ranks of uniformed cadets from the Dade County police academy. In Biloxi, he starred in a news conference tableau that showed how profound is the revolution that has upended the state of Bilbo and Barnett: the progressive young governor, Ray Mabus, surrounded by pillars of the Mississippi Democratic establishment, six white and five black, seven male and five female, all quite happy to be photographed with the Massachusetts liberal who will head the national ticket. In between these stops, on the plane, Dukakis read briefing papers, wolfed a sandwich, and gave a couple of interviews, including one with your correspondent.

A man who is running for president as the nominee or presumptive nominee of a major party is necessarily about as guarded as a human being can be. There is no advantage to him or his cause in saying anything he has not planned to say. After all, more than just his own political future, his "career," is at stake every time he opens his mouth; so are the immediate fortunes of thousands of officeholders and office-seekers, the material and philosophical interests of tens of millions of citizens, and maybe even the course of history. Under these circumstances, it's unfair to condemn him for caution or cowardice because he sticks firmly to what he has already said. The imperatives of his position require him to avoid spontaneity even as the conventions of political dramaturgy require him to feign it.

This is particularly true when he is talking about "the issues." By this point in a national campaign, a presidential candidate has been asked almost everything. His mind is thoroughly programmed with pat statements in every area of public policy. When you put a question to him, he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

searches rapidly through his mind for the statement closest in subject matter to the general drift of your question, adapts it slightly or not at all, and spits it out. Interviewing him is like popping a quarter into a jukebox.

If the candidate has a disciplined personality and a retentive memory—and Dukakis has both—your chances of getting anything unfamiliar out of him diminish accordingly. If you are a print reporter you have an additional problem. On television a "bad" interview—one in which the candidate is sullen or unresponsive or obviously anxious to get it over with—is actually a species of "good" interview. For print, though, a bad interview is just bad. And a print interview, unlike a television interview, can be ended with a signal to an aide to interrupt with some piece of "unexpected" urgent business.

ALL THIS FORCES a scribbler who has been vouchsafed 20 minutes with the great man to make some decisions. There is no point in skipping around among a wide range of political and public policy issues, because that is pretty much guaranteed to produce nothing but top hits from the jukebox. So the real choice is between (*a*) sticking to one or at most two issues, in the hope of exhausting the ready-made replies and breaking through to virgin territory, and (*b*) forgoing issues altogether and instead raising non-briefing-book subjects that might possibly shed light on the character and quality of mind of the interviewee. I chose (*b*), and began by asking the candidate if there had been any courses at Swarthmore that had particularly formed him.

"Tons of them," he said. "For one thing, nearly flunking physics certainly formed me. It was the first time I'd ever done poorly in a subject, and it was pretty obvious that whatever else I had up here, a small piece marked 'physics' was almost entirely missing."

Strike one, I thought to myself. The story of how Dukakis was forced to abandon his plan to follow his father into medicine because he got a D in freshman physics is a jukebox favorite. My own hunch, by the way, is that Dukakis was too smart to get a D in anything he didn't want to get a D in; and this particular D (the only one he ever got in his life) freed him to do his own thing, not his domineering dad's.

"I'm close to my children, I talk and listen to them," Dukakis was saying. "I think there was a greater leap from high school to college back then intellectually than there is today. My children have done so much more academically and intellectually in high school than we used to. Not that I didn't go to a good high school—I did. But by the time my kids got out they'd had six years of languages, a half semester in economics, a semester in psychology—stuff that we just never touched."

"What languages did you take in high school?

"Latin and French. But we didn't start in seventh grade, the way my kids did."

"And you're fluent in Greek and in Spanish," I prompted.

"Reasonably."

"And you've got a smattering of a couple of other languages . . ."

"Well, I studied French more than anything else, only I don't practice enough. I actually came out of Korea with a fair amount of facility conversationally, but I doubt I could give a speech in Korean. What I learned was household conversation. And my problem in Greek is that when they start shooting questions at me about what's going on in the United Nations, I'm lost. I don't have that political and diplomatic vocabulary."

Dukakis does have that vocabulary in Spanish, however—the result of a summer in Peru in 1954 and plenty of practice since, including on the stump during this campaign. I asked him if he has a sense that his speaking style is any different in that language.

"Some people say I'm a lot more emotional in Spanish than I am in English," he replied. "It's probably because the language itself is so much more expressive." Dukakis, who usually gestures (if at all) with flattened hands in rigid lines, now began gesturing roundly, with cupped hands. "The syllables, the consonants, the sounds—they're much stronger in Spanish than they are in English. Just listen to people speaking Spanish—it's much livelier, because linguistically that's the way the language is.

"Marty Kaplan did some speechwriting for me when I was announcing"—Kaplan, Walter Mondale's speechwriter in 1980 and 1984, is now a Disney studio executive and, not incidentally, the husband of Dukakis's campaign manager, Susan Estrich—"and one of the lines he wrote for me went, 'It can be a noisy and frustrating process, but the frustrations are the dues of leadership and the noise is the music of freedom.' Sounds pretty good in English, actually. But when you deliver it in Spanish—*'pero las frustraciones son las deudas de liderazgo y el ruido la música de libertad'*—it's a whole other thing."

Dukakis then talked a bit about his fondness for French. "I remember when I was in Peru going to a wonderful movie called *The Wages of Fear*, with Yves Montand, a terrific film. Of course then I was up to my ears in Spanish, and I hadn't spoken or heard French for a while. But I walked in there and the French was like music floating. And I remember loving a particular poem by Paul Verlaine, called 'L'Automne'—the autumn. I can't quote it, but I remember the sound of it—like moving water."

DUKAKIS REGULARLY CITES John F. Kennedy and Joseph McCarthy as the two examples—one positive, one negative—that drew him into politics. I'd always been suspicious of the Kennedy example. Like Dukakis, Kennedy was born in Brookline; but Kennedy did not become a national figure until 1956, a year after Dukakis graduated from Swarthmore, and by the time Kennedy's presidential campaign was in full swing Dukakis had already won his own first election (to membership in the Brookline Town Meeting, in 1959). Nor had Kennedy been much of a favorite, in the early and middle 1950s, of the sort of liberals who joined Americans for Democratic Ac-

continued on page 32

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FROM PRINCETON

GALBRAITH, HARRINGTON, HEILBRONER
Economics and Dissent in an Age of Optimism
Loren J. Okroi

In a remarkably lucid style, Loren Okroi analyzes the ideas of three leading reformer-critics in the United States and places their main arguments in the context of the economic, social, and political history of postwar America. In so doing, he provides not only a skillful introduction to American social thought since the 1950's but also a wide-ranging examination of the contemporary failures of American liberal ideology.

As he explicates the works of these three men, it becomes clear that present policy debates have not even begun to resolve the dilemmas their writings have exposed.
Cloth: $29.50 ISBN 0-691-07771-1

PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE
Larry M. Bartels

This innovative study blends sophisticated statistical analyses, campaign anecdotes, and penetrating political insight to produce a fascinating exploration of one of America's most controversial political institutions—the process by which our major parties nominate candidates for the presidency.

"This is clearly the best work I have seen on the topic. Bartels does a splendid job of building on and integrating several traditions of scholarship: studies of public opinion, voting, presidential primaries, and the mass media."—*Steven J. Rosenstone, University of Michigan*
Paper: $14.95 ISBN 0-691-02283-6
Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-07765-7

DEADLY PARADIGMS
The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy
D. Michael Shafer

Michael Shafer argues that American policymakers have consistently and fundamentally misperceived the political context of revolutionary wars directed against American clients, and that because American attempts at counterinsurgency have been based on flawed premises, these efforts have failed in virtually every instance.

At fault is a pervasive, compelling, but distorted vision of Third World states as beleaguered modernizers and the United States as manager of modernization.
Cloth: $34.50 ISBN 0-691-07774-6

INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS
The Law That Counts in World Politics
Edited by *W. Michael Reisman* and *Andrew R. Willard*

This provocative book shows that many international standards of acceptable conduct derive far less from adjudications, statutes, or treaties and far more from what is found to be acceptable in the conflicts that we today call international incidents.

The contributors demonstrate how law that counts has been developed, modified, and terminated in a variety of dramatic international incidents: the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the Harrods bombing, the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the incursions of foreign submarines into Swedish waters, and others.
Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02280-1
Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07772-X

CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
Sanford Levinson

Sanford Levinson's book examines the "constitutional faith" that has, since 1788, been a central component of American "civil religion." By taking seriously the parallel between wholehearted acceptance of the Constitution and religious faith, he opens up a host of intriguing questions about what it means to be an American in the late twentieth century.

". . . one of the most original books on the Constitution that I've read in a year saturated with the Constitution. I finally understand why the Constitution is to America what the Holy Scriptures are to Jews and Christians—what it is that makes an American."
—*Bill Moyers, Public Affairs Television*
Cloth: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-07769-X

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW IN PAPERBACK

CONDEMNED TO REPETITION
The United States and Nicaragua
Robert A. Pastor

Here is an insider's account of U.S. policy making toward Nicaragua, written by a major participant.

Robert Pastor was Director of Latin American Affairs on the National Security Council from 1977 to 1981, a crucial period in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. He presents a wealth of original material from his own experience, classified government documents, and interviews with nearly 100 leaders from the United States, Nicaragua, and throughout Latin America.

What emerges is a picture of the United States and an entire region haunted by the spectre of Cuba and yet "condemned to repetition."

"Robert Pastor is uniquely qualified to write a definitive book of this kind about the relationship between Nicaragua and the United States . . . . what is has been, is now, and what it ought to be."—*Jimmy Carter*
Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02291-7

THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY
Jeffrey K. Tulis

Twentieth-century presidents speak directly to the people more often than did their nineteenth-century predecessors. Jeffrey Tulis contends that this commonly recognized shift to a "rhetorical presidency" is much more significant than previously supposed. He argues that popular leadership by presidents is not simply a logical constitutional development but a fundamental transformation of the constitutional order and of the entire political system.
Paper: $9.95 ISBN 0-691-02295-X



Studies from the Project on the Federal Social Role
Forrest Chisman and Alan Pifer, Series Directors

DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE
Edited by *Amy Gutmann*

The essays collected here explore the moral foundations and the political prospects of the welfare state in the United States. Among the questions addressed are the following: Has public support for the welfare state faded? Can a democratic state provide welfare without producing dependency on welfare? Is a capitalist (or socialist) economy consistent with the preservation of equal liberty and equal opportunity for all citizens? The volume confronts powerful criticisms that have been leveled against the welfare state by conservatives, liberals, and radicals and suggests reforms in welfare state programs that might meet these criticisms.
Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02275-5
Cloth: $42.50 ISBN 0-691-07756-8

THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Edited by *Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff,* and *Theda Skocpol*

This volume places the welfare debates of the 1980s in the context of past patterns of U.S. policy, such as the Social Security Act of 1935, the failure of efforts in the 1940s to extend national social benefits and economic planning, and the backlashes against "big government" that followed reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s. The editors suggest how new family and employment policies might revitalize broad political coalitions and further basic national values.
Paper: $14.50 ISBN 0-691-02841-9
Cloth: $52.00 ISBN 0-691-09436-5



AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, which Dukakis headed at Swarthmore. So I asked Dukakis about a more prominent figure of the decade, one who was an ADA hero. "What about Adlai Stevenson? You worked in his campaign as a student in 1952 . . ."

"Yeah," Dukakis said with a shrug. "But it was McCarthy and McCarthyism that were dominant during the time I was in school. I was in Washington in the fall of '54, in the Washington semester program of American University, when McCarthy was censured. Quite a time to be there, as you can imagine. It's hard to exaggerate how overwhelming the mood of fear and accusation was, and how frightening. The Stevenson campaign was an interesting and in many ways an exciting campaign, but as I look back on it it was much more the influence of McCarthy—and a lot of minor league McCarthys—that really shaped that period. And Kennedy, by contrast, was a whole different world."

"Yet McCarthy was precisely the subject on which Kennedy was least impressive," I persisted.

"I don't know that that's fair."

"I remember Kennedy as being outstanding on things like Third World questions, not on McCarthy. Kennedy was ahead of his time on Algeria, for instance . . ."

"And Southeast Asia, to some extent. He strongly opposed military intervention in '53. But for me, the Kennedy influence came later, as he began emerging as a serious presidential candidate. It was McCarthy and McCarthyism that were dominant in the first half of the decade."

THIS PROMPTED me to ask Dukakis about the gubernatorial proclamation he issued in 1977 absolving Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, the Italian-born anarchists executed in 1927 for a murder they were convicted of committing during a payroll robbery in Braintree, Massachusetts. I added that it had seemed a surprising thing for someone of his technocratic reputation to concern himself with.

"Strictly speaking, I didn't pardon them," Dukakis said. "The proclamation basically said that if they had been tried under present rules and procedures they never would have been convicted. By the way, I'm no technocrat. I don't know where that came from. I don't spend a lot of time running around tinkering with machines. I'm a guy that loves ideas and public service, and my job is to try to lead. I have a reputation for *picking* good managers. I hope that's deserved, because if you don't do that you don't get anything done. But I don't sit around micromanaging. That's not what you do in this business.

"But the Sacco and Vanzetti case was one that I was deeply interested in—and one that was very symbolic. There was an enormous amount of anti-foreign, anti-immigrant sentiment behind it, and the case itself was, at least by modern standards, hardly consistent with due process. And it was the 50th anniversary of their conviction."

"And it was a case where the old Massachusetts establishment had helped hound them to the electric chair," I said.

"Well, there was a lot of fear there. It hadn't been too much earlier that Louis Brandeis almost wasn't confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was a time when a young Greek-American woman like my mother, who had graduated from college, could be advised and was advised that there were certain school systems she shouldn't apply to if she wanted to teach. So the injustice in the Sacco and Vanzetti case involved both civil liberties and anti-immigrant, anti-foreign prejudice. A lot of folks objected to what I did. Some were very angry about it. But it was a very important case and one where, as far as I was concerned, it was time to speak out on it—and I did."

I ASKED Dukakis when he first became aware of a larger world beyond the street and the house, a political world.

"I remember at the age of seven, with my brother, who was then ten, setting up a card table in the middle of the living room, drawing up a chart with all of the then 48 states alphabetically, and sitting there recording the delegate totals as the roll call was read over the radio on Willkie, Taft, and Dewey at the 1940 Republican convention. There wasn't any contest at the Democratic convention that year, of course, or we'd have listened to that, too."

My mental umpire called strike two—the 1940 anecdote is another jukebox staple. "How about politics in terms of justice and injustice?" I asked.

"Well, I can remember from the very earliest age, certainly by the time I was eight or nine, reacting very strongly to any suggestion of prejudice or bigotry. It was there from a very early age, and I've always had it, a very strong, very important part of me. But it was very early. If there was any suggestion of anti-black or anti-Semitic kinds of statements or references I'd just bristle."

I asked Dukakis whom he admires in American history, especially in the period before this century. "Most of all those who were the leaders, the pioneers, the agents of change. Jefferson, of course. But Andrew Jackson too. I think the Jacksonian period was a particularly important one in American history. Jackson was the only first-generation American ever elected president, so far. His parents were Irish immigrants. They came over in 1765. His presidency clearly was a watershed in American history, not only because he represented ideological change, but also because he represented what might be called the new Americans. Imagine this wonderful picture of all the rabble coming into the White House, tracking mud all over the floor. The proper Americans were all kind of horrified. But that was Jackson.

"Lincoln, of course. TR, in many ways. It's interesting how fundamentally different the Republican Party is these days from the party that Roosevelt helped mold. Despite a very successful presidency, his imprint on the party was minimal. That's one of the reasons he ran against Taft in 1912—he thought his values had been betrayed. Wilson, until his illness. And of course FDR. Truman, who's very attractive and appealing, a gutsy little guy who wasn't supposed to win and fought back. And then of course Kennedy."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"How about figures outside the presidency?"

"Louis Brandeis has always been an attractive figure to me. Before he was a jurist he was a one-man people's lobby, a brilliant and extraordinary guy. He did extremely well as a lawyer, and then he became a public advocate and fought for the public interest, often quite successfully. When he was appointed to the Supreme Court he had to fight to get confirmed, in part I think because of his religion, in part because there were those who considered him too radical. Yet here was a guy who had enormous success in making the system work for change."

Dukakis thought a moment. "John L. Lewis was an intriguing figure . . ."

I pointed to a spot above my eyes.

"Not only the eyebrows," Dukakis said with a smile. "That incredible voice! I was a great fan of the 'I Can Hear It Now' records. I used to listen to those things for hours." Then Dukakis lowered his voice an octave and slowed it by half in a pretty fair imitation of the great mineworkers' leader: " 'It ill behooves one who has supped at labor's table and been sheltered in labor's house to curse with equal fervor labor and its adversary when locked in deadly embrace!' "

Dukakis went back to his normal voice. "I was a great reader of biography when I was a kid. You know that series of biographies for young people they used to have? I used to read those voraciously. And I was always fascinated by revolutionary history in this country. People like Sam Adams. He never quite got the notoriety that his cousin did, but he was the first really populist leader in Massachusetts, and he had strong following among working folks and the artisans and the dock workers."

"He was governor after independence, wasn't he?"

"After, yes. He was 70 years of age when he was first elected. He was the guy that refused to ride in the governor's coach and insisted on walking everywhere. A young state senator once came up to him and told him it wasn't dignified for him to be walking around, that as governor he ought to ride in the governor's coach. And he said, 'Young man, I've been walking the streets of this city for 70 years, and I'll continue to walk them as long as I'm capable.' Because I've spent a fair amount of time on the transit system, I've always kind of liked that about Sam Adams."

THE PLANE was on the ground now. An aide hovered tentatively nearby. Pretending not to notice, I asked Dukakis to talk about the experience of merging his own Greek background with the Jewish background of his wife, Kitty.

"Remember, I grew up in a community where I don't think there were 40 Greek families, a community that was heavily Jewish and to a lesser extent heavily Irish," Dukakis said. "In fact I once met someone who for his senior thesis at Harvard did a kind of sociological analysis of Brookline High School, and actually went into the high school and interviewed people the year I was a senior. A lot of the paper had to do with the division between the Jewish kids and the Irish kids. Then there was this one guy that seemed to move fairly easily between both groups. Turns out that was me. But I grew up in a community that wasn't anywhere near as diverse as it is today. You walk into Brookline High School today and it's the League of Nations. I think there are 24 different ethnic groups and races represented in that high school today. It's 30 percent minority. We had, I think, five black kids in the entire school, and maybe ten Asian Americans, period. But my own friends came from all kinds of backgrounds, and it's never been a problem for Kitty and me. We respect each other's background and traditions . . ."

"Have you tried consciously to acquaint your kids with both traditions?"

"Yeah, and I think they're richer for it. They've been to church with me, they've been to temple with Kitty, and I think in many ways there's a richness and an understanding there that wouldn't come otherwise. But I think the thing that has made it a strength is that even though Kitty and I may have different temperaments and all this kind of stuff, we share very closely certain strong values. We're also people who are interested in and have always enjoyed exploring other cultures, other religions. Kitty went to a Christian Science camp for 11 years, because her mother had gone there as a kid. Her maternal grandfather was a guy named Byrne, an Irishman. I grew up in a town where I was going to a lot of bar mitzvahs. So we kind of grew up in that atmosphere. But I think if you're going to have a successful marriage and a successful family under these circumstances, it's got to be between two people who kind of instinctively reach out to and are interested in and respect other cultures and other religions. It's been great, and as best I can determine we've got three terrific kids. I'm not complaining."

"We gotta go, governor," the aide said firmly. The interview was over—and before strike three, unless you count the Sam Adams anecdote. I hadn't gotten to ask Dukakis half of what I wanted to, but I went back to my seat with a slightly better sense of him than I'd had before. He has equanimity, but no mystery. Except the mystery of having no mystery.

A FEW DAYS LATER I looked up the Verlaine poem Dukakis had mentioned, hoping I might find the Rosebud that would reveal his soul. It was curious, after all, that Michael Dukakis should express appreciation for the work of a French Symbolist poet whose life was as debauched as his verse was lyrical. The poem—its actual title is "Chanson d'Automne"—is a simple, melancholy affair of three verses. The last verse goes, "*Et je m'en vais / Au vent mauvais / Qui m'emporte / De-ci, de-là, / Pareil à la / Feuille morte*"—or, in Arthur Symons's translation, "And I go / where the winds know, / Broken and brief, / To and fro, / As the winds blow / A dead leaf." A lovely poem, and one that seems to have little to do with the brisk, can-do optimism that is Dukakis's hallmark. I'm not sure what to make of it, if anything. But who knows? Maybe the Duke isn't just a guy that loves public service. Maybe he's a guy with an inner life too, just like the rest of us.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Love and Other Diversions

Every country seems to be interested in love, but the French like to converse about it more than most. When a French writer runs out of subject matter, or even if he doesn't, *toujours l'amour*. Sometimes other things happen in such a work, but they tend to be background or justification for the love dialogue.

In film the prime exemplar of this French propensity is Eric Rohmer. Between 1962 and 1972 he wrote and directed a series called, as a group, *Six Moral Tales*, all hinging on discussions of love. (He also published the fiction from which he derived the films, and very good stories they are.) The best-known of the six, *My Night at Maud's*, *Claire's Knee*, and *Chloe in the Afternoon*, contain very little action in the usual sense but a good deal of fascinating conversation on their common subject. And each of them dramatizes its moral: an aspect of the risk or mystery that can accompany love.

Boyfriends and Girlfriends
(Orion Classics)

Who Framed Roger Rabbit
(Touchstone)

Bull Durham
(Orion)

Then, after two films drawn from other authors, *The Marquise of O. . .* and *Perceval*, Rohmer launched a new series, *Comedies and Proverbs*. So far, this series has been much inferior to the first. All of the later ones are made with his finesse—he's the Cellini of film intimacy—but most of the screenplays are attenuated. The proverbs themselves are not fertile, and the discourse about love, sensitive and witty for a while, palls—because it lacks the spiritual underpinning that the very Catholic Rohmer gave his early sextet. The best of the new is *Pauline at the Beach*, which at least had some Marivaux moves and countermoves to provide comedy. But most of the five are lapidary lapses. So is the sixth and latest, *Boyfriends and Girlfriends*.

The proverb on which this film rests is "The friends of my friends are my friends." (The French title translates as *My Girlfriend's Boyfriend*.) The setting is Cergy-Pontoise, a "new town" just outside Paris. Blanche, an employee of the town's bureau of cultural affairs, strikes up an acquaintance with Léa, who is at computer school. In time Blanche, who is unattached, meets Léa's boyfriend, Fabien, and also meets Alexandre, just a friend of Léa's. Blanche likes Fabien well enough but is smitten by Alexandre, so much so that she becomes tongue-tied in his presence and is miserable later. Matters sort themselves out eventually, in Rohmer's anti-Chekhovian mode. (Chekhov keeps telling us that Cupid really *is* blind, that lives are often made wretched by unrequited love. Rohmer advises his characters to be patient: things will work out.)

The dialogue (through subtitles) is so sharp and frank that we expect substance. It doesn't arrive. Rohmer's directorial skill never wavers, which only adds to the ultimate disappointment. The man who made *Six Moral Tales*, who here chose these quietly interesting actors, who frames each shot subtly, who uses the "new town" (as his admired Antonioni might have done) to adumbrate the desperately chic lives within it—that man, we think, must be designing this film toward some substantive end, as he did in the past. But no: this time, exceptional as Rohmer the director is, Rohmer the writer has been seduced by the hum of his fine-tuned dialogue into thinking that the hum itself is significant.

Emmanuelle Chaulet (Blanche) and Sophie Renoir (Léa) counterpoint each other in much more than the blonde-brunette mode: their voices and personalities, their ways of moving, both blend and contrast. (As do the quite ordinary clothes that Rohmer characters wear, selected for understated contrast and harmony.) The two men, Eric Vieillard (Fabien) and François-Eric Gendron (Alexandre), are equally well paired, though they have somewhat less chance for impact on us. All four, under Rohmer's hand, play like a good string quartet, but the score isn't worthy of them or their leader.

When I saw the trailer for *Who Framed Roger Rabbit*, I thought it was hilarious. It's a cartoon comedy, vintage 1935; then suddenly a live director calls "Cut," and Roger Rabbit walks off the set into a real studio filled with real people. Not only that, there's contact. Roger grabs the director's coat and tugs it. End of trailer.

I should have quit when I was ahead. Unfortunately, I went to see the whole feature-length film. The plot, the gags, the action are so stupid and strident, so unfunnily parodic, that the film's only interest is in wondering how they did it—the mix of animation and live action. Bob Hoskins is in it as a Hollywood private eye hired to do something or other about the Toons (as the

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Big. At last—the boy-in-a-man's body idea is used amusingly, particularly by Tom Hanks as the boy-man. (Reviewed 7/4/88)

A Handful of Dust. Evelyn Waugh's masterly novel, astringent yet with spiritual overtones, is now a beautiful film. The leading man and woman are OK; the rest of the cast, including Alec Guinness, are excellent. (6/27/88)

Rikky and Pete. Australian comedy, entertainingly farfetched. A brother and sister in their 20s head out from their Melbourne home into the desert. (6/20/88)

A World Apart. 1963, South Africa. Largely autobiographical—by the daughter of Communist activists in the anti-apartheid struggle. Politically a bit nebulous, but moving. (7/18&25/88)

SK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"INVALUABLE"

Howard Banks,
Washington Bureau Chief, Forbes

"DEFINITIVE"

John Limpert,
Editor, The Washingtonian

"INDISPENSABLE"

Jonathan Jessar,
Executive V.P., Burson-Marsteller, Inc.



"...THE SINGLE BEST GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS EVER PUBLISHED"

Victor Kamber,
The Kamber Group, Washington, D.C.

The **Washington Black Book** provides the most comprehensive, practically organized information on journalists in Washington available today.

Far more than just a "Who's who", it tells you how the bureaus work, how they interpret their mandate, who owns the publications and the specialized "beats" of their reporters.

You'll find unique "Black Book" pointers on how to place stories with specific publications, exactly to *whom* to address press releases, and whom to query about story ideas.

Updated annually, the Washington Black Book is the *only* source you'll need to have the Washington Press Corp at your fingertips. Order now!

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER:
SAVE 10%!

ORDER FORM

TNR

MADISON BOOKS, INC.
4720 Boston Way
Lanham, Maryland 20706
(301) 459-5308

$84.95 Paperback $_____
$2.50 each Postage and Handling $_____
Maryland residents add 5% sales tax $_____
TOTAL AMOUNT ENCLOSED $_____

ALL ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID. MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO MADISON BOOKS.

Payment enclosed
Visa # _____ Exp. Date _____
MasterCard # _____ Exp. Date _____
_____
Signature Date

Please ship to:
Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"This passionate, sorrowful book

is both a tribute to the beleaguered, persevering inhabitants of Beirut and to the beautiful, cosmopolitan city that has fallen victim to the political and religious animosities of the Middle East."—*Publishers Weekly*



"Eli Reed has found something new and unique to say about a city often dismissed as a war zone... Ajami's text skillfully sets the stage for Reed's photos, recounting diverse Lebanese fears, hopes and desires that seldom receive coverage in news reports about the latest bombing."
—*Los Angles Times Book Review*

128 four-color photographs, $34.95 hardcover; $19.95 paperback

Now at your bookstore

NORTON

W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 500 Fifth Avenue New York, N.Y. 10110

Before the Flames

A Quest for the History of Arab Americans

By Gregory Orfalea

An unprecedented 100-year history of Americans of Arab ancestry, once considered among the most foreign of all foreigners in America.

With vital timeliness, Orfalea plies his skills as poet to weave a history as colorful and alive as a tapestry.

". . . perhaps the most complete account of Arab Americans by a writer whose prose sings."
—*Book Reader*

$22.50 at bookstores, or from the publisher, 1(800)252-3206

University of Texas Press, Box 7819, Austin 78713

cartoon characters are called), and he tries hard to keep things lively. If Hoskins is dull, a picture really is in trouble.

Earlier films have used the mix of animation and live actors—*Anchors Aweigh* and *Mary Poppins*, for instance—but this is the first time it's been used throughout a feature. Basically (though "basic" is an easy word for a complicated procedure), it's double exposure: Hoskins takes something from the hand of a man, and later the hand of the cartoon rabbit is duped in. But this process is not in itself a guarantee of 100-minute enthrallment. The material for which they did all this labor is so dreadful that it reminds us how lucky we are to be rid of 95 percent of those cartoon shorts—which thrived on maniacal violence whose only excuse was that it never really hurt anybody.

Will I ever see a first-class baseball picture? Hope springs (swings?) eternal. The best one I can remember is *The Bingo Long All Stars and Travelling Motor Kings*, which had a lot of zest but was really about race problems, not baseball. Strictly in its baseball sequences, *Bull Durham* is very good indeed. It's a minor-league tale that fits what fans like myself see of the game and what we imagine goes on in the dugout and locker room. Kevin Costner has the right laconic, firm, Bill Dickey stance as an experienced catcher getting near the end of the line. Tim Robbins has the right mix of brainless talent and strength to make the veteran catcher protective and jealous.

But the rest of the story, which is most of it, is boring when it isn't offensive. Susan Sarandon is a mystical baseball groupie in this North Carolina town who selects one player each year as her stud. This year the thoughtful veteran and the effusive hotshot are contenders. Ron Shelton, who also directed, wrote the sex scenes just as vulgarly as he could—perhaps not past the edge of credibility but certainly past the edge of our concern. What is outstandingly incredible are the high-flown pronouncements, including literary judgments, given suddenly to Costner. They make him sound like a dummy for Shelton the ventriloquist.

Too bad Shelton wasted the good baseball stuff. The other stuff makes the film an easy out—not quite a strikeout but just a long fly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HBO runs a candidate for president.

"EIGHTY-EIGHTSOMETHING"

BY MAUREEN DOWD

THERE IS a Babbitt instead of a rabbit, a ditzy campaign aide instead of a Daffy Duck, and Mary McGrory instead of Betty Boop. But "Tanner '88," Garry Trudeau and Robert Altman's own wacky collision of reality and fantasy, is the political world's answer to *Who Framed Roger Rabbit*. Since they are dealing with Washington—a city that specializes in illusion—it's much harder in this show to tell the imaginary characters from the real ones. There is also a good chance that when Gary Hart sailed off into the sunset on the Monkey Business the 1988 political campaign moved beyond parody.

But Trudeau and Altman give it a shot in "Tanner '88," the satirical television series now running on Home Box Office, which recounts the dark-horse race of Jack Tanner, a fictional presidential candidate who represents a higher reality to which the real candidates (who often seem fictitious) might aspire. His campaign slogan is "For Real" (occasionally misspelled "For Reel"), a thematic twist that implies that if a real candidate could only figure out how to run on a reality platform, it could really mark a breakthrough. (Still with me?) As Sidney Blumenthal, the *Washington Post* reporter who serves as the show's political consultant, puts it: "We're aiming for sort of a suprareality."

Trudeau uses his *Doonesbury* technique of putting mythical characters in a real setting sprinkled with real people, and writes the show with his usual deft sense of the hip and the hypocritical. Mirroring the action of the campaign and piggybacking on as many real events, real candidates, and real celebrities as possible, Altman employs the choppy cinema verité style he made famous in *Nashville* and *M*A*S*H*—overlapping dialogue and plots that meander in a way that seems spontaneous. Tanner bumps into Hart, Bob Dole, and Pat Robertson campaigning in New Hampshire. A Nashville fund-raiser during Super Tuesday featuring Waylon Jennings was filmed at a real fund-raiser for Al Gore, and stars the real local television reporters (Ken and Barbies or Twinkies, in the film's au courrant argot) and real local officials who switch their allegiance from Gore to Tanner for Altman's camera.

Gore did not appear in the film, however, because his staffers (who were trying to calculate whether it would be worth the senator's while) never received a satisfactory answer to their queries about viewership figures. Jack Kemp, by contrast, eagerly made a cameo appearance, but looked so unauthentically hammy next to the cool imaginary politician that Altman had to cut his bit. The day Bruce Babbitt dropped out of the race, his staffers all took off their Babbitt for President buttons and put on Tanner '88 buttons. And Altman wasn't even shooting. That's verité.

The film has become a cult favorite among those who have watched it being filmed. Ironically, the small cadre of political junkies who can best appreciate the program live in the nation's capital, where cable television isn't available. It is hard to imagine what a traveling salesman from Akron, flipping on HBO in his hotel room hoping for a mildly erotic movie, could make of this fantastic voyage into the inner arteries of politics. A scene set at a Washington cocktail party featuring an elite cast of real journalists and Democratic operatives—including McGrory, Blumenthal, Robert Squier, Hodding Carter, Patt Derian, and Kirk O'Donnell—raises the question, Isn't everybody who wants to watch this show already in it?

Trudeau and Altman did not set out to create a Midwestern Faust. They merely wanted to tell the classic story of a decent, intelligent man struggling to keep his ideals through the corrupting, trivializing, media-dominated, image-fixated process of politics. "It's the most extraordinarily grueling ordeal any public figure who wants to be a president has to go through, having to reinvent oneself in terms of 30-second sound bites and preparing to think and speak to the tune of pushing people's hot emotional buttons," Trudeau told the *Los Angeles Times*. "It's almost like we're asking what Robert Redford says in the last line of *The Candidate*: 'What do we do now?' "

At times, "Tanner '88" comes perilously close to theater of the mundane: cinema superfluité. It might better be titled "eighty-eightsomething," because like its Big Chill counterpart on network television, "thirtysomething," it is so overstuffed with detail and drama that it is numbing. You squirm watching the "thirtysomething" episode that shows, in rapid succession, the yuppie hero dealing with his father's death, his brother's envy, his baby crying, his pipes bursting, and his Ritz crackers running out; you squirm at the realpolitik of "Tanner '88." The show captures all too well the campaign scene—the broken down buses, the missed assassination attempts, the hostile audiences, the pontificating speeches, the screwed-up schedules, the Chinese water torture of clichés. Anyone who has been on the trail with George Bush, for instance, will find it only moderately amusing when Tanner, trying to get the attention of a group of elderly ladies who are busy sewing an image of Bert Convy onto a quilt, confides, "People like you are truly the backbone of the country"—and gets completely ignored.

Trudeau and Blumenthal understand the Beyond Satire problem. "The Tanner stuff looks, almost, you know, quaint compared to reality," Blumenthal says. It got out of hand early on. They invented Tanner to fill the vacuum left last fall when Biden dropped out; they figured they'd get Tanner into the race and have him make it up as he went along and say the things that other politicians couldn't. His claim to run: he deserves to assume the mantle of generational leadership because—unlike Gary Hart or Joe Biden or Michael Dukakis—he knows that John Lennon is the only possible answer to the question, Who was your favorite Beatle?

But then in December—in a political plot twist even Altman couldn't have devised—Gary Hart decided to get back into the race, make it up as he went along and say the things that other politicians couldn't. "It was hard for Jack to make things up when Hart was making them up," a bemused Blumenthal explains. So Jack, as his handlers call him, started getting as confused as the rest of the country about what was real and what was satire out there on the trail.

Indeed, as the political season wears on, Tanner—played by Michael Murphy (an Altman favorite who starred in *Nashville*, *Manhattan*, and *An Unmarried Wom-*

Maureen Dowd, a reporter for the *New York Times*, has been covering the presidential campaign.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OF SCIENCE AND SPIRIT.



Award-winning writer Robert Wright explores what science has to say about the meaning of modern life.

"With a penetrating intelligence and superb writerly confidence, Wright interprets some of the great ideas of our time....The prose is so pleasurable one hardly realizes how much one is learning. In a sense Wright has invented a new genre, beyond history and sociology of science to psychology of science—all in the context of a superbly literate wit."
—**Melvin Konner, author of *The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit***

"No reflective person can fail to be excited by these ideas."
—**Heinz R. Pagels, author of *The Cosmic Code and Perfect Symmetry***

Published by
Times BOOKS
A Random House, Inc. Company

"Will undoubtedly be the basis of the Democratic Party's trade policy in this presidential election year."*

"The trade crisis is by far the greatest threat to American and global prosperity in the 1980s. Congressman Don Bonker has been in the forefront of the national effort to understand and respond to the problem. His book is a valuable account of that mission."
—C. FRED BERGSTEN,
former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs

"Takes trade out of the ivory tower of economic theory and places it in the commercial and political battlefield where the real action takes place."
—ROBERT HORMATS,
former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs

*Kirkus Reviews



Houghton Mifflin Company
© Houghton Mifflin Company 1988
Jacket design: Kandy Littrell

an) with so much diffidence and intellectual disdain that he makes Gary Hart look like Jack Nicholson on a toot—has become so removed that he begins to resemble the tabula rasa of Chauncey Gardner in Jerzy Kosinsky's *Being There*. Tanner's creators, hoping to give him a reason for running and jar him into looking less vacant, felt the need after a few episodes to put their hero through some reality shock treatment. He was taken for a session at the New York studio of renowned image consultant Dorothy Sarnoff to learn about eye contact and rib cage control. But confronted with the energetic Sarnoff—who taught Bob Dole and others how to be appealing on screen—the candidate becomes even more unbearably light. As he stares skeptically and mutely at the camera, Sarnoff has to help him throw his tie over his shoulder so that he can do some breathing exercises.

TANNER IS also taken to a Washington cocktail party with a guest list from the rolodex of a "Good Morning America" booker. He tries to fit in, wearing a red tie and drinking red wine, but again ends up looking dazed as he wanders through the posh maze of melon balls, strawberries, brie, nude Botero sculptures, and high-powered advice. But this time the viewer is sympathetic—everyone wants to run screaming into the night after talking about the Process for an hour over prosciutto and melon. This is the cocktail party from hell—the reason Washingtonians stay home at night. This scene is the show's narcissus pool, and it offers a surreal moment when Washington stares back at its own image in horrible fascination.

Given no guidelines, in an unrehearsed scene, the usual Democratic suspects are offered the opportunity to portray themselves in any way they like. Legend city, as George Bush might say. Although their deadpan advice to Tanner is meant to sound profound—these are, after all, the sorts of pearls that journalists and politicians spend their days seeking—in Altman's irreverent hands the material sounds merely inane. The barriers between illusion and reality break down completely here, and Washington's most valuable commodity—inside, expert advice—becomes better parody than the intentional parody.

Kirk O'Donnell tells Tanner: "You have to give a clear sense of a difference with your opponent." Robert Squier tells Tanner: "My guess is that the process'll

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

begin to happen before we get to the convention. . . . You've got to be the insider and you've got to make Dukakis the outsider." Hodding Carter tells Tanner: "If a white candidate could begin to talk about the concerns which suburban, BMW-driving, could-be Democratic primary voters are concerned about . . ."

To complete the insulated, self-absorbed circle in this triumph of video masturbation, Trudeau even gives Sid Blumenthal a wink and a plug, when he has Tanner's aide brief the candidate about the party guests and murmur: "Sid Blumenthal of the *Washington Post*, good on themes." It's almost as if Alfred Hitchcock, making his signature appearance in a movie, had a character walk by him and say, "Who is that incredibly attractive fat man?" In this Toontown version of Washington, as in real Washington, the journalists and image-makers loom much larger than presidential candidates.

Although the show often re-creates the backstage life of the campaign in eerie detail—right down to the flower basket wallpaper in New Hampshire farm kitchens and the copies of *Bonfire of the Vanities* on the campaign plane seats—it misses on one point. Political reporters are depicted in a dashing way, swigging Jack Daniels out of the bottle, playing strip poker, and dancing to Frank Sinatra tapes. But reportorial flair is an anachronism, dating from an earlier era before the bus was invaded by Coneheads—ambitious and earnest young reporters who do not have fun. The actor playing the hard-driving *Washington Post* reporter even shows up on the trail in expensive, well-cut suits and elegant ties—a lack of sartorial verisimilitude.

THE SHOW'S central irony is Tanner himself. In a year of uninspiring and flawed choices, Trudeau set out to invent his ideal candidate. As he told one interviewer, "He was created by a group of us saying, 'Well, who would we really like to see run for president? What are some of his characteristics?' And then we went from there." But Trudeau is like the middle-aged man who divorces his wife and then marries a younger version of the same woman. Given the opportunity to create anything—a Thomas Jefferson, an Abraham Lincoln—he gives us Gary Hart II, and the horror continues.

There are some early hints that we might be in for a Jekyll and Hart transformation, when the amiable Tanner

Introductory $1.00 Offer

Learn About History's Great Insights Every Month!

Featuring narration by Walter Cronkite and Louis Rukeyser.

The wisdom of the *past* can help us better understand the *present* and anticipate the *future*. But how many of us have time to read and study the ideas of classic authors?

For those who don't, *Knowledge Products* has gathered the works of the world's most influential thinkers in an exciting series of audio cassettes.

DRAMATIZED PRESENTATIONS

The Audio Classics are not simply readings of great books — they are dramatized condensations of philosophy, politics, economics, war, and other timeless topics. You'll hear about the lives of classic authors and great historical leaders, the influences on their work, the criticisms and praises of observers, and much more. Each presentation combines the skill and imagination of talented actors with the narration of leading American journalists like ***Walter Cronkite*** and ***Louis Rukeyser.*** The Audio Classics Series™ is an efficient, enjoyable way to acquire knowledge. You can listen to these cassettes again and again with fresh insights and renewed enjoyment each time!

$1.00 TRIAL OFFER

Each month you'll receive almost 3 hours of enlightenment and entertainment, always on a 15-day risk-free trial. You can receive the first selection at the special price of $1.00 (plus $2.00 shipping & handling) — a savings of $13.95! Try the Audio Classics today to stimulate your mind, broaden your horizons, and enrich your life! Simply mail the coupon below or call toll free ***1-800-876-4332.***

Here are some of the classic authors, great ideas and historic events that you'll learn about:

1 THE GIANTS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
• Jefferson • Paine • Thoreau • Garrison • Smith • Mill • Wollstonecraft • Machiavelli • Boetie • Marx & Engels • Rousseau • Hamilton, Madison & Jay • Burke • Hobbes • Locke • Tocqueville

2 THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION *(narrated by Walter Cronkite)*
• Constitutional Convention • Ratification Debates • Text of the Constitution • Bill of Rights and Additional Amendments

3 THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS *(narrated by Louis Rukeyser)*
• Classical • Marx • Austrian • Marshall • Welfare Capitalism • Walras • Schumpeter • Institutionalism • Chicago School • Free Market • Keynes • Post Keynes • Supply Side/Monetarism

4 THE UNITED STATES AT WAR
• American Revolution • War of 1812 • Civil War • Mexican War • Spanish American War • WWI • WWII • Korean War • Vietnam War

5 THE GIANTS OF PHILOSOPHY
• Plato • Aristotle • Augustine • Aquinas • Kant • Spinoza • Hume • Hegel • Schopenhauer • Kierkegaard • Nietzsche • Dewey • Sartre

6 PLUS, MORE GREAT IDEAS ON IMPORTANT TOPICS OF INTEREST TO YOU!

CALL TOLL FREE 1-800-876-4332 Ext. 350
TO START YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TODAY!

☐ YES! Send me, for $1.00 plus $2.00 shipping and handling, Common Sense and The Declaration of Independence, and begin my no-risk subscription to the Audio Classics Listening Library. I will receive an album of two cassettes every month, and you'll charge my credit card $14.95 plus $2 shipping and handling ($4 outside the U.S.) for each album. If I'm ever displeased, I have the right to return the current album within 15 days and owe nothing. I may drop out of the program at any time without penalty.

Introductory Offer $1.00

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐ Charge my credit card.

☐ MasterCard ☐ Visa ☐ American Express

EXPIRATION DATE _____

ACCOUNT NUMBER _____ SIGNATURE _____

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS® Customer Service Center
Box 305151 • Nashville, TN 37230 #350

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

starts talking about "the currency and power of ideas," laughingly acknowledges that he feels smarter than the rest of the candidates, and sneaks off to a motel room with a Magic Fingers massage bed to meet a pretty brunette. Soon Tanner adopts a chilly smile, begins standing in corners by himself, and makes reference to Copernicus, Darwin, Thomas Jefferson, and unalienable rights in the same sentence. According to Blumenthal, Trudeau originally intended to give Tanner only one Hartian quality—an affair with an inappropriate woman. Because Tanner is divorced and available, he needs to go out of his way to pick just the wrong person and he does: the deputy campaign manager for his rival, Michael Dukakis. Soon the *Washington Post* sniffs out this story and runs ominous stories calling it "an untenable conflict of interest."

Tanner's savvy, chain-smoking campaign manager, who has proved in earlier episodes that she understands the rules of campaign safe sex, confronts him: "You compromised not one but two presidential campaigns. What in the hell were you thinking about? What is it about guys like you and Hart?" When Tanner sullenly demurs that he is not like Hart, she presses on, finally asking the candidate something the viewer has been wondering for quite some time. Why is he running if he can't shake his self-conscious disdain? "You act like it's a goddamn lifestyle choice, like you're on sabbatical and had a year to kill," she says. "I'm so tired of watching you disengage whenever you feel like it." The campaign, she tells him on her way out, is important—"much more important than this year's girlfriend."

BUT THE similarities between Tanner and Hart are more than a good head of hair and a bad attitude about sex. Trudeau, like Hart, seems to believe that the means test for anyone who would be good at governing is that he should be bad at running. He seems to feel, like Hart, that the best politicians are ones who hate politics—those who scorn the grubby realities of running in favor of high-flown discourses on governance. Trudeau seems to give credence to Tanner's whiny arguments that if he compromises and wears his hair spray and makeup on a television appearance, it will detract from his "realness." He scorns his staff's attempts to make him look like a more forceful leader, explaining, "Being natural is one thing but trying to appear that way is a contradiction in terms. It's what Daniel Boorstin alluded to in his book as the 'human pseudo event.' "

We know Tanner has really become Hart when Robert Squier lets him have it at the Washington cocktail party. When Tanner begins complaining that his staff is "exploiting" him by trying to make his campaign commercials reflect his most deeply held beliefs, Squier snaps that he will have to learn to play the game better if he wants the nomination. "They're not going to take a cloak and drape it around your damn shoulders," he says, as Tanner stares back blankly. "You've got to go out and grab it."

Although Tanner is meant to seem flawed but decent, pretty soon he just seems flawed. He is finally reminiscent of the Washington lawyer who struggled to give his girlfriend a sign of commitment by saying, "I feel more ambivalent about you than I've ever felt about anyone." That doesn't make his picaresque journey any less perversely fascinating for insiders to watch, though. What's to become of Tanner will soon be seen on the small screen, as he goes to the convention in Atlanta and tries to cut a deal on delegates with Dukakis. What does Jack want? Mostly, he wants a renewal from HBO that will take the show through November. It would be a shame, for real and for reel, if he has to dematerialize before the election. On the other hand, it might be the perfect metaphor for the meaninglessness of it all. □


"This timely, readable biography
integrates Tutu's personal story with a strong sense of what it is like to live under apartheid. . . . Through apt quotation, du Boulay communicates the charisma that comes from Tutu's faith, passion, humor, and ebullience."
—BOOKLIST
TUTU
VOICE OF THE VOICELESS
SHIRLEY DU BOULAY
"Voice of the Voiceless will prove the definitive study for the many biographers of Tutu to come. We are offered an always absorbing and impressively researched chronology of Africa's most famous contemporary."
—THE TABLET
Cloth, $22.50
ISBN 0-8028-3649-6
To order, call 1-800-633-9326 or write:
WM. B. EERDMANS PUBLISHING CO.
255 JEFFERSON AVE. S.E. / GRAND RAPIDS, MICH. 49503

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE BLACK SIDE OF THE STORY

Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 by Eric Foner

(Harper & Row, 690 pp., $29.95)

It has been more than a generation since any historian has attempted to write a general history, based on the sources, of the tumultuous years following the American Civil War. Indeed, aside from a few excellent interpretative essays, such as Kenneth M. Stampp's *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877* (1965) and Michael Perman's *Emancipation and Reconstruction, 1862-1879* (1987), it is hard to think of any general history of the period that is more worth reading than William Archibald Dunning's old, prejudiced, but nevertheless informative *Reconstruction, Political and Economic*, published in 1907 in the original "American Nation Series," edited by Albert Bushnell Hart. Appropriately enough, then, the latest attempt to tell the full story of the postwar era, Eric Foner's *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877*, appears in "The New American Nation Series," edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris.

Foner's book is a splendid addition to the series. This is history written on a grand scale, a masterful treatment of one of the most complex periods of American history. *Reconstruction* is an eloquent re-creation of the time when, for a brief moment, it seemed American society might be reconstructed so that all men (though not yet all women) would be treated as equal before the law. It is also a moving account of the failure of that dream—a failure so complete that, as Foner says, it would be nearly a century "before the nation again attempted to come to terms with the implications of emancipation and the political and social agenda of Reconstruction."

A comparison of Foner's book with Dunning's tells a good deal about the changes that have occurred in American historical writing. Dunning required 378 pages, or about 100,000 words, to tell his story of Reconstruction. Foner needs 690 pages, or about a quarter of a million words, for his. Obviously Foner presents a fuller, more leisurely story, and, employing an artfully simple style, he does not so much assert his interpretations as insinuate them through striking quotations and revealing anecdotes. Dunning's book reads like a lawyer's brief; Foner's, like a complex, closely plotted novel.

Dunning relied heavily on five collections of manuscripts—those of Salmon P. Chase, Andrew Johnson, Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and Lyman Trumbull. Since there was little previous scholarly writing on the Reconstruction period, he rested his conclusions on the evidence he found in these sources. Foner, on the other hand, has been able to draw on an enormous accumulation of books, articles, and dissertations written on Reconstruction, mostly during the last quarter century. Foner, of course, has done a prodigious amount of research himself; his bibliography lists more than 100 manuscript collections—including all those that Dunning cited. But unlike Dunning, he has used his sources not so much to establish new interpretations as to illustrate, or sometimes clarify, views that have been advanced by other scholars.

The books' interpretations provide an even greater contrast than their methodologies. In Dunning's version of Reconstruction, which remained the authoritative account during most of the first half of this century, the benevolent plans of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson for a speedy restoration of the Union were overturned by the Radical Republicans, headed by Thaddeus Stevens, "truculent, vindictive, and cynical," and Charles Sumner, "the perfect type of that narrow fanaticism which erudition and egotism combine to produce." At the insistence of the Radicals, the former slaves of the Confederates were enfranchised, and, assisted by renegade white Southerners (scalawags) and predatory Northerners (carpetbaggers), they initiated a period of Black Reconstruction. There ensued in each of the Southern states a carnival of corruption, which the ignorant and venal administration of Ulysses S. Grant did much to encourage. In time, however, right-thinking Northerners joined with the desperately oppressed Southern whites to overthrow the Negro-carpetbag-scalawag govern-

Election-Year Reading

Ritual, Politics, and Power
David I. Kertzer

A lively and—in this election year—particularly timely look at the role of ritual in political life.

"From Machiavelli, Venetian doges, and Jacobins to JFK's funeral and Gorbachev and Reagan's recent joustings for media attention, Kertzer **brilliantly illuminates the symbolic aspects of low and high politics.**" —Joseph LaPalombara

"Fascinating, amusing, and topical." —Myron J. Aronoff $22.00

Common Decency
Domestic Policies After Reagan
Alvin L. Schorr

"After Reagan, in a political climate more receptive to sensible social policy, liberals will badly need clearly articulated goals and technically sound devices to achieve them. . . . **Here is a realistic social agenda."**—Robert Lekachman $9.95 *paperback*

The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon
The Crisis of Purpose in Afro-American Politics
Adolph L. Reed, Jr.

"Democratic Party leaders . . . should find Reed's data useful. So will anyone else who comes to it with more than a superficial interest—and knowledge—of Jackson's life."—Clarence Page, *The Chicago Tribune* $8.95 *paperback*

Why Presidents Succeed
A Political Psychology of Leadership
Dean Keith Simonton

"A brilliant, comprehensive, much-needed analysis of presidential performance from Washington to Reagan, which **every presidential aspirant should ponder. . . . A major contribution."** —R. Gordon Hoxie, President, Center for the Study of the Presidency $22.50

Yale University Press
Dept. 3546, 92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520
(203) 432-0940

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments and to restore "home rule"—a euphemism for white supremacy—in the South.

Foner's account could hardly be more different. Lincoln's ambivalences about the future of blacks are passed over rather lightly, but Foner is merciless in his treatment of Andrew Johnson, who had "two interrelated goals—white supremacy in the South and his own re-election as president." In Foner's version, the Radical Republicans were not motivated by economic or political self-interest; they sincerely hoped "to reshape Southern society in the image of the small-scale competitive capitalism of the North." The Reconstruction legislation they adopted—including both the 14th and the 15th Amendments to the Constitution—marked "a radical departure" from the past, "a stunning and unprecedented experiment in interracial democracy."

From the very beginning their goal was rejected by the old planter class of the South, who intended to keep blacks in a state of peonage that was little better than slavery. Efforts by Freedmen's Bureau officials to protect the blacks were frustratingly unsuccessful, largely because these government agents "never quite comprehended the depths of racial antagonism and class conflict in the postwar South." Nor did enfranchisement, required by Radical Reconstruction legislation, serve to defend them, because violence by Southern whites against their former slaves became "an intrinsic part of the process of social change" in the region. It culminated in the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, "certainly one of the most ignoble chapters in all of American history." Only continuing Northern supervision—and occasionally Northern military intervention—kept the promising experiment of Reconstruction alive in the South, but after 1869 Northern interest in Southern problems "gave way to issues arising from the economic legacy of the war and the impact of capitalism's rapid expansion." "Abandoned by the nation," the Reconstruction governments in the former Confederacy "fell victim to violence and fraud."

Thus, like a number of other recent historians, Foner has reversed the values that Dunning-school historians gave to nearly all the players in the Reconstruction drama. But he has gone beyond his revisionist colleagues in stressing "the centrality of the black experience" in the Reconstruction story. In a deliberate effort to overturn stereotypes, he offers an admiring picture of the freedmen during the postwar years. Absent from his pages are the clichés that filled the Dunning-school monographs: the ignorant ex-slaves, bewildered by freedom; the shiftless black field hands too lazy to do honest work; the self-promoting black leaders who capitalized on their followers' credulousness; the venal and corrupt black politicians in the state legislatures. Indeed, in attempting to erase these racist caricatures, Foner at times overidealizes the black community; it would be welcome to find in his pages a freedman who was less than heroic. But even if Foner's picture is somewhat one-dimensional, he has performed a real service in bringing blacks front and center in the Reconstruction drama, where they belong.

"RATHER THAN passive victims of the actions of others or simply a 'problem' confronting white society," Foner argues, "blacks were active agents in the making of Reconstruction." Some 180,000 blacks who enlisted in the Union armies "played a crucial role not only in winning the Civil War, but in defining the war's consequences." Because the Army served as a school "for men of talent and ambition" and "flung open a door to advancement and respectability," it trained many of the black political leaders of the postwar years.

Both leaders and followers emerged from slavery with a fierce "desire for independence from white control, for autonomy both as individuals and as members of a community." One illustration of that desire was the establishment of separate Negro churches, which became the seedbed of civil rights leadership in both the 19th and 20th centuries. Though Foner offers no close demographic evidence, he suggests that the Reconstruction years also had a profound effect on the black family. Indeed, he argues, "blacks during Reconstruction laid the foundation for the modern black community."

Universally blacks wanted land, which was half promised to them in the Freedmen's Bureau Act and through General Sherman's orders, and in the few cases where Southern whites allowed them to purchase land, they formed prosperous, self-respecting communities. Foner realistically notes that a sweeping policy of allocating small plots of lands to the freedmen "would hardly, by itself, have solved the economic plight of black fam-

THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL

"Has compiled a brilliant odyssey of how political money works its will, whether it 'walks around' in Baltimore or sends its message in Washington." —ADAM CLYMER

"*Power and Money* further develop[s] and exemplif[ies] his unique insight into the dynamics of political changes in our times."
—DAVID S. BRODER

"One of the *Washington Post's* best political reporters."
—FRED BARNES, *The Washingtonian*



$19.95, now at your bookstore

W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
NORTON
500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ilies," but he believes that "land distribution would have had profound consequences for Southern society, weakening the land-based economic and political power of the old ruling class, . . . and affecting the former slaves' conception of themselves."

WITH ALMOST equal unanimity blacks insisted on their right to participate in public life. In the state constitutional conventions throughout the South, mandated by the Radical Reconstruction legislation, black representatives performed creditably, for even the uneducated delegates "proved perfectly capable of judging political and constitutional questions and promoting the interests of their constituents." In "a stunning departure in American politics," over 600 blacks served as legislators in the reconstructed states, and they used their ballots with "political shrewdness and independence." Foner considers this massive participation of blacks in public life "the most radical development of the Reconstruction years."

Unlike some other recent students, such as Thomas Holt, whose *Black Over White* (1977) describes a highly factionalized black electorate in South Carolina, Foner believes that the "politically tenacious black community" maintained a "remarkable political unity" throughout the Reconstruction years. On key issues involving racial justice, blacks went far beyond the policies of either their scalawag or carpetbagger allies. Envisioning "a society purged of all racial distinctions," blacks in every Southern state defeated proposals to require segregation in schools and other public institutions; "while most blacks . . . did not object to voluntary racial separation, they insisted the state must remain colorblind." "Not for the first time in the nation's history," Foner observes, "their commitment to the ideal of equal citizenship exceeded that of other Americans." Largely in consequence of the struggles of these black Americans, he concludes, Reconstruction established "a standard of equal citizenship and a recognition of blacks' right to a share of state services that differed sharply from the heritage of slavery and Presidential Reconstruction, and from the state-imposed segregation that lay in the future."

Welcome as a corrective to earlier interpretations, Foner's stress on the centrality of the black experience in some ways weakens his purpose to present "a coherent, comprehensive modern account of Reconstruction." *Reconstruction* is not truly a history of the South during Reconstruction, for its focus is almost exclusively on the Southern blacks—not on the Southern whites who made up about 60 percent of the population of the former Confederate states in 1870. In Foner's history, whites tend to be invisible men. To be sure, planters are introduced from time to time, usually to show how they conspired to exploit black laborers or to keep blacks from voting, and yeoman farmers get a dutiful paragraph or two. But Foner is so lacking in sympathy for all Southern whites that their problems receive none of the thoughtful analysis and sympathetic understanding he gives to issues that confronted blacks. Readers of *Reconstruction* will not understand that most ex-Confederates were not involved in the lynchings, terrorism, and Ku Klux Klan vigilantism to which Foner devotes so much attention. Instead, they lived hard-scrabble lives, attempting to restore a region devastated by war.

Indeed, Foner's stress on the distinctive experience of blacks during Reconstruction sometimes causes him to slight the difficulties that both whites and blacks faced in the South. As Gavin Wright has recently shown in *Old South, New South* (1986), the basic problem with the Southern economy during the post-Civil War decades was not so much ra-

LibertyPress/LibertyClassics

GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION

Compiled and Edited by William B. Allen

April 1989 marks the bicentennial of George Washington's presidency, yet this is the only one-volume compilation of his writings in print. Washington must now be acknowledged as a man of considerable political insight.



"Professor Allen's choices are excellent and should enable the reader to gain insight into Washington's political thought and his ideas about American liberty and the republic. It is a fine volume." — *Robert Middlekauff, The Huntington Library*

"George Washington: A Collection is an important addition to the literature on the American Revolution. The book provides a splendid introduction to Washington and his political beliefs, to the events of the Revolution through which he lived, and to the eighteenth-century world." — *Pauline Maier, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

743 pages. Printed throughout in two colors with 15 illustrations.

Hardcover $26.00 **0-86597-059-9**
Paperback $ 9.50 **0-86597-060-2**
Liberty Fund edition, 1988

Please send me: *George Washington: A Collection*
Liberty Fund edition, 1988

Quan.		Price	Amount
	Hardcover	$26.00	
	Paperback	9.50	
		Subtotal	
		Indiana residents add 5% sales tax	
		Total	

☐ Enclosed is my check or money order made payable to Liberty Fund, Inc.

☐ Please send me a copy of your latest catalogue.

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

We pay book rate postage. Please allow approximately 4 weeks for delivery. All orders must be prepaid in U.S. dollars.

Mail to: Liberty Fund, Inc.
7440 North Shadeland Avenue
Department X109
Indianapolis, IN 46250

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cial discrimination or the share-cropping system—malign as both were—as the decline in the world demand for American cotton. That decline kept the price of cotton so low that for Southern whites and blacks alike the central issue of the period was how to make a living—not what party held power or who was elected to the state legislatures. Foner offers only two passing references to this major economic change.

His stress on the centrality of the black experience also to some extent undermines Foner's intention to "place the Southern story within a national context," to show "how changes in the North's economy and class structures affected Reconstruction." Devoting so much of his space to the condition of blacks in the South, Foner does not have room for extended account of Northern political developments or election campaigns, nor does he handle these matters with the methodological sophistication and the statistical tools now expected in superior political history. Tariff controversies are hardly mentioned; the fight over the resumption of specie payments, which once loomed as the central economic issue of the era, is referred to only in passing; farm protest movements get short shrift; Indian wars are covered in a couple of paragraphs; and foreign relations are passed over lightly. On all these issues Foner's account is less full and less perspicacious than that of Dunning, who insisted that Reconstruction was a national, not a local problem, and that the proper focus for the historian should be on the victorious rather than the vanquished section of the country.

Foner's *Reconstruction*, then, is not truly a comprehensive history of the United States during the Reconstruction decade, nor is it a history of the South during Reconstruction. It is, however, a major contribution to Afro-American history, which adds immensely to our understanding of the role played by blacks during the Reconstruction years. Foner has written a powerful and moving account of the genuine accomplishments of black people against overwhelming odds.

DAVID HERBERT DONALD

David Herbert Donald, Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard, is author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning *Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War* (Knopf).

THE PEACOCK THROWN

The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations by James A. Bill

(Yale University Press, 520 pp., $25)

For nearly 35 years after World War II ended, observes James Bill in his panoramic history of U.S.-Iran relations, "the United States anchored its national interests to this small, non-Western, absolute monarchy on a scale unprecedented in American diplomacy." More recently, the two countries have been linked in a very different way: as the embodiment of each other's deepest political fears and loathings. And the American shoot-down of an Iranian airliner will only further postpone the day when relations between Washington and Tehran can be placed on anything even approaching a non-hysterical basis. Thus it's hardly surprising that America's failure to keep this oil-rich, strategically located land in friendly—or at least not violently hostile—hands is becoming one of our leading foreign policy fables.

Like Munich and Vietnam, the Iran episode is thought to hold profound lessons for American statesmen, particularly for their frustrating efforts to deal with the turbulent Third World. Yet like Vietnam, the Islamic revolution that shattered a cornerstone of American grand strategy occurred too recently for a critical consensus to have formed. Instead, two clashing schools of thought vie for influence.

The first, reflecting what foreign policy sophisticates call a globalist view, depicts America's staunch support for the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as a simple necessity in a dangerous world dominated by East-West rivalry. From his CIA-assisted return to power in 1953 to his ouster in 1979, the argument goes, the Shah faithfully helped Washington keep the Persian Gulf and its oil out of the Soviet orbit, provided valuable platforms for American intelligence operations (notably two installations that long monitored Soviet missile test flights), sold oil to the West at cut-rate prices through 1973, and quietly befriended Israel. And while he may have employed torturers, the Shah was really a social and political reformer at heart.

His overthrow, it is said, stemmed mainly from the same post-Vietnam outbreak of moral and strategic confusion in Washington that undermined Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Jimmy Carter's naive human rights pressures fatally unnerved the Shah and emboldened his foes, and his guilt-stricken administration withheld crucial support when the monarchy needed it most. As in Nicaragua, Carter's blundering aided the triumph not only of declared enemies of the West, but of rulers far more tyrannical than their predecessors.

The second school of thought, reflecting a so-called regionalist view, insists that American policy stumbled in Iran and elsewhere in the Third World precisely because of its anti-Soviet, globalist focus. Viewing developing countries like Iran simply as pawns in the cold war, presidents from Eisenhower to Carter hitched American fortunes to pro-Western "one-bullet regimes," no matter how unpopular, and arrogantly ignored the nationalistic forces building in the societies they ruled. Uninterested in understanding developing societies, Washington guaranteed that the inevitable revolutions would be bitterly anti-American.

The Eagle and the Lion, written by one of America's foremost specialists on Iran, weighs in heavily in the regionalists' favor. Imbued early in his career with a love of Iran and its people, Bill visited the country frequently during the 1960s and 1970s in an effort "to immerse myself as completely as possible in the society." He met not only the usual Westernized intellectuals and politicians of Tehran, but the peasants, mullahs, busboys, and merchants shunned by insular American diplomats. Drawing on these firsthand experiences, on a thoroughgoing familiarity with America's Iran policy-makers both in Washington and in the field, and on voluminous academic and documentary sources from both nations (including the shredded U.S. intelligence papers pieced back together by the militants who captured the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979), Bill makes a powerful case that American policy toward Iran has been marked by "pervasive ignorance."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In fact, Bill's regionalist brief—skillfully woven through an absorbing tale of cold war confrontation, Persian pageantry and court intrigue, cloak-and-dagger escapades, corporate power, religious fervor, and revolution, with a cast of characters ranging from presidents to street mobs—leaves the clear impression that America's Iran policy, especially since midcentury, couldn't have worked out worse if it had been planned that way.

AS BILL explains, through the end of World War II, Iranians from all walks of life viewed the United States as a champion of their struggle to resist Russian, and above all British, domination. But Americans began frittering away their stock of goodwill even before the war ended. The 30,000 Americans stationed in the country during the war profoundly offended their hosts with their drinking and brawling, as well as their apparent inability to drive about without hitting Iranian pedestrians. And on his visit to Tehran for a Big Four conference in 1943, Franklin Roosevelt snubbed the Shah and appalled Iranians with a proposal that would have opened the way to unprecedented Soviet influence in their country.

Thereafter, U.S. policy degenerated into a series of major insults to Iranian national pride. The most important was the CIA's extensive involvement in the military coup that ousted nationalist Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq and restored Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the Peacock Throne. But nearly as offensive to Iranians—and notably to a 65-year-old clergyman named Ruhollah Khomeini—was the Status of Forces Agreement in 1964. This treaty, which became known in Iran as the Capitulations Agreement, extended unparalleled diplomatic immunity to all uniformed and civilian Pentagon employees and their families stationed in Iran. Twelve days after approving this pact, the Iranian Parliament accepted what most Iranians viewed as the payoff—a $200 million loan from U.S. banks to purchase modern weapons.

In 1971 thousands of foreign dignitaries (many American) flocked to a champagne-drenched, $200 million blowout in the ancient capital of Persepolis celebrating the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy, while famine struck three Iranian provinces (including Persepolis's). Three years later, Richard Nixon appointed former CIA Director Richard Helms as U.S. ambassador to a

*"Fascinating. Policy makers, candidates, and voters would all benefit from reading it."**

Balanced Budgets & American Politics

James D. Savage

"A timely addition to this election year debate, and an important contribution to the understanding of the crucial role budgets have played throughout American history. The book traces budget politics from the birth of the nation, when for the years 1789-91, the total Federal gross debt was $77 million, to the end of President Reagan's first term . . . . Savage, an economist and political scientist, argues that balanced and unbalanced budgets have evoked powerful political emotions because of their link to competing visions of government and society. . . . The real value of *Balanced Budgets and American Politics* is the new dimension it adds to the study of budget politics by exploring how public attitudes toward debt and deficits have swayed the course of history."—*Susan J. Tolchin, *New York Times Book Review*. $27.95

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850

Exercise **More** with **Less**

■*MORE EFFECTIVE* By duplicating the motion of cross country skiing, the world's best exercise, NordicTrack provides the ideal aerobic workout.

■*MORE COMPLETE* Unlike bikes and other sitdown exercisers, NordicTrack exercises all the body's major muscles for a total body workout.

■*MORE CALORIES BURNED* In tests at a major university, NordicTrack burned more calories than an exercise bike and a rowing machine.*

■*MORE CONVENIENT* With NordicTrack, you can exercise in the comfort of your home. NordicTrack easily folds, requiring storage space of only 17" x 23".

*Scientific test results included in NordicTrack brochure.



■*LESS TIME* Because NordicTrack is so efficient, you burn more calories and get a better aerobic workout in less time.

■*NO IMPACT* Running and some aerobic workouts can cause painful and potentially harmful jarring. A NordicTrack workout is completely jarless.

■*NO DIETING* No other exercise machine burns more calories than NordicTrack . . . so you can lose weight faster without dieting.

■*NO SKIING EXPERIENCE REQUIRED* Easy and fun to use.

FREE BROCHURE AND VIDEO
Call Toll Free Or Write:
1-800-328-5888
In Minnesota 1-612-448-6987 In Canada 1-800-433-9582
141 Jonathan Blvd. N., Chaska, MN 55318
☐ Please send free brochure
☐ Also free video tape ☐ VHS ☐ BETA
Name _____
Street _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____
255H8

NordicTrack
A CML COMPANY © 1988 NordicTrack

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PHOTO BY WALLY McNAMEE

Unconventional Television

When it comes to televising important national events, no one does it like cable television's C-SPAN.

C-SPAN, a public service of the cable television industry, telecasts events without analysis or commentary—a "you are there" approach to national issues and the political process.

This summer, let C-SPAN take you to the Democratic and Republican national conventions. Only C-SPAN will televise the conventions in their entirety live and *without interruption*, giving you a delegate's-eye view of the entire event.

For a unique look at the presidential election process, join millions of Americans in making C-SPAN . . . Your Campaign Headquarters.

The Democratic National Convention
Live from Atlanta
July 18-21

The Republican National Convention
Live from New Orleans
August 15-18

C-SPAN AMERICA*S NETWORK

For information about C-SPAN availability in your area, contact your local cable television operator, or write:
C-SPAN • 444 North Capitol Street, NW • Suite 412 • Washington, DC 20001

country already convinced that the agency controlled its destiny. And on New Year's Eve 1978, with millions of already restive Iranians hoping for public American pressure on the Shah to liberalize his regime further, Jimmy Carter chose instead to toast his host as a respected, beloved leader whose country was an "island of stability." Barely one year later, the Shah flew into exile in Egypt. But in October 1979 came the crowning indignity—the decision to permit the Shah to receive medical treatment in America, which led directly to the seizure of the embassy.

BILL SHOWS that the only thing that American officials did well in 40 years of Iran policy-making was to stifle or freeze out dissenting advice from inside and outside their own government. The phrase "intelligence failure" scarcely does justice to this record of incompetence, which Americans seem to have forgotten was the work of figures who continue to enjoy respect and influence, such as Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Along the way, Bill retires some of the leading Iran myths underpinning the globalist view. The Shah, he demonstrates, was anything but an enthusiastic reformer, determined to modernize his country over the protests of a tradition-bound clergy. Rather, his reforms were largely designed to defuse dangerous social, economic, or political pressures. Seconding Barry Rubin's conclusion, Bill cites as the best example of the Shah's real motives his final liberalization campaign. Launched in the mid-1970s, this drive was designed not to stop Jimmy Carter's human rights nagging (Carter was not yet president), but to appease an increasingly violent opposition and possibly to co-opt the more Westernized middle-class elements of that opposition.

Nor did the Shah fit Jeane Kirkpatrick's description of the kind of friendly dictator morally and politically deserving of blanket U.S. support. Far from permitting the rhythms of traditional life to continue undisturbed, as Kirkpatrick put it, the Shah tried to break the clergy's power by closing religious publishing houses, asserting state control over the clerics' financial resources, infiltrating religious services with SAVAK agents, and imprisoning, torturing, and even killing large numbers of uncooperative clergymen. Bill also shows that Carter supported the Shah as single-mindedly as his less human-rights-minded prede-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cessors, contenting himself with only occasional and meek criticisms in public and private.

The Eagle and the Lion, moreover, makes clear that private American citizens were at work shaping American-Iran policy for their own purposes long before the Iran-*contra* affair. The rogues' gallery includes not only Michael Ledeen and Richard Secord, but Kissinger, David Rockefeller, and John McCloy, whose frantic lobbying to admit the cancer-stricken Shah into the United States undoubtedly reflected a peculiar combination of considerations that fogged their strategic vision—the financial interests of Chase Manhattan and a sentimental attachment to the former monarch. Indeed, one of the book's most valuable features is its description of America's "Pahlavites," those political and media luminaries, including Jacob Javits and his wife, Marian, Abraham Ribicoff, Barry Goldwater, Barbara Walters, Joseph Kraft, and Arnaud de Borchgrave, who promoted the Shah's image as tirelessly as if they were hired guns. (Mrs. Javits, of course, was just that.)

YET BILL FAILS to show that a regionalist policy would have worked much better. The regionalist thesis that the more Americans understand about foreign countries the better they can deal with them seems self-evident: it has a nice can-do ring. But it rests on several assumptions worth closely re-examining after decades of experience in the Third World.

For example, is Iran really comprehensible to Americans, or any Westerners? Bill insists that "serious understanding is possible" and scorns the view that Iranians are "irrational, fanatical, unpredictable, aberrant, or 'oriental' "—i.e., essentially unfathomable. But he acknowledges that Iranian politics and society are "extremely difficult to penetrate and explain," and reports that even most specialists "were baffled by the shifting depths of the Iranian personality." Indeed, Bill demonstrates that long years of studying Iranian history and culture did not prevent Anthony Eden from supporting retrograde Iran policies as British foreign secretary during the Mussadiq years.

Clearly, knowledge can help policymakers avoid the most obvious mistakes. But extra information is rarely decisive when it comes to the tough judgment calls required in most important foreign policy decisions. Moreover, imperfect knowl-

Honored as the best book of 1987-1988 by the National Conference of Black Political Scientists.

Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach *by Ronald W. Walters*

This book argues that blacks use the electoral system differently from other groups to achieve their social, political, and economic goals. Walters examines black participation in the politics of the primaries, party conventions, and general elections, showing the results of both traditional behind-the-scenes bargaining (dependent leverage) and the more recent direct entry into the presidential selection process as candidates (independent leverage). A veteran political scientist and an active participant in Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign, Walters deals with the most significant topics in black political studies and electoral studies in general.

State University of New York Press
P.O. Box 6525 / Ithaca, NY 14850 / (607) 277-2211
Walters. **Black Presidential Politics in America**
_____*$14.95 pb. 0-88706-547-3* _____*$44.50 hc. 0-88706-546-5*
Prepayment required. Please add $1.50 for postage and handling. NYS residents please add sales tax.

How many undeserved radar tickets were issued last year?

a) 1,012,317 **b)** 649,119 **c)** 0 **d)** No one knows

Unfortunately, the answer is **d)** No one knows. Over ten million tickets were issued last year. Some experts say up to thirty percent of them were incorrect.

Here's why

You may find this hard to believe, but traffic radar doesn't tell the operator which vehicle he is clocking. The radar unit displays one number. That's all. It might be the closest car, it might be the fastest car, it might be the biggest car. Or it might not. The operator has to decide.

And since radar operators are human, they don't always guess right. Even if only one percent of the tickets issued last year were wrong, that's *one hundred thousand undeserved tickets.*

Free report

Our engineers had to know every detail about traffic radar before they could design Escort and Passport, the most respected names in radar detection.

Now we've released a report that explains radar and radar errors, in plain language. And it's yours free. Just call us toll-free or mail the coupon.

FOR FREE REPORT ON TRAFFIC RADAR CALL TOLL FREE 1-800-543-1608

Or mail coupon to:
Cincinnati Microwave
Department 99988
One Microwave Plaza
Cincinnati, Ohio 45249-9502

Please send me your free report **TRAFFIC RADAR: How it works, and why it gets wrong readings.**

Name

Address

City

State, Zip

CINCINNATI MICROWAVE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

edge about other societies is the rule in diplomacy, not the exception, especially concerning countries with which America has almost nothing in common culturally or historically. As a result, the best guide for American foreign policy is a clear idea of America's own needs and wants.

And even if Americans could have comprehended so alien a society, would all friction have disappeared? Are misperceptions and misunderstandings primarily to blame for U.S.-Iran tensions, as Bill contends? These conclusions—and the all-important corollary that the two countries' interests are fundamentally compatible—are eminently debatable.

Specifically, America's key interest in Iran can be summed up in one word—oil. If Iran and its neighbors lacked oil, or if the West didn't need it, the Persian Gulf, Islamic fundamentalism, the Afghan conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, and the centuries-old Russian drive for influence and a warm-water port would matter about as much as border clashes between Niger and Mali. As is the case with most large Third World countries, exactly what Iran wants apart from survival is unclear. But under the Shah and his successors alike, a top Iranian priority has been somehow to assert the nation's pride and dignity after more than a century of foreign domination. This impulse is understandable, but it is not necessarily consistent with guaranteed Western access to oil at reasonable prices—especially if Iran's rulers despise not only the United States (however justifiably) but most of their pro-Western neighbors.

NOR IS IT clear that Washington could have done much to ease the hostility of Iran's eventual leaders. In this vein, the biggest problem with *The Eagle and the Lion* is its neglect of the opposition's program during or after the Shah's rule. Bill barely touches on the mullahs' vision of the theocracy they sought, and of how it would relate to the outside world, and he provides only the sketchiest profiles of Khomeini and his chief lieutenants. The little that we do read about the radical clergy's worldview—that it "rested on a fundamental distrust of the Western model of politics and the Western way of life"—suggests that America was resented as much for what it was as for what it did. But like all good regionalists, Bill plainly has trouble believing that, for ideological or geopolitical reasons, some Third World forces can be innately hostile to the West.

But even were this not the case in Iran, could Washington have mollified the opposition once the major mistakes had already been made—the dilemma America faced during the 1970s? Even granting Bill's argument that Nixon, Ford, and Carter handled matters as ineptly as possible, it is difficult to accept his insistence that even in 1977 the United States could have salvaged its image with most of the Shah's enemies. For one thing, if Iranians were ready to let bygones be bygones even after such outrages as the 1953 coup and the Status of Forces Agreement emphasized in Bill's analysis, then how truly pivotal—and disastrous—could these events have been?

Following an old regionalist convention, the author strongly suggests that even after the revolution astute American diplomacy could have courted the triumphant opposition's more moderate elements, bolstered them politically, and thereby helped guide Iran down a more progressive democratic path. But as Bill makes all too clear, the Westernized, generally middle-class reform leaders, who shared little with the radicals but a hatred of the Shah, always represented only a thin band on the chaotic Iranian political spectrum. For all the Western hopes vested in them, and their own unrealistic expectations of combining Khomeini's Islamic precepts with liberal democracy, the moderates enjoyed almost no mass support of their own. In the end, they could only ride the tiger.

Bill's list of 12 foreign policy lessons to be learned from Iran is no more satisfying. His archetypal suggestion that American officials "focus less on the Soviet role in Third World upheaval and more on the deepening class conflict and vibrant new forms of populist religion" sweeping these countries—as if that were certain to reveal new possibilities for accommodation—fails to recognize that indigenous radicals can threaten American interests as sharply as Kremlin puppets. Khomeini's Iran is a prime example; the Qaddafi and Noriega regimes are two others.

And American foreign policy cannot possibly navigate by the author's admonition to use military force only as a last resort. In some crises, especially when Moscow might be drawn in, using force should probably be ruled out quickly; in others, a swift resort to force might throw the adversary off balance or intimidate him, and even save lives on both sides in the long run. This is surely one lesson of Grenada, however incompetently the invasion was carried out. And the current situation in Panama may demonstrate the price of overcaution. As always in foreign policy, everything depends on the circumstances.

IN FACT, one finishes *The Eagle and the Lion* wondering if the basic problem of American policy toward Iran has been neither too much globalism nor too much regionalism, but the common conceptual framework unquestioningly accepted by both. Globalists and regionalists alike assume that the United States is stuck with its dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and therefore with the need to involve itself deeply in the region. They differ only on the forms such involvement should take. Both regard substantially greater energy independence for America as probably impossible and at the least prohibitively expensive.

But while pinning American security and prosperity to low-priced raw materials from faraway sources may have been sensible in the days of U.S. world predominance, today this strategy is—or should be—much more controversial. For it has left the United States in an all but impossible bind—addicted to supplies of a critical commodity located not only halfway around the world from its primary concentrations of military strength, but in the midst of chronically unstable states, right next door to its chief adversary.

BOON

I put my head
down low
finally and said

where then do I
belong: your
belonging

is to belong nowhere:
what am I
to be:

your being is to be
about to be:
what am I to

do: show
what doing comes to:
thank

you
for this office,
this use.

A.R. AMMONS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The purely economic case for heavy reliance on Gulf oil is no longer clear-cut either. The cost of these imports includes not only the retail price per barrel, but the $40-some-odd billion America spends annually to provide adequate military protection for the Gulf, as well as big portions of the foreign aid billions showered on Egypt and Israel, and the economic assistance and rent money that Washington pays to keep its Philippine bases. Add these costs to America's imported oil bill and even a $50 barrel equivalent price for synthetic fuels starts to look awfully competitive. And the benefit of secure supplies—which neither a regionalist nor a globalist strategy can guarantee—only heightens the attraction of allegedly uneconomical domestic energy alternatives.

Even if Americans won't kick the imported oil habit, the United States can do much more to limit consumption and diversify its foreign sources of supply—for example, by supporting exploration throughout the Third World, or by purchasing oil at premium prices from Mexico and other sources much easier to protect militarily than the Persian Gulf states, or through some kind of gasoline tax or other conservation measures. Further, since oil is a fungible commodity, these steps could reduce Western European and Japanese dependence on Persian Gulf producers as well.

In 1947 Walter Lippmann warned that the containment strategy just outlined by George Kennan would force America to lead "a coalition of disorganized, feeble or disorderly nations, tribes and factions" in the Third World that could not possibly resist Soviet pressures without massive American intervention. Bill's study indicates that relying too heavily on Third World producers of critical materials can be just as foolhardy. Neither the globalist nor the regionalist view offers satisfactory solutions to the dilemma he so exhaustively describes—America's extraordinary dependence on a small, backward, alien, and wounded land that may ultimately be incapable of re-creating an orderly politics and society. Escaping this bind will surely require more drastic departures from today's foreign policy approaches than Americans are accustomed to considering.

ALAN TONELSON

Alan Tonelson is writing a book for the Twentieth Century Fund on redefining U.S. foreign policy interests.

MADE IN AMERICA

Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America by Edmund S. Morgan

(Norton, 318 pp., $18.95)

"Size was the key," writes Edmund Morgan. The puzzle was how to frame a system of government that would be at once national in its vision and popular in its foundation. On the one hand, as Morgan observes, the country was already so far united that its government had to be conducted "in terms of a whole continent." On the other hand, because of the weakness of the federal authority under the Articles of Confederation, the forces of localism dominated at the center as well as the periphery. How to overcome localism, he says, was "the central problem" confronting the aspiration for self-government. The problem has continued into our own day. But the new parochialism of the Reaganites will find no support in the thought of the Madisonian nationalists who took the lead in framing and ratifying the Constitution.

In the 1780s the imbalance of power in favor of the states was nourished by the widely received opinion that government by the people could prosper only in a small polity. In this view, as Montesquieu put it, a big republic would be "distracted by a thousand private views," leading first to anarchy and then to tyranny. The small republic, however, would presumably have the homogeneity necessary for internal self-government and could provide for its external needs, such as defense, by a compact with other similar states. In this model of the "confederate republic," a contemporary could find a rationale for the Articles of Confederation and, accordingly, expect that regime to combine the advantages of both the small and the large republic without incurring their respective disadvantages.

The record of the Confederation in its later years fatally disappointed these expectations. According to James Madison, its "vices" were twofold: conflict among the states and oppression within them. The latter abuse in particular exemplified the "republican disease" of majority tyranny. Since no polity could ever be perfectly homogeneous, argued Madison, smallness of scale simply set the stage for a single-interest majority to oppress the minority, as in the case of debtors against creditors, or one dominant religious sect against the others. It followed that the way to avoid oppression by such factious majorities was to "extend the sphere" of government so as to "take in a greater variety of parties and interests" and thereby make it less probable that "a majority of the whole" would have the motive or the opportunity to "invade the rights of other citizens."

Setting forth this celebrated theory of the "extended republic" in the Tenth Federalist paper and other writings, Madison concluded that "the larger the society . . . the more duly capable it will be of self-government." America, therefore, could not govern itself successfully as 13 separate peoples, but only as the "one people," who in Jefferson's language had declared its independence in 1776. This audacious idea of "an American people," according to Morgan, was the "invention" by which Madison hoped to triumph over "the spirit of locality" that had brought the Confederation to the verge of dissolution. So great indeed was Madison's fear of the unchecked localism of the states and his faith in the superior wisdom of national deliberation that throughout the Philadelphia convention, and for some time after, he insisted—in vain—that Congress must have a veto over the harmful action states might take not only against other states, but also against themselves because of the "republican disease."

The clash between the small and the big republic theories centered on the role of diversity in popular government. Both sides agreed that greater scale is accompanied by greater differentiation. But the states rightists wanted, so far as possible, to isolate the resulting diversities under separate and autonomous governments in order to reduce conflict within these jurisdictions. The nationalists, while fully recognizing the value of "the diversities in the faculties of men," which, according to Madison, produced the pluralism of the extended republic,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No matter who wins, you can have your own reliable government source.

The Dorsey DICTIONARY *of* AMERICAN GOVERNMENT *and* POLITICS

JAY M. SHAFRITZ

With 3500 entries. Vital information on terms, concepts, events, laws, government agencies, political bios, etc.

"A splendid job—comprehensive, authoritative, and scholarly. It also has some delightful extras [including] cartoons and other illustrations."—James MacGregor Burns

"Very probably going to make itself indispensable."—Theodore Lowi, Cornell University

661 pages $34.95 cl. $18.95 pa.

The Dorsey Press
224 S. Michigan, Chicago IL 60604

Want to brush up on a foreign language?

With Audio-Forum's intermediate and advanced materials, it's easy to maintain and sharpen your foreign language skills.

Besides intermediate and advanced audio-cassette courses—most developed for the U.S. State Dept.—we offer foreign-language mystery dramas, dialogs recorded in Paris, games, music, and many other helpful materials. And if you want to learn a *new* language, we have beginning courses for adults and for children.

We offer introductory and advanced materials in most of the world's languages: French, German, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, Mandarin, Greek, Russian, Portuguese, Korean, Norwegian, Swedish, and many others.

Our 16th Year

Call 1-800-243-1234 for FREE 32-p. catalog, or write:

AUDIO-FORUM® Room B819.
96 Broad Street, Guilford, CT 06437
(203) 453-9794

aimed to bring the resulting array of interests and ideas into a central forum of government. There, thanks to the larger constituency, the narrowness of local views would be offset and the decisions of government brought closer to the impersonal demands of justice. Integration not segregation was the solution.

IN BRINGING about these happy outcomes, the "American people" would do two things. As the constituting authority, they would "ordain" the Constitution, converting those 7,000 or so words proposed by the Philadelphia convention into a fundamental law that bound both general and state governments; thus a federal system would be created that was authorized not by a compact among the states, but, as the preamble says, by the will of "We, the People of the United States." Madison was less consistent on this point than other nationalists, such as James Wilson. Yet their assertion of "an uncontrolled constituent power in the people," as Morgan puts it, served the eminently Madisonian purpose of undercutting any claim by the states to ultimate authority and became a main argument against nullification, interposition, and secession throughout our history.

As the governing authority, the American people also manned the machine they had set up for their governance. Its design, however, was no mere rendition of what Madison called "the republican principle" of majority rule. The Framers would agree that if you think of the people as abstracted from an institutional structure, the belief in popular government is indeed, as Morgan says, a "fiction." In order to turn that fiction into reality, the new system was therefore composed of elaborate mechanisms to counter the self-destructive tendencies of government by the people and to elicit its superior wisdom. The fundamental law laid down certain restraints upon government, restraints first mainly on the states and then on Congress in the Bill of Rights. Its nationalist champions, however, thought of it in a positive sense, terming it, in Wilson's words, "a declaration of the people in what manner they choose to be governed." Constitutionalism is sometimes conceived as hostile to democracy. In our beginnings it appeared not in opposition to popular government, but as an indispensable instrument of it.

We admire the deeds of the Framers. No one had ever done anything quite like this before. But what about their ideas? How innovative was Madison's "invention"?

Some scholars think that the case for the small republic and against the big republic goes back to classical thought. Plato and Aristotle did take up the question of scale, and both came down on the side of smallness. They applied this constraint, however, not only to government by the many, but to any decent regime—of the one, the few, the many, or a mix. The first clear statement I can find that scale uniquely constrains republics comes in Machiavelli's *Discourses* of 1513. Comparing the fate of popular government in the small republics of Sparta and Venice with its fate in the great Roman republic, Machiavelli concluded, for much the same reasons later advanced by Montesquieu, that if a republic were big enough for defense, it would succumb to internal "confusion" and ultimately to Caesarism; at the same time, he granted that if it were small enough for self-government, it would be weak against external foes. Seeing no escape from this dilemma of scale, Machiavelli reluctantly gave up the republican cause and declared his preference for the "greatness" of imperial Rome.

IF WE WANT to get at the precedents for American ideas, however, we must look, as Morgan does, at what was done and said during the struggle against the Stuarts in 17th-century England. The attempt to establish popular in place of royal government was a tragic failure. Some have thought it a farce. "A very droll spectacle it was," commented the aristocratic Montesquieu some 100 years later, "to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy." Vindicating Machiavelli's political science, a cacophony of dissent and sedition forced the collapse of the Commonwealth into the arms of Cromwell and prepared the way for a retreat to monarchy. In spite of this failure, however, the idea of the big republic was given an enormous impetus in the realm of political thought. Decentralization and even a kind of federalism were sometimes advocated, but the polity in question embraced a population not of thousands, as in a Greek city-state, but of millions, as in a modern nation-state.

As Morgan shows, Commonwealth thought anticipated the essentials of the American constitutional republic of 1787: the people in their two roles—as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ordainers of the Constitution and as governors—joined by a written fundamental law. This is surely a formula for popular government. But to call it "popular sovereignty," as Morgan does, can distract our attention from a crucial parting of the ways in political thought. The crux was the meaning of the term "sovereignty" and the location of that power in the state. One path led toward the British orthodoxy at the time of the American Revolution. This had been given its classic formulation by Blackstone in his *Commentaries* of 1760, where he defined sovereignty as "that absolute, despotic power which must in all governments reside somewhere" and which in the British constitution was entrusted to Parliament, giving it "sovereign and uncontrollable authority" to make and unmake all man-made laws, including those deemed "fundamental."

THE OTHER PATH led toward the view reached by the American colonists. Repudiating the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, they finally concluded that the ultimate lawmaking power rested not in any agency of government, but in the people, who authorize the frame of government and can intervene ad lib to alter it. When we add the further element of the people as the governing as well as the constituting authority, we clearly have a conception that can be called "popular sovereignty."

This conception of the role of the people came from Britain. But contrary to what Morgan seems to believe, it has never been generally accepted there. In the 18th century it was conventionally held that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 had terminated the long struggle with the Stuarts by vindicating not the sovereignty of the people, but the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament. The Bill of Rights of 1689 and the other formal instruments by which the English sought to legitimate the change avoided any suggestion of an uprising by "the people" and emphasized instead the role of existing institutions, above all the two houses of Parliament. In later years, Edmund Burke, for instance, drove home this distinction in his fierce attack on certain democratic reformers who claimed that in 1688 the English people acquired the right to choose their governors and their frame of government. "On the contrary," he declared, "they regenerated the deficient part of the old constitution through the parts that were not impaired. . . . They acted by the ancient organized states [estates] in the shape of their old organization, not by the organic *moleculae* of a disbanded people."

The distinction is important because it lights up a major issue of the American Revolution: popular versus parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover, today, as Colin Turpin, a British legal scholar, has recently observed, the "official or dominant theory of the British constitution" still locates sovereignty not in "the people," but in "the Crown in Parliament." We will not understand the great concentration of power in the British system of government as compared with the American unless we take into account this profound difference not only in legal theory, but also in political culture. While avoiding this British extreme, "the continentally minded men" of 1787 nevertheless gave us a constitutional theory capable of coping with "the spirit of locality" that plagues democratic politics, as Madison feared and Morgan richly illustrates.

SAMUEL H. BEER

Samuel H. Beer is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government Emeritus at Harvard University.


Windjammin'
It's everything you've always fantasized
Sail aboard traditional Great Sailing Ships to exotic ports of call in the Caribbean, unspoiled by civilization. Stroll along hidden coves and beaches where your footprints are the only ones in the sand. Move to the beat of native steel drums and Reggae music. Lose yourself to a whole other world where time is measured by sunrises and sunsets. That's Windjammin'. And there's nothing like it.
Windjammin' is also congenial shipmates. Great food and drink. And all the swimming, snorkeling, sunning and partying you can handle. All for as little as $625 for six days and we'll share your airfare.
Call or write for your free Great Adventure Booklet.
4552
Windjammer Barefoot Cruises LTD.
800-327-2600 (IN FLA. 800-432-3364) (305) 373-2090
Name
Address
City/State/Zip
P.O. BOX 120, DEPT. MIAMI BEACH, FL 33119-0120

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOYS IN BERLIN

The Temple
by Stephen Spender

(Grove Press, 224 pp., $15.95)

What a writer becomes depends on where he goes when he's young: that's at least an arguable thesis. Eliot went to London, Hemingway went to Spain, Graves went to war, and so became the writers that we know. If Eliot had gone to the bullfights instead, he'd have become somebody else, and *The Waste Land* would no doubt have a gored torero in it instead of a drowned sailor.

These geographical speculations were started by thoughts of the Auden Gang—how they chose to go to Germany at the end of the 1920s, when the fashionable place to go was Paris, and how English writing was changed by the fact that they went there. Not a lot of them went—Auden, Isherwood, and Spender are the ones that count—but their collective influence was considerable among their own generation and the one after, and echoes of their voices can still be heard in young writers.

Why did they go? Not for the politics, certainly. The Germany they went to was pre-Hitler—politically volatile but not politically interesting to these unpolitical young men. For Weimar culture, then? Perhaps in a sense, though they didn't know about Brecht, or the Bauhaus, or UFA films when they set out. Isherwood later explained their primary motive in a simple sentence: "To Christopher, Berlin meant Boys." And Auden, in a private letter, put it even more forcefully: "Berlin is a bugger's daydream." In Weimar Germany one could live a free sexual life without fear of persecution; one could be openly homosexual there, and if one were an inhibited Englishman, and didn't exactly know how, one could learn.

But the motive was clearly not simply boys and buggery. Sexual freedom there certainly was, but it was in a way a symbol for broader freedoms, which got less attention, because they were less shocking. (The same was true in the United States in the 1960s: American society loosened up in many ways then, but the sexual revolution got all the publicity, because sleeping in heaps was simply more titillating than changes in family relations, or conventions of dress, or prose style, or the structure of the Democratic Party.) These young Englishmen were (with various degrees of certainty) homosexuals, but they were also writers, and Germany seemed to offer them an atmosphere in which writing freely would be possible.

It wasn't possible in England then. We think of the '20s as a liberated time, when Western societies cast off the restraints of the pre-war past; and so it was in Germany, where defeat in the Great War had brought an old order to an end. But England had won, and so was condemned to carry into the post-war years the burden of its past. The spirit of DORA, the wartime censorship regulations, continued into the '20s, and there were many acts of official suppression. Some of them became famous cases—*Ulysses*, *The Well of Loneliness*, Max Beerbohm's drawing of Edward VII in heaven, D. H. Lawrence's paintings, *Lady Chatterley's Lover* are classics in the history of censorship. Others are forgotten—*The Autobiography of a Child* and *Sleeveless Errand*, for instance, and a painting titled *The Breakdown*, banned from the Royal Academy summer show in 1926 because it represented a nude white woman dancing before a black musician. Sex, race, and the royal family were still delicate issues in the England of the '20s, as delicate as they had been 30 years earlier, when Victoria was on the throne; Weimar Germany would have had no problems with any of them.

All of the young men who went to Germany wrote about their lives there. Isherwood wrote *Berlin Stories*; Spender put his experiences into poems, and into his letters to Isherwood (which were published a few years ago); Auden, the most reticent of the three, wrote "1929" and the first of the *Orators* odes. None of these writings could be described as a bugger's dream; none is about homosexuality in the way, say, that Forster's *Maurice* is. Look at the first stanza of Spender's poem, "In 1929":

> A whim of Time, the general arbiter,
> Proclaims the love instead of death of friends.
> Under the domed sky and athletic sun
> The three stand naked: the new, bronzed German,
> The Communist clerk, and myself, being English.

More monumental than erotic, I'd say—a sort of heroic statue to International Brotherhood. And even Isherwood's stories, though they deal with some pretty louche characters, are only sexually specific about Mr. Norris's comical (and heterosexual) masochism; the real subject is the narrator's extreme detachment—the freedom of the camera eye.

It isn't sexual freedom, then, that the early writings of these young men are primarily about. What they seem to have gotten from the Weimar experience was a sense of freedom of a more general kind, the feeling of living without rules. Any traveler in a foreign country knows that feeling: that he has left his own rules behind, and that somehow the local ones don't apply. But because these young travelers were also writers, freedom for them meant something more; it meant not having to be *English* writers. They could be free of English conventions, English inhibitions, English themes, English characters, all the baggage of the English cultural past. In Auden's first ode in *The Orators*, "Christopher" says: "Tell the English . . . Man is a spirit." For Christopher (and for Auden) the English are somewhere else: he and his friends, "in cold Europe, in the middle of Autumn destruction," are outside nationality. And so they are free—free to act as they choose, but also free to write, free to imagine. Or so it seemed, then.

That sense of freedom is what that small circle of young writers gave to English culture of the '30s, and it is that sense that makes the '30s writings of their generation so much more interesting than anything done by their American contemporaries. They had escaped provinciality; we hadn't. And it was surely the power of that feeling of freedom that brought them back to their German memories in later years, to tell the story again, and more directly, stripped of the veils of fiction: first Spender, in *World Within World*, and then Isherwood, in *Christopher and His Kind*. For both, the days in Germany had been crucial to their lives as artists and as men.

Stephen Spender is the last survivor of the group, and *The Temple* must be the last account we will have of their Weimar lives. The last to be published, that is: it was one of the first to be written—nearly 60 years ago, in the autumn of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1929. Spender reworked it over the next couple of years, and submitted a revised version to Geoffrey Faber in 1931. Faber considered the manuscript unpublishable—it was, he said, both libelous and pornographic; so Spender dropped it into a drawer, from which he retrieved it in the '60s, "during some financial crisis of the kind to which poets are liable," and sold it to the University of Texas. John Fuller found it there 20 years later, and told Spender about it. Spender sent for a copy, rewrote it, and here it is, a '20s novel in the '80s.

TO ANYONE who knows anything about the lives of Auden and his friends, Spender's story—or at least the first part of it—will be familiar. A young writer of homosexual inclinations leaves Oxford to go to Hamburg in the summer of 1929. There he meets German young men of similar sexual tastes, and enters their hedonistic, sunbathing, party-going society. Later he travels to Berlin to visit an English writer-friend, and goes for a holiday on the Baltic coast, where he makes love first with a man and then with a woman. Still later he goes for a walking tour with a male friend along the Rhine. Then he returns to England. It's virtually the same story that Spender has told (except for the sexual encounters) in the third chapter of *World Within World*, and more elliptically in his poems of the time.

The principal characters are familiar too; we have met them before in *Lions and Shadows* and *World Within World*, and in Auden's poems, and in biographies of Auden: the overpowering, brilliant Auden-figure, here called Simon Wilmot; remote, manipulative William Bradshaw (Isherwood's two middle names, which he would use for his own self-portrait in *Mr. Norris Changes Trains*); the Spender-character, passive, clumsy Paul Schoner. Wilmot/Auden, though not often present, dominates the book and Paul's life, as Auden obviously dominated Spender's. In one crucial scene, Paul climbs into bed with another man, not because he desires him—he finds him physically repulsive—but because Wilmot's theory of guiltless love dictates that he should. Poor Paul. Poor Spender.

Not only are the characters familiar, so are their works. Paul quotes lines from a poem he has written, which are in fact lines of Spender's "In 1929" (the ones I quoted above). Wilmot utters Audenesque phrases like "helmeted airman" and "heaven reachers." Bradshaw is writing a novel called *Northwest Passage*, as he is in *Lions and Shadows*, and quotes lines from Auden's poems. The result is a novel that is also an anthology of Auden Gang anecdotes and quotations, and a barely veiled literary memoir—rather like *Lions and Shadows*, but more emotional, and less controlled.

LIKE OTHER of the group's writings of the time, *The Temple* is a book about freedom. One can see the theme, in two of its aspects, in the two titles that Spender gave to the book. He first called it *Escaped*, and it's obvious what he meant: his Paul Schoner escapes from England's puritanism of word and act to Germany, where mind and body can be free. Later Spender changed the title to *The Temple*, a phrase that is glossed in a remark that Paul makes when he sees a photograph of a nude young man: "Oh, wonderful," he exclaims, "the temple of the body." The young Germans he has met—homosexuals and sun worshipers—seem to him to have a new attitude toward the body; they regard it as a source of joy, and Paul hopes he'll learn to feel that way too.

The opposite of freedom is restraint, and if you are a writer, restraint is censorship. That subject comes up explicitly in a passage in which Germans ask Paul why the English have banned *Ulysses* and *The Well of Loneliness*, but it is present implicitly throughout the novel, in the frankness of the sexual passages, and in the unjudgmental tone. To underline the point, Spender writes in his introduction:

> This is an autobiographical novel in which the author tries to report truthfully on his experiences in the summer of 1929. In writing it I had the sense of sending home to friends and colleagues dispatches from a front line in our joint war against censorship.

The war against censorship seems to have been Spender's primary motive for writing the novel when he began it in 1929. In that version, the novel ended with Paul's second visit to Hamburg in the autumn of 1929, making it, as he says, "pre-thirties and pre-political." But when he returned to the manuscript in 1986 he moved that last section forward in time to 1932, and so made the novel both "thirties" and "political." Storm troopers appear, Jewishness becomes an issue, and the whole dark future of Nazism is foreshadowed in the text.

One can see why Spender did that: to heighten the contrast, as he says, between the summer sunlight of 1929,

"A wise guidebook for small-d democrats who need to see through the cynical manipulation of modern politics."
—Bill Greider, author of *Secrets of the Temple*

"Refreshing... opinion polling was intended as a means of improving the machinery of democracy...*What Americans Really Think* lives up to these high goals."
—Detlef D. Matthies, *Los Angeles Times Book Review*

WHAT AMERICANS REALLY THINK

And Why Our Politicians Pay No Attention

by BARRY SUSSMAN

Now at your bookstore
PANTHEON

Corrective perspective



RUN-OF-THE-MILL maps place the U.S. above. Since "upper" is equated with "superior," this has bred misconceptions and mischief. The Turnabout Map of the Americas offers a corrective perspective.

"I'm having it framed" — Robert MacNeil
"Helps restore proportion" — A. Schlesinger,Jr.
"The Department of Education could send it out" — William R. Hearst, Jr.

Unique gift and conversation piece, in brilliant colors. English or Spanish, 17x23" — $6.00 at bookstores. Or by mail, tubed, $7.50 (add'l $6.00). — From Laguna Sales, Dept. H, 7040 Via Valverde, San Jose, CA 95135. *(In Calif. add 6% sales tax)*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when freedom seemed an artistic and sexual issue, and the winter darkness of the '30s, when freedom became political and mortal, and to draw to his novel the terrible drama of that change. Still, I think it was a mistake. The two dates, and the two issues, divide the book, and give it an odd bifocal vision that never quite focuses. "My own memory," Spender writes, "combined with the exigencies of narrative and the perspectives of hindsight, wrote or rewrote most of the book for me." It's a strange, hybrid form—a collaboration between the old man and his young self. But no old man can write, or think, or feel quite as he did in his youth, not even a man who has remained as faithfully himself as Spender has, and most readers will be conscious, I think, of hindsight, that wise but arid improver of the past, invading the young man's text.

The merits of *The Temple* are not to be found in its formal properties. Spender has never really been a fiction writer, though he wrote a novel and some stories in his earlier days. What is valuable here is the time that the book records—a critical time in history, and in literary history too—and the sensibility of the shy, gifted young man who lives through it. The book has the honesty that has always been Spender's literary virtue; it may be awkward and stumbling sometimes, but it is never false. The old voice and the young man's may make a dissonance, but one does not doubt either.

Because Spender was the friend of Auden and Isherwood, the book has another quality that is interesting: it is a direct and intimate account of the interdependence of the members of that influential circle, of what it meant to be a writer who was the friend of writers. Here is Spender's account of how Paul feels when he gets a letter from William Bradshaw:

> This letter gave Paul an elated sense of belonging to a family outside either his own or William's families. Their writing was the blood and spirit of their friendship. Each wrote in his separate circumstances, his separate life, yet each was a member of one body of literature, common to them all. He rejoiced in their successes, and whereas he felt discouraged if his own work received adverse criticism, when he read attacks on their work, or on all of them as a 'group,' he felt that the critics were imbeciles and these friends spirits of light fighting the forces of darkness.

What Spender says here is central to the book. The bond that Paul feels with his friends is not sexual but literary; they are a family of writers, not a band of homosexuals. Because their family exists, *outside* of conventional orders, they are free to express their freedom from conventions, and to oppose their common enemies—everything that is traditional, puritanical, and English. The passage defines what the Auden Gang was all about.

It's for that reason, primarily, that *The Temple* will be read. It is one more telling of the story of that extraordinary family of writers, and it will take its place with *Lions and Shadows* and *Berlin Stories* and all the other accounts of what it was like being young, gifted, and uncertain in a fascinating, troubled time. In strictly literary terms it is the least of those accounts; but it has the quality of ingenuous truth-telling, and that makes it a worthy and admirable book.

SAMUEL HYNES

Samuel Hynes is Woodrow Wilson Professor of Literature at Princeton University.

Glasnost revives Russian émigré literature.

A LITERARY THAW

BY PETER LUBIN

TOWARD THE END of *The Gift*, Vladimir Nabokov's novel of the Russian emigration, the novelist hero Fyodor Gudonov-Cherdyntsev is at last alone with his wife-to-be, the enchanting Zina Mertz. In a delirium of happiness they discuss how fate, after many false starts, has finally brought them together. Fyodor explains to Zina that he intends in his next work to "reach a final dictatorship over words ... because in my last book they are still trying to vote." "That's all marvelous," says Zina. "I like it all immensely. I think you'll be such a writer as has never been before, and Russia will simply pine for you—when she comes to her senses too late ..."

It has taken a long while, more than 70 years, but there are signs that Russia may be coming to her senses, and not just temporarily, and not merely for economic reasons. For Gorbachev's most important reforms have less to do with economic *perestroika* (which may not work) than with transforming the state of the soul. The literature of the Russian emigration, of Nabokov and Vladislav Khodasevich, Ivan Bunin and Mark Aldanov, Anatoly Shteiger and Boris Poplavski, Alexei Remizov and Wladimir Weidle, may at last be discovered by Soviet readers. Not all of these writers were explicitly anti-Soviet, though most could hardly help it. But whether they were or not, they were all condemned to nonexistence by the Soviet state for the mere fact that they lived, and managed to write, outside of the Soviet Union. If they are now resurrected, it will be one of the more thrilling events of modern times: the rediscovery, by a country with a great literature, of a long-inaccessible, virtually unknown part of that cultural tradition.

To the casual observer the moment that Zina foresaw may not seem to have arrived. Red army soldiers still goosestep in May Day parades. Soviet ships do not quietly pass in the night, but deliberately ram any Western vessel that troubles them, from Nova Zembla to the Euxine Sea. Soviet border guards still point their machine guns inward.

But if we watch closely, we will see that the current reform movement is quite different from the famous *ottopel'* or Khrushchevian thaw of the 1960s. While Khrushchev's reign was accompanied by some new freedoms in literature, his thaw was primarily a political one. He was interested in exploding the Stalin cult, and in breeding better pigs. He took little interest in the intelligentsia, except to denounce abstract art and

Peter Lubin is a writer living in Cambridge.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to quarrel with the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny at an exhibition at the Manezh in Moscow. Khrushchev showed his literary taste in his fondness for Demian Bednij, the execrable peasant poet of the Civil War, who as long as Nikita Sergeyevich was in the Kremlin could be heard on the radio, virtually every half hour, throughout the Land of Rus. Thus is the whim or preference of a Maximum Leader in a totalitarian state inflicted on hundreds of millions of hapless subjects.

Gorbachev, one suspects, has more elevated tastes. He surrounds himself, and is at ease, with people of intelligence. The Soviet representatives who accompanied him to Washington, the scientists who attended the recent meeting in Boston of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the dozens of officials we have been exposed to in recent months, have been impressive. They are a far cry from those glum, wide-trousered Soviet men who used to stand on the Kremlin podium (somewhere between Mikoyan and Bulganin) to accept the staged spontaneous welcome of the Soviet People.

YEARS AGO, a Soviet citizen who prided himself on his knowledge of the Forbidden Literature would show his knowingness with a couplet: "*My govorili o Mandelshtame / Tsvetaevu on tozhe znal.*" ("We spoke of Mandelstam / He also knew Tsvetaeva.") That the speaker could even mention Mandelstam and Tsvetaeva, that he knew their names and could "discuss" them with someone else, was an achievement. Today the couplet has lost its punch, for both writers have been published in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet government has also reprinted the collected works of Bunin, a "half-émigré" (because much of his work was published before he left Russia). But if his poetry and novels can be published, his *Memoirs*, with their bitter description of the Revolution, cannot, except in bowdlerized form. In the Soviet Union, after all, "collected works" always means "selected works."

Others may have to wait a bit longer. It is unlikely that the émigré poet Vladislav Khodasevich, called by both Nabokov and the *Encyclopedia Judaica* "the greatest Russian poet of the 20th century," will have his poetry published any time soon. It is not that he bothers to denounce Lenin or the Bolsheviks. It is just that his verse is suffused with a spirit determinedly individual and aloof, contemptuous not just of the state but of any coterie. Whether he is comparing a cork in a bottle to the soul, or sitting alone in a room "looking up at a sky made of stucco / At a sixty-watt sun in that sky," Khodasevich cannot possibly fit in to any collective scheme of things. In a country where words matter so much ("*I slovo sil'nee vsego*"—"the Word is more powerful than anything"), his breathtakingly seductive voice would be too dangerous for Soviet authorities to handle.

AND THEN there is Nabokov himself, whose creation, Zina, foresaw all this. Will they "pine" for him, that champion of absolute liberty, whose every word celebrates individual freedom and fancy, after they have "come to their senses"? Soviet authorities have thrown a sop to those clamoring for Nabokov. They have published one of his chess problems in a Soviet chess magazine. And that issue disappeared so fast that even Harvard's Slavic librarian had to move heaven and earth to find a copy. Next to be published, after the chess vein is exhausted, might be the equally innocuous—from the political standpoint—butterfly articles, including, perhaps, the monograph on the blues of the Genus Lycaeides Hubner (#105 in the series published by Harvard's Museum of Comparative Zoology, unfortunately out of print).

But if in a year or a decade—for a country, like a man, comes to its senses slowly—the Soviet government does begin to publish Nabokov's fiction, they will start with the love triangles and murders, *King Queen Knave* and *Laughter in the Dark*, which have no obvious politics. Those books that directly confront the Russian revolutionary past, *The Gift*, with its icon-smashing chapter on Nikolai Chernyshevsky (regarded by some as a 19th-century ancestor of the Bolsheviks), or *Invitation to a Beheading*, where the hero is tormented by totalitarian clowns, or even Nabokov's Russian memoirs, *Other Shores*, will not, one suspects, be published for many years to come.

Evgenij Baratynsky, the 19th-century Russian poet, once wrote that he would "find a Reader in Posterity." At long last, for many of the writers of the Russian emigration—if not quite for all—that "Reader in Posterity" may soon be found. □


Call for any book
• Immediate shipment worldwide.
• Credit cards or check. • Ask about our overnight gift delivery nationwide. • Free monthly New Title Forecast. • Mail orders welcome.
• Open 24 hours every day.
BOOK CALL
1-800-255-2665
In CT or Worldwide (203) 966-5470
59 Elm Street, New Canaan, CT 06840

HOW TO EXECUTE AN AGENCY

by E. Waterhouse Allen

Wicked, informed satire about Bureaucratic Types you should recognize! Distilled from 50 years work in human service agencies. 1st edit., $3.95.

BARK-BACK
P.O. Box 235, Glenshaw, PA 15116.

100% cotton/ Your logo!

The biggest difference between a Queensboro Shirt and a Lacoste or Ralph Lauren polo shirt is a Queensboro Shirt comes with your logo or design! Impeccable quality, minimum order just 6 shirts. All shirts guaranteed unconditionally for at least an entire year. For a price list, brochure and **FREE CLOTH SAMPLES** call **1-800-84-SHIRT** (in NY 718-782-0200).

The Queensboro Shirt Company
Dept NR-8 119 N 11th St Greenpoint, NY 11211

"THERE ARE CIRCUMSTANTIAL reasons why today's premature polls should break against Bush. Bush wrapped up his nomination early in March, after which he had nothing much to do. Michael Dukakis had a nice long workout on the punching bag of Jesse Jackson, lasting all the way until June 7. Under these circumstances, Bush would be in a trough if he were Alexander the Great."

To subscribe to *National Review* call 1-800-341-1522, or write NR, 150 East 35th Street, New York, NY 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE, *from page 6*

negotiate international regulations for climate control.) The alternative may well be a scorched Venus-scape.

HUGO S. CUNNINGHAM
Omaha, Nebraska

GLASNOST'S PROSPECTS

To the editors:
Being 72—and counting—I don't know whether I'll be around to collect, but I'm willing to bet my Social Security check against David Satter's advance for his book that he will have to eat his Cassandra-ish words ("Why Glasnost Can't Work," June 13). Why? Because his prognosis presupposes the following:

1) That Gorbachev knows less about the Soviet system—and the Russian people—than he does. In plain words, that he is dumb.

2) That he is more devious and more vicious than Stalin was. A tall order.

3) That he is a Utopian dreamer. If this were true, we would have never heard about him.

Gorbachev's biggest problem was best expressed by a local cartoonist years ago in another context: EVERYBODY WANTS PROGRESS BUT NOBODY WANTS CHANGE.

ERWIN FUCHS
Seattle, Washington

BLOODY MESS

To the editors:
TNR needs a Shakespearean quote checker. A while ago a "Washington Diarist" columnist implied that Juliet's "Wherefore art thou Romeo" meant she was asking *where* he was, instead of *why* he was called Romeo. I let that go. But now comes Erich Segal attributing to Lady Macbeth the line "the multitudinous seas incarnadine" ("Heroes and Echoes," July 4). She doesn't talk like that at all; that is her husband's line. And when Lear says, "Upon such sacrifices, my Cordelia / The gods themselves throw incense," he is not, as Segal says, "holding the body of his beloved daughter"; she isn't dead yet.

ALBERT MISSELDINE
Adrian, Michigan

Erich Segal replies:
As Macduff says (Act V, Scene viii, line 6), "I have no words . . ."

EASY WARS

To the editors:
Ronald Steel's article is a pretty good one ("Do Democrats Start Wars?" June 27). But when I was in the Army, we learned that many conservatives believed in "easy war"; they liked wars like Libya and Grenada, but not like Lebanon, World War II, and Korea. In other words, they believed in the illusion of American omnipotence—that is how they resolved Steel's paradox.

JOHN P. MALLAN
Washington, D.C.

THOSE RUSSIANS

To the editors:
In his Moscow Diarist, Fred Barnes writes, "After seeing the Soviets up close in all their glorious inefficiency and backwardness (fresh fruits and vegetables are as scarce as computers), it's harder to take them as seriously as a threat to our national security" ("Big Deal," June 27). Barnes should do some serious rethinking. Just recently, the Russians brought up two astronauts to the spacecraft already floating in the vast regions of space and arrived off schedule by only two minutes. Since the Russians were the first in space with the Sputnik in 1957 and produced the first manned space flight in 1961, they have surpassed us in space. Inefficiency? No way.

MAX C. GOODMAN
Levittown, Pennsylvania

The editors welcome correspondence from readers. Letters should include the writer's full name, address, and telephone number; be typed double-spaced; and be held to under 200 words. Letters may be edited for space. Please address letters to: Correspondence, TNR, 1220 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

CLASSIC T-SHIRTS!
Beethoven, Hemingway, Da Vinci, Jung, J.F.K., Mozart, Shakespeare, Cheshire Cat, Twain, Darwin, Van Gogh, Gandhi, Nietzsche, Poe, Freud, Austen, Sherlock Holmes, others.
T-Shirt: (white or lt. blue) $11.75, 4/$42.
Sweatshirt: (white or grey) $20, 2/$38.
Sizes: S, M, L, XL. **Ship:** $1.75 per order.
Illustrated brochure: 75¢ (free with order)
Historical Products, Box 220 C T **Cambridge, MA 02238**

INTENSITIES & ANALOGIES
by A.R. Thurar
The psychological reasons for everyday behaviors: Art, Drama, Love, Music, Religion, Sex, Sports & many others.
ECR Press, P.O. Box 1208, Stn. B, Ottawa, Ont., Canada K1P 5R3. $8 + $2 s/h (chq. or m.o.)

TRB, *from page 4*

religious and many are not especially ethnic. Their motive is the same mundane but profound one as the Armenians'. Only in this case there is no close examination of their motive. And whatever their motive for leaving the Soviet Union, "a well-founded fear of persecution" cannot be their motive for not wishing to live in Israel. The Armenians we don't let in, as opposed to the Jews we do, have no place else to go.

Then there are the Vietnamese boat people, another tide that is rising again this year. The British government of Hong Kong recently announced that it will isolate future boat people in a former leper colony on a small rock island, will deny them access to any relief agencies, and will send them back to Vietnam unless they can prove that they are motivated by fear of political persecution rather than by mere economic desperation. The message, said the Hong Kong secretary for security, is "Do not come here." Malaysia has adopted similar measures. Thailand has gone further, pushing boat people back out to sea and letting them drown. (Now it claims to fix the boats first.)

Asian countries have taken these desperate steps because Western countries, including the United States, have refused to help absorb all the Vietnamese willing to risk their lives to leave. Secretary of State George Shultz, on his recent visit to Asia, said the only alternative may be to send people back to Vietnam. It's "hard" not to take people in, he said, but "you have to jack yourself up and say you're just not going to do it."

The distinction between political and economic motives is false on several levels. The United States assumes political motives in some cases (Soviet Jews) but not in others. Most refugees' motives are, in fact, mixed. And why not? Economic and political elements are equal parts of the American dream. In any event, economic motives are not necessarily less respectable than political ones. Would you rather be a Vietnamese peasant or a Jewish professional in the Soviet Union? A Vietnamese peasant or a Jewish professional in Israel?

We can't let in everybody, they say, and maybe that's true, though I think we could let in a lot more than we do. But with all the people in the world whom nobody wants, why are we fighting over the few whom somebody else wants desperately? □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sturdy, Stackable Natural Beechwood Bookshelves

At a price you would expect to pay for plastic!

For Fast Service
1-800-228-3535

Credit Card Customers Call Toll Free
24 Hours-7 Days a Week, In Nebraska 1-800-642-9606

Stack them. . .they're interlocking

Each free-standing unit is 27¾"w x11½"d x 37"h and is designed to interlock and stack. This means you can actually create your own wall unit! And if you move, just fold them down and take them with you.

Perfect for books, display or storage

This quality shelving system is made of natural European beechwood. A hard wood tough enough to be used for flooring and beautiful enough to be used for fine furniture. Do not confuse this item with "wood tone" or plastic imitations. Our low price is made possible by volume purchases, not by inferior material.

Sets up in seconds... without tools!

No tools, screws or glue required. Just take it out of its flat carton, fold the sides out, and the shelves practically fall into place. And, natural beechwood is attractive. . . even unfinished. So the unit can be used immediately. Of course, you can also stain, varnish, or paint them if you prefer.



1. Open hinged sides.
2. Lower shelves into place.
3. You're done! Ready to interlock and stack!

NEW LOW PRICE

List Price $59.95

NOW ONLY $39.95

AVAILABLE BY MAIL ONLY

Barnes & Noble
Booksellers Since 1873
Dept. H284, 126 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10011

1066018. Please send me____sturdy beechwood shelf unit(s) at your special sale price of $39.95 (plus $6.95 shipping and insurance, per unit). N.Y. and N.J. Residents: Please add sales tax.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Charge It ☐ **VISA** ☐ **AMEX** ☐ **MC**

Account # _____ Exp. _____

Signature _____

30 Day Money-Back Guarantee

Our low price for this European import is only $39.95 per unit (plus $6.95 shipping and insurance per unit). . . probably less than you would have to pay for a comparable unit in plastic. And as with all items you purchase by mail from Barnes & Noble, you may return it within 30 days for a full refund or credit to your charge card.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WASHINGTON DIARIST

Boomer Rock

NEVER MIND miracle wrinkle creams. Never mind nostalgia news shows or magazines for the "mature" 40-year-old woman. Never mind baldness remedies or the exploding Ben-Gay market for Peter Pan jocks whose muscles are crying out in the Nautilus wilderness. These were mere harbingers of the baby boomers' onrushing winter of discontent. There's a piece of news in the air that has about it the chill of an early snowfall. When you get older, losing your hair, many years from now, you boomers can pack up your seven-inch vinyl 45s and head for the west coast of Florida. At least you can if you've had a hit. Florida is the announced site for—you better sit down, kids—a retirement home for aged rock stars.

THE MAN PUSHING the project is Joey Dee. Remember Joey Dee? He and the Starliters hit No. 1 on the charts with "Peppermint Twist" only 27 years ago. It is evidence of the evanescence of rock that Dee is remembered as a one-hit wonder; in fact he was on the charts nine separate times over two years, featured the Ronettes in his act, absorbed the Rascals into his group, and hired Jimi Hendrix before he was Jimi Hendrix. Anyway, if you can name three other Joey Dee hits without looking them up, you probably deserve to turn the first shovel of earth at the Florida groundbreaking.

THAT EVENT, when it comes, is likely to be played as a giggle piece on the middle-class news, the last gig, finally, on the increasingly depressing oldies circuit. But the edifice of this old-age home will also be a tomb for the fading boomer beat. Boomers are often accused of monstrous generational hubris, and it's true they're often a smug and self-indulgent lot. But they've also got a certain amount to be smug about. Boomer Rock—the generation's common ground—is still on the charts, from The Contours to pseudo-boomer Terence Trent D'Arby, still the music of consumer seduction, and still the anthem of the postwar West. Maybe you missed such artifacts as *Time Stands Still*, the Hungarian film that pictured 1950s Budapest dissent to the beat of Paul Anka. But you can always tune in to Radio Moscow and gauge the tempo of East-West relations by how much rock it programs. Rock has even outlasted the cold war. Did somebody say "It Will Stand"? They sure did. It was The Showmen, and in fact that hit was in the very same Top-40 with "Peppermint Twist."

ANYBODY WANT to bet that when the Republicans get down at their convention in August, the groove they choose, in public at least, will lie somewhere between John Philip Sousa and Lionel Hampton? Too bad for George Bush. Plenty of Republicans are closet rockers. Despite their public cultural conservatism—and Professor Bloom notwithstanding—they can shake a tail feather along with the least inhibited Citizen's Party voters. Everybody knows that Education Secretary William Bennett once had a blind date with Janis Joplin, and that Bennett knows his oldies. But Bennett's far from unique in this sense, even among prominent and influential conservatives. Sneer as some Republicans might at Prince's sexy lyrics, they whoop with delight when the Dominoes' 1951 innuendo-packed classic, "Sixty Minute Man," hits the turntable. One distinguished conservative I know used to bring the house down with a no-holds-barred lip sync of "Shout," Parts One *and* Two, but he feels that if such youthful indiscretion becomes public, he'll be ruined.

WHAT AN IDEA. Conservatives have just plain missed the rock boat. There is in fact a fair amount of rock territory which is already theirs, but which they've ceded for wrong-headed tactical reasons. Right Rock extends from Dale Hawkins's "A House, a Car and a Wedding Ring," a 1950s celebration of traditional family values, to The Raiders' "Kicks," a 1960s anti-drug number, to the recent and considerably more subtle "Freedom Overspill" by Steve Winwood, which is (arguably) about the personal confusion that arises when traditional social roles are mixed up. Indeed, there's enough of this stuff to release a double-album right away. Tipper Gore could do the late-night pitch for it on TV.

IS THERE NO ONE else who recognizes the danger that compact discs pose to familiar oldies? No one else who hates CDs? CD versions of old hits purportedly make them much clearer. Big deal. Who wants clarity in oldies anyway? Clarity takes away the reverb, the fuzz, *it changes the record*. CDs, as a matter of fact, pose the greatest threat to the oldies culture since stereo remixes were invented. Real rock and aural clarity are natural enemies, as rock's greatest practitioners have long realized. Phil Spector used to wear a button that read, "One Mike on Everything," a plea to kill stereo, while Motown's sainted producers would run every recording they made through a tinny little speaker before they released it, to make sure it had the right immediacy.

WHAT'S HAPPENING to rock on CD's, though, is ontologically the same as what's happening to black-and-white movies as they move through the colorizers' computers, and even to the Sistine Chapel, as Michelangelo becomes Peter Max. It is a reordering of the past to accommodate the changing sensory environment. An enhanced past is not in itself a new idea. Look, for example, at Sir Arthur Evans's nouveau "restoration" of Knossos. Indeed, we're busy "enhancing" our own architectural heritage daily with interpretive restorations and facadectomies of our older buildings. Such reordering has been a matter of mere fashion; we've always redone the past to accommodate our tastes. But now we're redoing it to accommodate our senses as well, a form of interference that's much more radical. The past doesn't just have to look right any more. It has to *feel* right. In the way that Scitex machines create digital "photographs" of things and scenes that don't exist, we're creating a sensory past that didn't exist either. This is most easily seen in colorized movies and CD songs, but our enhanced pop environment goes further than that. The Sistine Chapel is every bit as pop as "Peppermint Twist". Do those oldies but goodies remind me of you? Less and less of you as you were, I'm afraid.

CHARLES PAUL FREUND

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

De Beers

SOME THINGS IN LIFE ARE SO SUPERB ONE IS COMPELLED TO BRING THEM TOGETHER.

Some men have the ability not only to embrace beauty, but to revel in it. They joyfully acknowledge that there is a particular pleasure in giving something rare and lovely. The rarest and loveliest object of all being a fine quality diamond of a carat or more.

Your jeweler is the expert. He can show you many pieces of quality diamond jewelry such as this classic 3 stone ring with a magnificent brilliant-shaped centerstone of 3.59 carats. Or another that will reflect your own taste and style. And tells the world that you delight in that which is truly and eternally beautiful.

For more information and a complimentary booklet, "Diamonds of a Carat or More," write to: Diamond Information Center, 1345 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10105.

A diamond is forever.



DIAMONDS AS EXCEPTIONAL AS THE WOMAN WHO WEARS THEM.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Property of
AMBASSADOR COLLEGE LIBRARY
Big Sandy, Texas

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED